1948

FO 1110/55

N 502

PR 265

pp TO 1304 (END)

PR

(INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPT.)

PR 1061

1948

Registry Number: PR1061/265/913

FROM K. Banin-Kemplicz, Polish Embassy.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry: 17th Nov 1948

Free distribution of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs book called "Information on Poland": requests address to which book & subsequent supplements may be sent.

26/11

Last Paper

PR 1037

References

520

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 16/2/49

(Index) Pass. 12 9/49

Next Paper

PR 1115

(Minutes.)

This might be Puna. Could E.E.I.D. get it for us?

J. P. Cloake 19/11

Intelligence Section first. (Mr Parrott)

Yes. I need we have a copy replied c.e. Parrott 25/11

A. W. Galsworthy 19/11

E.E.I.D. Yes. I am asking for this on PE pps.

F. Vere Hodsman 8/XII

Mr Parrott c.p. again 10/XII

b.u. 1/2/49

11/12

Mr. Cloake

Mr Parrott. Are you getting this now?

Yes, the bound volume has arrived, & the supplements will doubtless follow in due course.

J. P. Cloake 2/2

E. M. Wright 3/2.

E.M.K. 8/11

4/2

34925

Enter

TELEPHONE: LANGHAM 4324 (6 LINES)

POLISH EMBASSY.

47, PORTLAND PLACE,

LONDON, W.1 November 19 48

1061

Dear Sir,

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has just issued a book called "Information on Poland", a kind of Polish encyclopaedia, which will be kept up to date by periodical supplements to be inserted in the publication.

I should be pleased to include the name of your organisation on the list of subscribers and I would like to add that we propose to distribute this publication and the following supplements free of charge.

As it is important that the supplement should always reach the department where the book is kept, otherwise the encyclopaedia would soon be out of date, I should be obliged if you could indicate the exact address or number of the department to which this publication should be forwarded.

Yours faithfully,

K. Dunin-Kemplicz
(Press Attache)

PR 1116 /G

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group . . . FO . . . . . .

Class . . . 1110 . . . . . .

Piece . . . 55 . . . . . .

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

Jacket PR1115/265/913G

B Higgins

16/12/94

now completed
Patriot" and
by the same

cubating in my tray over
Mr Sheridan now consid

J.P. Clarke
8/2

any action
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the question
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Sheridan
10/2

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(Action completed) 17/2.

(Index)

Next Paper

35393

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
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20 SEP 1995

PR 1116 /G

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class FO 1110
Piece 55

PR 1116 G/265/913 G
Blocking Sheridan (Extract)

PRO DOCUMENT
PUT IN PLACE
JK 09 OCT 1995

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(Signed)

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17/2.	

Next Paper

35393

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20 SEP 1995

2 ~ 1948

INFORMATION RESEARCH

PR 1116 /G

PR 1116 / 265 / 913

Observations on the now completed "Testament of a Russian Patriot" and the projected second book by the same author.

Mr Murray
18 - 11 - 48.
23 - 11 - 48.

Last Paper
PR 1115

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 17/2.

(Index)

Next Paper

(Minutes.)

I am afraid that this has been incubating in my tray ever since it reached the Department. Could Mr Sheridan now consider it?

J.P. Clarke 8/2

Mr Sheridan.

I do not think there is any action to be taken on this now: I have discussed with Mr Murray the question of the author's book: the difficulty is to find a ghost-translator.

L Sheridan 10/2

Mr Beaumont 10/2
Refer Secretariat. 2nd 11/2.

17/2

35393

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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of the Public Records Act, 1958

PR 1116/265/913E
Letter 18/11/48

B Higgins
16/12/94

N THE NOW COMPLETED
" AND THE PROJECTED

, H.D.

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proved insufficient to convince
book. It was therefore agreed
on some random principle, ~~xxxxxx~~
th a synopsis

). reported adversely on its
would have to be very largely
value. He emphasised
cut, and re-written. He offered Messrs Heath typical
passages, translated "literally" and re-written as H.D.
would propose.

7. Unfortunately, Messrs Heath still had no idea of what the book was like, apart from H.D.'s views, so at variance with those of the book's sponsors. H.D.'s suggestion was rejected as too drastic.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NOW COMPLETED "TESTAMENT OF A RUSSIAN PATRIOT" AND THE PROJECTED SECOND BOOK BY THE SAME AUTHOR

by the "translator", H.D.

1. Now that the work of making a book from some 400,000 words of Russian "Jottings", together with a considerable quantity of manuscript material not included in the jottings, is completed, it may be useful to add some notes on the book.

2. First, there have been aspects of the way the matter has so far been handled, from which may be drawn conclusions likely to improve the handling of any subsequent work.

Secondly, these notes may facilitate more efficatious utilisation of the book, as an instrument of political education, when it does eventually appear.

3. The original decision seems to have been that the first 412 ms. pages of "Jottings", equivalent to about 300,000 words in English, consitituted a) a book, and b) a book of propaganda value.

This view, completely erroneous in both senses, was passed on to Messrs A.M.Heath, who, not themselves reading Russian, were naturally prone to accept the opinion as authoritative (especially having regard to its source).

4. Messrs Heath then handed the book to H.D., asking him to translate roughly some 40,000 words of passages selected for their subject interest.

5. Those passages, selected before either H.D. or Messrs Heath could have read the book, proved insufficient to convince any editor of the value of the book. It was therefore agreed that a series of extracts, made on some random principle, should be prepared, together with a synopsis.

6. Having read the book, H.D. reported adversely on its value. He emphasised that it would have to be very largely cut, and re-written. He offered Messrs Heath typical passages, translated "literally" and re-written as H.D. would propose.

7. Unfortunately, Messrs Heath still had no idea of what the book was like, apart from H.D.'s views, so at variance with those of the book's sponsors. H.D.'s suggestion was rejected as too drastic.

8. H.D.now made eight selections of ten pages each of ms, dispersed with mathematical evenness throughout the book, but beginning with a point such as inevitably included a later passage on jet aircraft. These selections were translated, more or less literally, with a minimum of editing.

9. This involved translating a further circa 50,000 words, though H.D. insisted that the result would still be far from fragments of an eventual book. Indeed, it was only when much time and labour had been wasted, that Messrs Heath finally - having by then seen enough of the book to adjudge H.D.'s earlier opinion sound - accepted H.D.'s suggestion of complete re-writing.

10. This still left aside the question of what should be added to the materials supplied, to make a book which would a)contain the gist of the author's original story, partly given in the "Jottings" ; b) having the logical shape of the sort of book a man of the author's standing might write, and c) satisfactorily revealing the author's personality and views, and reasons for his defection. None of this was clear either from the original "Jottings", or from additional manuscript material eventually supplied, but had largely to be left to the imagination of one familiar with the author's political and emotional background. There was the further problem of style. That will be dealt with in the concluding note.

11. Thus, through a fantastically unreal misreading of the first 412 pp. of "Jottings", much labour was lost, and much time, though H.D. made every effort to minimise those losses by delivering the translation of the extracts in a rough state- being convinced that even if polished, they could not be used in that form.

The important thing in the early stage was to reveal how much more material was needed than originally provided.

12. Had it been realised at the outset that the possibility of producing a book, which might be of great value, was present provided that a "ghost" writer were available who a) knew Russian, b) knew the subject, and c) could collaborate with the author, much time might have been saved, not to speak of loss of nerves and labour. The book was left to a mere "translator" though it should have been obvious that no translator could cope with it and make a book.

13. In this connection it must be emphasised that the circumstances that H.D., as well as knowing Russian, also knew the subject and was largely able to see eye to eye with the author on many things were purely fortuitous. Messrs Heath brought in H.D. solely as a Russian-language expert !

It was, for author and all concerned, a fortunate accident that one person provided the three desiderata for the "ghost" writer required.

Clearly enough, it will often be impossible to find such a combination in one person. The point, however, is put on record since it does emphasise the impossibility of leaving such work merely to a translator.

14. While all this clarification of the nature of the "translator's" task was going on, the author was allowed to hold a press conference which, without due guidance, was foredoomed to be farcical and harmful.

Admittedly, the need for a conference was precipitated by the author's ill-considered letter to certain newspapers. But that was no reason to saddle Messrs Heath with a completely unprepared press conference.

The following points may already have been noted, yet for the sake of thoroughness, it is worth while adding another analysis :

a) no time for preparation of the Press Conference was allowed ; it was originally arranged on a Thursday for the Saturday of the same week - leaving two days for preparation, instead of at least two weeks. In any case, Saturday was the worst possible day for such a Conference. Moreover, Mr Cyrus Brooks, of Messrs Heath, who would normally act for them in the matter, was away on holiday. It is fantastic to think that anybody should have suggested leaving arrangements for a Press Conference to junior staff of a Literary Agency, which by its nature knows nothing whatsoever of press conferences.

When H.D. protested telegraphically, and requested postponement, the Conference was postpooned - to the following Monday ! How could the matter be handled in so frivolous a way ?

b) No thought was given to the circumstance that Messrs Heath had no idea whatsoever what a Press Conference involves, i.e., what one expects to gain by a conference, how to gain one's aim, how to prepare for that result.

c) No reasonable care was taken to exclude the Communist Press, which was thus able to cover the floor with its admirably disposed network of agents, ready to monopolise the Conference. Did anybody imagine that the Communist press might be edified by the Conference ?

d) a Statement, as from the Author, was made ready to Messrs Heath only about half-an-hour before the Conference. A

key passage at the end of the statement was omitted and had to be read out, at once producing an amateurish impression. But, most criminal, there had been no time for anybody to check the English text, while that text teemed with egregious howlers - such as making the author assert that he was a "member of the Politbureau" - giving the communist representatives an open field for developing the thesis that the author was an impostor and did not really know the Soviet Union.

a) Moreover, that prime carelessness proved most embrassing to both Mr Brooks and H.D., who certainly could not be expected to leave the impression - which might easily have been assumed - that he was responsible for the translation.

But above all, it made the author look foolish and unserious.

e.) No attempt had been made to ensure a fair number of leading questions from representatives of the friendly press. Indeed, about the only leading favourable question, one about the Stalin genocide in the Caucasus, was prompted to the United Press representative by H.D. in the few minutes available before the Conference began.

The absence of such leading questions might not so seriously have embarrassed a man more practised in answering press questions. It was fatal in the case of the author

f.) It must have been obvious to those who had already had a fair amount of contact with the author that he would not be particul arly good at answering press questions. But it was naturally assumed by both Messrs Heath (Mr Brooks) and H.D., neither of whom could at that stage know the author's peculiar qualities, that there was nothing to worry about on that score, and that if the author was not otherwise likel to make a satisfactory impression, he would have been prepared as to how to answer.

The net result of the Conference was that a very damp squib was fired, making it much more difficult at a later stage to raise interest in the author or his work !

15. Their handling of the matter so far leads H.D. to the conclusion that the real possibilities of the author's work were never clearly or adequately envisaged. It is therefore useful, for their bearing on future publicity, to summarise its present qualities.

It is in a totally different category from the ridiculous Gouzenko book, or from that of K ravchenko. It is not and never should be represented to be :

a) the work of a Russian who has abandoned his country for an easy life (Kravchenko) ;

b) the work of a small creature caught in a cruel machine (Gouzenko) ;

c) a work of "sensational personal revelations" (although such are included in the book).

On the contrary, it is - and this should in publicity be emphasised, made the basis of any statement - the work of a highly successful Soviet scientific expert who makes as impersonal as possible a survey of a system of centralised rule against which he has fought politically in the past, as inhuman and inefficient, and against which he intends to fight politically in the future. It is the work of a Russian patriot, who is an émigré only because he is a patriot.

16. The book contains the following main themes :

a) the author's rise as an enthusiastic young communist, (a very important point, this,) and how he began to be disillusioned in bolshevist communism ;

b) a description of the organisation and functioning of the all-over-riding political bureaucracy on which the system depends, from Politbureau down to the lowest levels ;

c) a description of theinhuman aspects of farm collectivisation, and the living conditions of all ordinary Soviet people ;

d) a description of how the system frustrated even those scientific developments which the Politbureau desires ;

e) a description of how the German attack nearly brought an ill-prepared Soviet Union to disaster ;

f) an analysis of the Politbureau's aims, showing the inevitability of its adoption of an attitude of permanent aggression towards the rest of the world ;

g) a statement of how and why the author was sent to work in Germany on jet aircraft, and how and why he finally decided that his right course was to seek political asile in some other country, whence to continue to play his part in the anti-Stalinist struggle ;

h) examination of the difficulties of starting underground opposition in the USSR, and how men are coming to grasp the necessity of avoiding precisely that form of underground discipline and centralisation which thebauthor

indicates to be the original root error of Leninism.

17. Perhaps the most important parts of the book are those given above under (d), (f) and (h). These passages provide effective reading material for the most dangerous supporters of pro-bolshevist thought, at least in this country.

That is to say : a) the scientific intellectuals, convinced that at least Stalinism affords scientists better conditions for work than capitalism does ;

b) the liberal-minded, liberal-labourish well-wishers, who firmly believe that with just a little more kindly reasonability on our side, we shall be able to get back to the compromise collaboration between the two opposing worlds of the Litvinov era of inter-war Soviet foreign policy;

c) the author provides a logical explanation, not invoking "Christianity" or any such ideas, of how the Soviet system went wrong, and thereby also provides the young reader who is not likely to be impressed by religious arguments with something on which to build a forward-looking political faith which is anti-bolshevist. There is today a fantastic tendency to present people with the alternatives "communism or christianity" - which cannot fail, with the younger generation, to work to the advantage of communism. It is most salutary to have a voice from the USSR showing that there <u>is</u>, politically and philosophically, a third way.

It is this quality of the book which makes it advisable to lend it every support, not as a work of mere sensation, likely to titillate the prurience of the mass reader about Soviet horrors, while leaving him in as sloppy a state of mind about it all as before, but as a work of sound political instruction, which it should prove difficult for the more subtle and more dangerous friends of communism to answer.

18 This leads to consideration of the author's proposals for a second book. Once again, whereas he has a very clear view of what his own country needs, he is very hazy about what to say outside Russia. The material offered is once again a mass of "Jottings", from which, as before, about 30% of incident can be extracted and largely re-written, (rejecting the remainder,) while much else which is not given at all needs to be added, to make a book.

19. But what book ? Clearly, the subject is : Soviet aims in Germany, as first stage of world conquest. Here, the average reader is ignorant of the historical premisses which are clear to the average Slav. These are :

a) the medieval Germanic drive against the Slavs, the the early genocide of the Western Slavs ;

b) the continuation of that conflict in changing form from the Suabian League to 1938 (Czechoslovakia), leading to the new Slav imperialist view that :

c) much German territory is really "Slav" ;

d) the geo-political theory of the great heartland, the exploitation of that theory by the Nazis, to explain the influence the theory now has on Stalinist thought, which throws further light on :

e) the history of Germane-Soviet cooperation, 1918-41;

f) the history of the German "Zersplitterung" and the Nazi role of Unificators, which Stalin now aims to take over.;

20. It would be a great help, in preparing the second book, if assistance could be given in the form of basic data on all of these subjects. H.D. could of course obtain what he would require from his own sources, but, being less of a specialist on the German question, he has less material ready to hand, the he would welcome cooperation on those subjects which would save much research time.

That being agreed, it should be possible to embark on Book No II.

21. To conclude, an important aspect of the work deserves mention - that of style. Had the book been simple narrative, merely to be translated, the question of English style would scarcely have arisen.

But the book contains a large measure of political exposition and argument. Much of this, moreover, has been written only in English, i.e., no Russian text exists. (Indeed, it might be said that no Russian text of any part of the book now exists, since even those sections which do reproduce part of the original "Jottings", are so completely re-written, as to resemble the original closely only at very rare points.)

For the method followed in drafting was for H.D. to draft freely in English whatever he felt was required to complete the book, (including much completely new material), and then after to read this to the author in a rough Russian translation, to be followed by incorporation of any improvements the author desired.

Now, this process inevitably involved the danger of the

of the book's seeming in places too well written, too English, opening the possibility for an opponent to suggest that it is after all only another piece of "manufactured" propaganda.

There was another crucial question of style which had to be taken into account. Though the author's powers of exposition are patently very poor, so that not a single chapter of the book as written by him could be used as it s tood, it would be very dangerous, quite apart from moral considerations, to make the final text too different from what he <u>might</u> write, werehe more skilled. That would preclude the possibility of the author following his first book by any other, without the same assistance.

Nor can the moral aspect of this be left out of account. It would be morally wrong to saddle the author with a work which he manifestly could not have written. It was only possible to try to produce the book which the author might well write, at the end of some period of training in the mere technics of writing a book, enabling him to produce the book which <u>he</u> wished to write.

Further, with the author counting on the possibility of some knowledge of the book filtering into the Soviet Union, the book had to have a shape and tempo which would lend it weight as political argument in the important Russian fiel d.
To this end, every passage embodying anything more than a paraphrasing of his original text, was read to the author in Russian, and approved by him before being considered final.

Thus, though largely <u>not</u> translated, in the ordinary sense of the word, the work does remain stylistically a translation. It is idle to look for the slickness of sensationalism of a Kravchenko or a Gouzenko, because the author is neither, and does not intend to be.

It was because of these considerations, that, to minimize any danger of the fact that much of the book was drafted in English, i.e., to cover any characteristics of his own style which might involuntarily show, that H.D. has taken the following steps :

a) here and there a sentence has been deliberately left with a slightly Russian flavour to it ;

b) new quotations from Lenin have not been given in the standard English version, but newly translated from Russian ;

c) even in the case of a quotation from Churchill, H.D. has not used the original text, but translated back from the

Russian text (Pravda version).

In other words, whereas normally H.D. aims at completely Englishing his text, when translating from Russian, and considers that the only true method of translation, here, in the interests of the book itself, and the author, he has been at pains not merely to shape the book as the author wished, but also to balance the extensive really un-translated parts by sufficient evidence that the book is indeed "translated from Russian".

15 November 1948

HD.

PR 1176

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Class ... 1110

Piece ... 55

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Jacket PR 1117/265/913G

B Higgins

16/12/94

...'s article "The liquidation ... in the U.S.S.R".

...80/6/48G of 27th Feb (PR35/10/913)

...utes.)

...h contains much ammunition ...lites but for France and Italy. ...and the agrarian section in ...tion officers to get more of ...substance of Clozerman's ...this way.

... Sir M. Peterson's point in ..."kulak", the evidence of ...pid expropriation, ~~and~~ the use of "voluntary" collectivization as a means to "launch the drive against the kulaks", and the attack on Tito for not going far enough.

J.I. Cloake 7/12

Mr. Parrott
Mr. Maclaren } have seen 30/12

N. Dept RMAH 29

S. Dept REE 31.12.12.

W.E.I.D. SW 4/1

~~E.E.I.D.~~ B4/1

F.O.R.D. V.C 10.1.49

Most important.

If N. Dept agree we might print this Soviet Union H. We have used it for a major piece in the Digest, and for our basic paper on Agriculture.

I have sent a

35393

(Action completed)	(Index)
RSS 4/12/48	Ree 12/9/49

Next Paper PR1183

32

1948

PR

PR 1176

Registry Number PR 1176/265/913
FROM Sir M. Peterson
No. MOSCOW 485
Dated 26th Nov 1948
Received in Registry 2nd Dec 1948

Summary of E. Glezerman's ~~article~~ "The liquidation of the exploiting classes in the U.S.S.R."

Reference: Moscow letter 280/6/48G of 27th Feb (PR35/10/913)

Last Paper
PR 1117

References

17/95

(Print)
Soviet Union H
PRINTED

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 12/1/49

(Index) 12/9/49

Next Paper
PR1183

(Minutes.)

This most useful despatch contains much ammunition suitable not only for the satellites but for France and Italy. I.R.D is hoping to ~~extend~~ expand the agrarian section in the Digest to enable information officers to get more of such material published. The substance of Glezerman's article might well be used in this way.

Of particular value are Sir M. Peterson's point in para 2 about the definition of "kulak", the evidence of Soviet protection and support for rapid expropriation, ~~→~~ the use of "voluntary" collectivization as a means to "launch the drive against the kulaks", and the attack on Tito for not going far enough.

J.I. Cloake 7/12

M. Parrott, M. Maclaren } have seen 30/12

N. Dept RMAH 29

S. Dept REP 31.12.12.

W.E.I.D. SW 4/1

~~E.E.I.D.~~ B4/1

F.O.R.D. V.C 10.1.49

Most important -

If N. Dept agree we might print this Soviet Union H. We have used it for a major piece in the Digest, and for our basic paper on Agriculture.

I have sent a

35393

a letter of thanks.

Re remarks about telling the agrarian populations of the orbit countries what lies in store for them apply with more force to those peasantries which still have some say in the national destiny, in the free countries outside the orbit.

18/12

3/2

Confidential
PR 1176/265/G

Dept
Chancery
Moscow
from
I. R. Dept

RECEIVED IN DIVISION.
21 DEC 1948
SENT TO TYPE 21/12/48

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN T

Toc.

22 Dec.

Dear Chancery

Your desp 485 (280/25/48G) was a most useful piece of work. We have used it in various ways, especially a big piece in our Digest. Will you please convey our thanks to all concerned?

What you say in your

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Moscow.

Achilles' heel of the present régimes in most of the satellite countries, it is with this aspect of the question that I shall mainly deal in this despatch. First, however, I should perhaps reiterate the point made in the enclosure to my letter under reference about the word "kulak." This expression is intended to connote all manner of evil attributes in those to whom it is applied and thus to some extent masks the truth. In Soviet practice all those peasants who did not favour collectivisation were and are arbitrarily labelled as "kulaks," so that in reality the term merely denotes any successful individual farmer. It is important that this point should be made clear in any exposition of Communist agrarian policy addressed to the agricultural populations of non-Russian countries.

its very essence necessitates the use of force. The victorious proletariat must defeat the exploiters in open battle—otherwise the conditions necessary for their complete liquidation cannot be created." He points out, however, that the way for forcible elimination must be prepared by economic development. Thus in Soviet Russia it was possible to destroy the landowners and the wealthy *bourgeoisie* in the first phase of the revolution, but the task of destroying the kulak class could only be started some years after the victory of the revolution and after lengthy and careful preparation.

5. When the States in the Soviet orbit were taking their first measures of expropriation (*i.e.*, nationalisation measures and the confiscation of large estates), "the powerful support of the Soviet Union pro-

last para about the agrarian populations of the orbit countries applies with quite as much force to the peasantry in other countries where it still has a vote and some say in the national destiny.

Yours ever

Inf. Res. Dept.

AW 18/12

P. 3/2

(13555) Wt. 43698—114 200m 2/47 G.S.St. Gp. 620

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(PR 1176/265/G) 22nd December, 1948.

Confidential OUTFILE.

Dear Chancery,

Your despatch No. 485(280/25/48G) was a most useful piece of work. We have used it in various ways, especially a big piece in our Digest. Will you please convey our thanks to all concerned?

What you say in your last paragraph about the Agrarian populations of the Orbit countries applies with quite as much force to the peasantry in other countries where it still has a vote and some say in the national destiny.

Yours ever,

INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Moscow.

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SECRET

SOVIET UNION
December 2, 1948
Section 3

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PR 1176/265/913

Copy No. 8

FUTURE OF AGRARIAN POPULATIONS WITHIN THE SOVIET ORBIT

Article by G. E. Glezerman

Sir M. Peterson to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 2nd December*)

(No. 485) *Moscow,*
Sir, *26th November*, 1948.

In my letter of 27th February last to Mr. Christopher Warner I observed that the agrarian populations of the East European countries would undoubtedly be forced by their Communist-dominated Governments to travel along the same road as that previously followed by the Soviet peasantry, and I went on to suggest that one of the lines which our anti-Communist publicity might profitably pursue would be to bring home to the farming communities of those countries what that process would entail. I now venture to repeat that suggestion and to bring to your attention an article published in the latest number of the journal *Questions of Philosophy* (No. 2 of 1948), which conveniently illustrates and, I think, reinforces my point. It is entitled "The Liquidation of the Exploiting Classes in the U.S.S.R.," and its author is G. E. Glezerman.

2. A large part of the article is naturally devoted to the elimination of the big landowners and kulaks and, since I am suggesting that agricultural policy is the Achilles' heel of the present régimes in most of the satellite countries, it is with this aspect of the question that I shall mainly deal in this despatch. First, however, I should perhaps reiterate the point made in the enclosure to my letter under reference about the word "kulak." This expression is intended to connote all manner of evil attributes in those to whom it is applied and thus to some extent masks the truth. In Soviet practice all those peasants who did not favour collectivisation were and are arbitrarily labelled as "kulaks," so that in reality the term merely denotes any successful individual farmer. It is important that this point should be made clear in any exposition of Communist agrarian policy addressed to the agricultural populations of non-Russian countries.

3. Glezerman traces in a fairly orthodox manner, and with copious quotations from Stalin and Lenin, the various stages by which, it is now contended, the "exploiters" were extirpated in this country. He makes no notable revelations, but the significance of his account lies in the fact that he is quite clearly addressing himself to the Soviet Union's satellites. Whereas, he says, the Russian Communists had little or no guidance in the matter of the practical realisation of socialism and thus had to blaze their own trail, guided only by "the true compass of Marxist–Leninist theory" and "the genius of their great helmsmen, Lenin and Stalin," the countries of the new democracy, which arose from the ashes of war and are now taking their first steps along the road to socialism "have the inestimable advantage of being able to rely in the course of their development on the tried and proven practical experience of Socialist construction in the U.S.S.R."

4. The writer proceeds from the dogmatic assertion that "the liquidation of the exploiting classes is a task which by its very essence necessitates the use of force. The victorious proletariat must defeat the exploiters in open battle—otherwise the conditions necessary for their complete liquidation cannot be created." He points out, however, that the way for forcible elimination must be prepared by economic development. Thus in Soviet Russia it was possible to destroy the landowners and the wealthy *bourgeoisie* in the first phase of the revolution, but the task of destroying the kulak class could only be started some years after the victory of the revolution and after lengthy and careful preparation.

5. When the States in the Soviet orbit were taking their first measures of expropriation (*i.e.*, nationalisation measures and the confiscation of large estates), "the powerful support of the Soviet Union pro-

tected these countries from military intervention and allowed them to develop peacefully, and because of this it was not necessary for them to resort to such drastic measures of repression as were essential in Soviet Russia in the years of intervention and civil war.'' However, the writer continues, '' this by no means signifies that the development towards socialism in the countries of the new democracy can proceed without a class struggle, without a sharpening of this struggle.'' It must be remembered that capitalist elements in those countries have still not been eradicated since '' in circumstances where an individual peasant economy prevails in the countryside, where in addition there is no nationalisation of land and private ownership of land exists, where there are kulak farms employing hired labour—there the capitalist elements still retain their base.''

6. At this stage in his article Glezerman interpolates an attack on '' the Tito clique '' for '' denying the fact of the growth of capitalist elements and the sharpening of the class struggle connected with this in the Yugoslav countryside.'' Tito's attitude indicates '' a departure from the policy of the class struggle and leads to the propagation of the possibility of the peaceful conversion of the exploiters to socialism. It fundamentally contradicts the Marxist–Leninist teaching about classes and the class struggle, according to which the class struggle in the transition period does not abate, but, on the contrary, becomes sharper.''

7. As a result of the drastic measures taken by the Soviet régime in the first period of the revolution, the backbone of the exploiting classes (*i.e.*, the land-owners and major capitalists) was broken; the kulak class was seriously weakened, owing to the expropriation of many of its members; and the social level of the poor peasants, who acquired land and the means of production, was raised to that of '' middle peasants.'' However, the question '' Who shall defeat whom? '' had not yet been resolved. By 1930 it had been definitely settled in the spheres of industry and commerce, but the final victory of socialism depended on the resolution of the question in the sphere of agriculture (*i.e.*, on the smashing of the kulaks), since the latter were '' the last and most numerous exploiting class in the U.S.S.R.'' Glezerman is careful to define the difference between the anti-kulak drive in 1918 and that of 1929–30. In the first stage, he asserts, the objective was to break the resistance of the kulaks and restrict their exploiting tendencies but not to destroy them completely, since this would have endangered the stability of the State. But in 1929 the aim was to uproot them altogether, to liquidate them as a class. In 1928, he points out in a footnote, the exploiting classes numbered 6,801,000 in all, of whom 5,618,000, or 3·7 per cent. of the total population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were kulaks.

8. Stalin laid down that there were two distinct approaches to the question of the elimination of classes, *viz.*, the Leninist line expressed in the formula, '' the destruction of classes by way of intensified class struggle by the proletariat '' and the line of the '' Right capitulators '' expressed in the formula, '' the abolition of classes by the abatement of the class struggle and the absorption of the capitalists into socialism.'' The latter line, Stalin asserted, would have meant disarming the workers and the labouring peasantry, protecting the kulaks and paving the way for the restoration of capitalism. He therefore condemned the method of conciliation and decreed the intensification of the class struggle.

9. The main feature of the new drive against the kulaks was collectivisation. '' It was only possible,'' says Glezerman, '' to make an end of the kulaks as a class by means of the mass collectivisation of agriculture, for the roots of capitalism lie in small individual enterprise which continually gives rise to capitalism.'' The correctness of this conclusion is proved by the experience of the U.S.S.R., which '' should be taken into account by those nations which are now travelling the road to socialism and which sooner or later will have to solve analogous problems in their own countries.''

10. In the second half of 1929, therefore, a mass collectivisation movement was begun. The change-over which this represented, however, was accomplished not simply by the peaceful adoption by the peasants of the collective farm system, but in the form of a mass struggle of the peasants against the kulaks. Unlike revolutionary changes of the past, which were achieved as a result of pressure from below, '' this changeover was accomplished from above, on the initiative of the State authority, with the direct support from below of the millions of peasants

struggling against the kulak cabal for a free collective-farm life.''

11. The long and painstaking preparation for collectivisation included, in addition to the steady squeezing of the independent peasants, the introduction of machines and a new farming technique and the training of workers in these new methods.

12. Not less important than the direction of the blow against the capitalist elements in the countryside, however, was its timing, and it was here that Stalin's genius became most apparent. The crucial moment arrived in 1929, when the collective and State farms were producing more grain than the kulaks had formerly produced, thus providing "a material base for replacing kulak production by collective- and State-farm production." Without this prerequisite, Stalin had pointed out, the attack on the kulaks "would have been the most dangerous kind of adventurism." Once that essential condition existed, however, it was possible to launch the drive against the kulaks with the utmost vigour and ruthlessness, and that this was done is proved by the fact that by the middle of 1930 the collective farms had been given property expropriated from the kulaks to a value of 400 million roubles, representing some 15 per cent. of the total property then owned by the collective farms.

13. For the rest, Glezerman's essay is mainly devoted to a catalogue of the putative advantages and blessings enjoyed by the Soviet people and the Soviet State as a result of the pretended elimination of classes and to the denigration of the theory that socialism can be attained by conciliatory evolutionary methods. In this despatch I need not concern myself with these arguments, which are, indeed, already familiar and well-worn.

14. The implications of Glezerman's account, in so far as it concerns agriculture, are perfectly clear. It is impressed upon the rulers of the new democracies that their agrarian policy should be modelled on that pursued by the Soviet State in the first thirteen years of its existence. Since, however, the satellites enjoy the protection and support of the U.S.S.R., they should be able to travel the same road at a faster rate. Having virtually expropriated the large land-owners, they should now be devoting themselves to the same lengthy and careful preparation for the liquidation of the independent peasantry. This involves, on the one hand, the encouragement and stimulation of collectivisation, the provision of the machinery necessary for large-scale farming and specially favourable general treatment of existing collective farming organisations; and, on the other hand, it entails constant discrimination against the individual farmer through taxation, the assessment of quotas to be delivered to the State, the fixing of prices for his produce, and so forth. As reports from the countries concerned have shown, this course of action is already being pursued. But, Glezerman points out in the most emphatic terms, this process is only a means to an end and enforced collectivisation, coupled with the extermination of the independent peasantry as a class, remains a prime essential. Moreover, it must be imposed from above, and the time for its imposition will have arrived when the "voluntary" collective movement is sufficiently productive to make it possible without endangering the economy of the State.

15. It is scarcely necessary to point out that in thus indicating to the new democracies the path along which they are expected to travel, the article shows up the falsity of many of the tactical pledges given to their peoples quite recently by the Communist rulers of those countries, and this, too, reinforces my belief that in our own publicity we should do everything possible to ensure that the agrarian populations of the orbit countries realise precisely what is in store for them. There can be no more convincing way of achieving this than by quoting directly from their Soviet task-masters.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Missions at Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Sofia, Budapest and Bucharest, and also to Information Research Department.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

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No. 485

(280/25/48G)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
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Rec'd 2/12/48

26th November, 1948.

Sir,

In my letter 280/6/48G of 27th February last to Mr. Christopher Warner I observed that the agrarian populations of the East European countries would undoubtedly be forced by their Communist-dominated Governments to travel along the same road as that previously followed by the Soviet peasantry, and I went on to suggest that one of the lines which our anti-Communist publicity might profitably pursue would be to bring home to the farming communities of those countries what that process would entail. I now venture to repeat that suggestion and to bring to your attention an article published in the latest number of the journal Questions of Philosophy (No. 2 of 1948), which conveniently illustrates and, I think, reinforces my point. It is entitled "The Liquidation of the Exploiting Classes in the U.S.S.R.", and its author is G.E. Glezerman.

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The Right Honourable
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
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4. The writer proceeds from the dogmatic assertion that "the liquidation of the exploiting classes is a task which by its very essence necessitates the use of force. The victorious proletariat must defeat the exploiters in open battle - otherwise the conditions necessary for their complete liquidation cannot be created". He points out, however, that the way for forcible elimination must be prepared by economic development. Thus in Soviet Russia it was possible to destroy the land-owners and the wealthy bourgeoisie in the first phase of the revolution, but the task of destroying the kulak class could only be started some years after the victory of the revolution and after lengthy and careful preparation.

5. When the states in the Soviet orbit were taking their first measures of expropriation (i.e. nationalisation measures and the confiscation of large estates) "the powerful support of the Soviet Union protected these countries from military intervention and allowed them to develop peacefully, and because of this it was not necessary for them to resort to such drastic measures of repression as were essential in Soviet Russia in the years of intervention and civil war". However, the writer continues, "this by no means signifies that the development towards Socialism in the countries of the new democracy can proceed without a class struggle, without a sharpening of this struggle". It must be remembered that capitalist elements in those countries have still not been eradicated since "in circumstances where an individual peasant economy prevails in the countryside, where in addition there is no nationalisation of land and private ownership of land exists, where there are kulak farms employing hired labour - there the capitalist elements still retain their base".

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7. As a result of the drastic measures taken by the Soviet régime in the first period of the revolution, the backbone of the exploiting classes (i.e. the land-owners and major capitalists) was broken; the kulak class was seriously weakened, owing to the expropriation of many of its members; and the social level of the poor peasants, who acquired land and the means of production, was raised to that of "middle peasants". However, the question "Who shall defeat whom?" had not yet been resolved. By 1930 it had been definitely settled in the spheres of industry and commerce, but the final victory of Socialism depended on the resolution of the question in the sphere of agriculture (i.e. on the smashing of the kulaks), since the latter were "the last and most numerous exploiting class in theU.S.S.R.". Glezerman is careful to define the difference between the anti-kulak drive in 1918 and that of 1929/30. In the first stage, he asserts, the objective was to break the resistance of the kulaks and restrict their exploiting tendencies but not to destroy them completely, since this would have endangered the stability of the state. But in 1929 the aim was to up-root them altogether, to liquidate them as a class. In 1928, he points out in a footnote, the exploiting classes numbered 6,801,000 in all, of whom 5,618,000, or 3.7% of the total population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were kulaks.

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16. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Missions at Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Sofia, Budapest and Bucharest and also to Information Research Department.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,

Maurice Peterson.

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P/H) from G.F. Crawley, C.R.O. from W. Watson 15th DEC

ADDED PAPERS

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MINUTES

I certainly agree that ~~them~~ this pamphlet should go to all Information Posts in India and Pakistan. Ceylon might also be included.

J. L. Cloake 11/12

Draft

FE/D first Standard Minute. I am having further distribution in our territories (Calcutta etc. Middle East)

F.S. Crawley 14.12.48

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Next Paper

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15th December 1948

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Price
6d.

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1948.

ASIA

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

Information Department,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

8th December 1948.

ID 5532/48.

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Confidential.

Dear Murray,

"BRITISH SURVEY" on
Communism in S.E. Asia.
Vol. IX No. 19, Nov. 1948.

Would you advise us to obtain copies of the enclosed pamphlet, through the C.O.I., for dispatch to overseas Information Posts in India and Pakistan?

Yours sincerely,

(G.F. Crawley)

Ralph Murray Esq.,
S.E. Asia Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE,
17 Carlton House Terrace, S.W.1.



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BRITISH SURVEY

Price 6d.

Vol. IX
No. 19.

Nov. 1948.

Subject:
COMMUNISM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

British Survey—Copyright in all Countries

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BRITISH SURVEY

Published by The British Society for International Understanding,
Benjamin Franklin House, 36, Craven St., Strand, London W.C.2. Tel. Whitehall 0555

Vol. IX. No. 19. NOVEMBER, 1948.

COMMUNISM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

IN modern times, until the arrival of the Europeans, the countries of South East Asia were loose collections of peoples without any centralized unity. It was the Western Powers that consolidated and extended them, developed their natural resources, enabled their populations to multiply tenfold or more, and introduced them to the ideas of democracy and self-government. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia, and the Philippines have all been under Western control for long periods and Siam, while it has retained its political independence, has been moulded by similar forces. The ideas that inspire nationalism in Southeast Asia are all Western ideas ; and inasmuch as the Western Powers have introduced them, they have been the authors of the movements which are now displacing themselves.

The more revolutionary elements in these Nationalist movements have always sought independence, not by evolution and agreement but by violence ; and, in cases where the independence has been achieved (always by agreement) they are not satisfied and aim at taking their countries right out of the orbit of the Western democracies into that of the U.S.S.R. Where they have long looked to Moscow for guidance they now look to it for direction. Moderates and socialist leaders of the Nationalists have everywhere been undermined and, where possible, removed when they have ceased to serve the Moscow programme. In the unsettlements and disturbances in South East Asia, following upon the Japanese surrender and the rise of Nationalism, the Soviet sees a great chance of exploiting the situation for its own ends.

Let us now consider the Communist campaign country by country.

MALAYA.

The growth of Communism in the Malayan Federation and Singapore can be understood only in the light of the country's racial make-up. In 1911 there were 1,438,000 Malays, 917,000 Chinese, and 267,000 Indians in a total of 2,672,000 ; in 1947 there were 2,611,000 Chinese in a total of 5,818,000. The racial pattern has therefore entirely changed in the last thirty odd years. The Malays are mostly small cultivators, the Chinese are either urban dwellers or labourers on tin mines or estates, and the Indians are mostly rubber estate workers.

The picture on the cover shows Communist flags captured by troops in a raid on a jungle H.Q. of terrorists in Malaya.—*Central Press Ltd.*

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Before the war of 1939-45 it was often said that Malaya had no politics, for the races lived harmoniously side by side, but what was more strictly correct was that there was as yet no organized political activity relating to internal questions. The Chinese, however, had since the Chinese Revolution been brought within the sphere of Chinese home politics, particularly those of the Kuomintang though there was also a large body of Malayan-born Chinese without political affiliations. In 1927 the Kuomintang was purged by Chiang Kai-shek of its Communist elements. The result was that the extremists split off into organizations of their own, and in Malaya the Malayan Communist Party controlled the Leftist elements. Its organization was complex, with a Communist Youth Section, a General Labour Union, a Picket Corps (for intimidation purposes), a Special Branch (a kind of Gestapo), and a Malayan Racial Emancipation League to bring Malays and Indians into the Communist fold. Propaganda amongst the Malays had, before the war with Japan, an almost negligible effect and the Indians, too, mostly stood aloof. The Malayan Communist Party was, then, almost exclusively a Chinese organization completely under Chinese control

Uneasy Alliance with S.E.A.C.

After the Sian *coup d'état* and the ensuing agreement whereby Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists agreed to combine against their common enemy, Japan, there was a period of uneasy co-operation which lasted until the beginning of 1941. The names of the Malayan Communist organizations were changed to suit the new policy (*e.g.* the General Labour Union became the Labouring Classes' Anti-enemy Backing-up Society) but the Communists remained "anti-imperialist" and fomented strikes even after Britain was at war with Germany. Between the German attack on Russia in June 1941 and the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December of that year, the Malayan Communists were in an anomalous position—siding, of course, with Russia but still hostile to Russia's new ally, Britain. But when the Japanese attacked, the Party announced its all-out support of the Allies against the Axis. When in February 1942 Singapore fell, the Japanese began a purge of the Chinese especially the Communists (but indeed of all Chinese who had been active against them, including Kuomintang members and Chinese Members of the Volunteers), and a number estimated at more than 40,000 were seized and shot. Numbers of Chinese Communists took to the hills and became the nucleus of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army which was directed by a civilian underground organization, the Communist-controlled Anti-Japanese Union (A.J.U.) Contact was made with them in 1943 by officers of Force 136 who had been sent in by submarine, and later an agreement was signed between the M.P.A.J.A. and the Supreme Allied Commander, Lord Mountbatten, whereby the former were to assist the South East Asia Command in the intended invasion of Malaya in return for money, training, and supplies. At the same time the Malayan Communist Party temporarily dropped the first item in its nine-

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point programme, namely the establishment of a Malayan Republic.

The Japanese having surrendered in August, 1945, the invasion was no longer necessary, and during the interval between the massing of the Japanese for surrender and the arrival of the British forces, the M.P.A.J.A. came out of their retreats in the jungle and occupied houses in the towns. Their policy was to claim entire credit for the Japanese surrender. At the same time they announced their willingness to " co-operate " with the British Military Administration which had now been established. Whatever were the bona fides of the M.P.A.J.A. itself, it was immediately clear that its master, the A.J.U. had no intention at all of co-operating with the B.M.A. although its spokesman gave lip-service to such an intention. The Communists duly engineered strikes and demonstrations of all kinds with the intention of bringing the B.M.A. into hatred and contempt, while inflation and the rice shortage, due to the drying up of Siamese and Burmese imports on which Malaya was largely dependent, assisted them in their aims.

Meanwhile 3,000 to 4,000 regular guerillas of the M.P.A.J.A. together with a number of irregulars to a total of 6,800 were disbanded in December without incident. They handed in their arms and equipment, but it was widely believed at the time that there were still large caches of arms in the jungle, both from Allied and Japanese sources. Searches were accordingly made for these by British troops and police, but seldom with success.

Post-War attempt to form Anti-British " People's Front."

In February 1946, the Communists, having successfully engineered a general strike in January, attempted to bring about another general stoppage in celebration of the British surrender to the Japanese in 1942, but it came to nothing owing to the timely action by the B.M.A., and the Army. Several of the ring-leaders were banished. After this Communist activity tended to go underground, but, besides using the strike weapon, the Communists attempted to obtain a hold on the new parties which had come into being in connection with the new Malayan Union which the British Government created, after new agreements with the Rulers, on 1st April, 1946, and which was generally unpopular.

The first " Malay " party, the Malay Nationalist Party, which was formed in November 1945, was supported by the Chinese Communists, but it also had some Indonesian adherents. There had before the war been a few Malays among the Communists of Malaya, but these were relegated to a subordinate position and were used only, with a similar number of Indians, to suggest a racial unity in the Communist movement in Malaya. After the war, a drive to secure converts from among the Malays to the M.C.P. was somewhat reinforced by the participation of a number of Indonesian Communists. But the direction of the Party continued to be in Chinese hands. The M.C.P. joined in the agitation which was very widespread among the Malays in general against the Malayan Union (though for quite different reasons) and also against the

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successor to the Union, the Malayan Federation which came into being in February, 1948 (for precisely the same reasons that they had agitated against the Union—namely because they hoped to prevent either of them from working). It took advantage of Chinese dissatisfaction with the new constitution to organise a general strike against it in the last months of 1947. Having attempted without success to obtain control of the newly founded Democratic Union (which aimed at democratic government within the British Commonwealth), the Malayan Communist Party directed its attention to the formation of Putera (Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat), or United People's Front, which the Malay Nationalist Party now joined.

Resort to Violence.

In June 1948 the Malayan Communist Party, in response it seems, to orders from external authority, *embarked upon a campaign of terrorism. Communist guerillas, many of the ex-members of the M.P.A.J.A. took to the jungle and began to attack isolated estates and mines. The instructions under which the terrorists were acting aimed, it seemed, at producing the kind of political and economic chaos in Southeast Asia that would help the rise of Communism. Britons, Chinese, Malays, and Indians were murdered irrespective of race if they happened to be in the way. A main obstacle to speedily dealing with the terrorists was the extremely difficult nature of the country, for Malaya is still over three-quarters under jungle and swamp. Most of the 223 civilians who had been murdered up to the end of October were Chinese whilst the Europeans murdered numbered seventeen. Similar casualties were inflicted on the terrorists, but the police and armed forces available were inadequate to deal with the campaign of ambush over so wide an area, and reinforcements, including a contingent of the Guards, were sent, arriving in October, 1948. All races were now increasingly co-operating with the Government in restoring order. However, the nature of the terrain, the fact that the Communists mingle in disguise with the ordinary community and the difficulty of rounding up terrorists who seek escape by the frontier with Siam, is likely to mean that the restoration of order will be a lengthy process. (A more detailed note on these troubles will be found on p. 15).

INDONESIA.

The first manifestations of nationalism in Indonesia had a mild, almost conservative colour. The revolutionary element was introduced from Holland itself and it was the Indische Vereeniging (Indian Party) founded in 1911, and composed of Dutch Indonesians which first agitated for the independence of the Netherlands Indies. Communism made its appearance in the early nineteen-twenties, and its leaders fomented strikes and disorders which the Netherlands Indies' Government suppressed without difficulty. Although sporadically active, Communism in Java had before the

* For the inclusion of S. E. Asia in the Zhdanov programme at the Warsaw Communist Congress in Sept. 1947. See British Survey Vol. IX No. 4, p. 5.

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war with Japan in 1942, no great hold on the nationalist movement though a number of its leaders were overtly or secretly sympathetic to the Communist aims. During the Japanese occupation a Communist group, the Sajoeti, tried to infiltrate into certain Nipponese organizations under the pretence of co-operating with the invader and established cells in the *desas*, or villages. Amir Sjarifoeddin, who was later to become the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister in the Republic of Indonesia, was one of the leaders. The Japanese discovered the plot to seize power and mass arrests ensued. The second Communist group, the P.K.I. (Partai Komunis Indonesia), which had already been banned by the Dutch, was to be the nucleus of the main Communist organization after the war.

Legacy of Japanese Occupation.

When the Japanese surrendered they sponsored an Indonesian Republic under Soekarno. At this time the policy of the Communists was to exert influence behind the scenes but to avoid coming into the open until they considered that the time was ripe. The reason for this was clear. The new Indonesian Republic was suspect in Allied circles because of its inception under Japanese auspices. It was in conflict with the Dutch, and relied for its support on liberal opinion abroad, especially in the United States. This opinion, though well disposed towards the young Republic, was highly suspicious of Communist influences, and if the Republican Government had taken on a noticeably Communist tinge most of the support from this quarter would have been lost. Moreover the Republic looked to the European and the American trade to secure its economic position, and it hoped to secure a loan from the U.S.A. At the same time, considerable doubt has been expressed regarding the general tendencies of the principal leaders—Soekarno, although associated for long with the *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, took every opportunity of proclaiming that Russia was the ideal state which should be copied by the Republic. On 6th November, 1946, he declared that the youth affiliated with Pesindo (Communist Youth Movement) should also practise the doctrines of Marx. Dr. Hatta, the Vice-President, appointed the Secretary of the Communist Party in Sydney to be a temporary Trade Commissioner to the Republic, and Amir Sjarifoeddin had in 1940 been accused by the Dutch of collaboration with the P.K.I. which was then banned in the Indies.

The Republic of Indonesia, meanwhile, insisted that its policies were not Communistic. In 1946 Dr. Soekarno and his colleagues suppressed with ease the feeble attempt of Tan Malakka, the Trotskyite leader, to seize power. To the Communists the existing Republican Government represented only a transitional stage which would be succeeded by a thorough-going Communist regime when the situation was propitious and the signal was given. In January 1947, at the Party Congress at Solo, the P.K.I. had already ceased to co-operate with the Republican Government.

After the Linggadjati Agreement.

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by the Linggadjati Agreement signed in March, 1947, between the Republic and the Dutch and renewed by the Renville Agreement of January, 1948, was not to the liking of the Communists. They intended to oppose any solution which might be inspired by the ideology of the Western democracies.

The view was widely held in Europe that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia was deliberately favouring the Communist programme, but the fact is that the Communist higher command was prepared to leave the control no longer in the Government's hands, and in September, 1948, an insurrectionary movement under overt Communist leadership broke out. A certain Moeso, fresh om long residence in Moscow, and a colleague of his, named Suripno, organized the insurrection and set up a Communist state in East Java with headquarters at Madiun. A similar movement also started in north-west Sumatra and there was some doubt as to the extent to which the Republican Government could rely on the army or the police. President Soekarno forthwith proclaimed a state of emergency and ordered the army to quell the uprisings. The Dutch promptly offered their help to Dr. Hatta, the Prime Minister, but the offer was refused.

The Indonesian Republican Government's version of the turn of events is that the Communists were encouraged by the conditions, produced by the Dutch "blockade" of the Republic and that the Dutch welcomed the Communist insurrection as an excuse for intervening in Republican territory. The Republican Government proclaimed that it would quell the risings in a short while. Tan Malakka was released from gaol to organise his Trotskyite followers against the Stalinist Communists. The Dutch, for their part, say that the crisis has not induced the Republican moderates to meet them half-way, but that, on the contrary, the Republican Army has been ordered to cross the boundary and to penetrate deep into Dutch territory. This move is said to be in order that the Republicans can harass the Dutch supply lines, kill collaborators, and carry out scorched earth tactics in the event of Dutch troops entering Republican territory, as expected. It is said that the Masjoemi Party, the principal Moslem organization, which has the support of 80 per cent. of the population of the Republic, is opposed to Communism, but it remains to see what the upshot will be. In early October the Republicans had driven the Communists from most of the towns but the latter had taken to the hills and their real intention may be to conduct a protracted guerilla campaign. Moeso was killed.

BURMA.

For some years before the war an extreme Nationalist Party calling themselves "Thakins" were planning to secure independence for Burma by violent and subversive means, and thirty odd members of the party went to Japan for military training in 1940 and 1941. One of the Thakins, U Aung San, fought with the Japanese army. After their occupation of Burma, the Japanese created a so-called "Burmese Government" under Dr. Ba Maw,

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but this was soon seen to be merely an instrument for mobilizing Burma in aid of the Japanese war effort and was carried on under strong military control. Disillusioned, U Aung San made overtures to the British and agreed to assist their return. The British entered Burma at the beginning of 1945 and the military administration continued until October 16th, when the Governor returned and civil government was resumed. But, meanwhile, the political parties which had been suppressed under Ba Maw's regime had coalesced, under Aung San to form the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. This organization refused to co-operate with the Governor except on its own terms, which were that the A.F.P.F.L. should control the Government's policy. These terms the Governor could not accept. He continued to govern with the assistance of a nominated Executive Council until June 1946, when he came home and subsequently resigned on grounds of ill-health. Under pressure of labour unrest, and a strike of police and civil servants in September, the incoming Governor formed a new Executive Council in which Aung San had a majority.

Meanwhile the British Government had decided on a speedy handing over of the government to Burmese leaders. In April, 1947, a Constituent Assembly was to be elected and negotiations with the frontier peoples, the Karens, the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins, were to decide on what terms they would co-operate with the Burmese. Aung San was able to persuade the Chiefs of these tribes to join the new government, and he and the A.F.P.F.L. obtained a victory at the polls in April.* On 19th July, Aung San and the leading members of his cabinet were assassinated. The assassination was due to personal jealousy and Aung San's rivals hoped that chaos would ensue after the assassinations which would enable them to seize power. The Governor, however, took prompt action and Thakin Nu accepted office as Prime Minister.

On October 17th, the treaty for securing Burma's independence was signed by Mr. Attlee and Thakin Nu. On 4th January, 1948, Burma became independent.

In the past, political allegiance in Burma had always been attached to persons, not to parties ; and groups broke away from the A.F.P.F.L. almost immediately after its formation, including the followers of U Saw (who was condemned to death in November and executed in May, 1948, as one of those responsible for the assassination of the Ministers) and the extreme Communists.

Communism in Independent Burma.

We now come back to the Thakin Party in the time of the Japanese occupation of Burma. The Communists organized and led the Anti-Japanese Resistance Movement. They smuggled their party member, Thakin Thein Pe, through the Japanese lines to make contact with the Supreme Allied Commander, Lord Mountbatten. Another leader was Thakin Than Tun. After the war this political alliance continued, with Aung San in the saddle and Than Tun

* The elected members included 6 Communists out of a total of 254.

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providing much of the brains. Totalitarian methods were adopted on the model of the Communist Party with storm-troopers (the People's Volunteer Army) and the use of strikes as a political weapon. But the coalition disintegrated when the old moderates consented to be sworn in as members of the Governor's Executive Council. Thakin Soe and Thakin Than Tun both seceded to form their own parties. But the policy of the A.F.P.F.L. was on very Leftist lines, and when an excuse had to be found for paying compensation to British firms whose property was sequestered under a nationalist scheme, Aung San found it tactful to point out that the Soviet itself paid compensation in such cases. It is said that in Burma there is no Right—all politics are Left or Extreme Left.

In May, 1948, the Prime Minister of the new Union of Burma, Thakin Nu, was reported to have declared his intention to lead Burma into the Communist camp. Immediately afterwards, U Tin Tut, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, calmed the fears of the Western Powers by pointing out that the report was incorrect and that at that time there was no Communist Party membership in the Government. (This, at least, was technically true). Thakin Than Tun had by this time declared against the Government and, with his men sitting astride Burma's road and rail communications with the north, and operating in a country well suited for guerilla warfare, the Government found itself in a hazardous position.

There was a strong and troublesome separatist movement in Arakan, and the Karens, another dissatisfied minority, was pressing for the establishment of a Karen State. In September, in the middle of these happenings, U Tin Tut, the most cultivated and intelligent of the leaders, was assassinated—probably because of his connections with the West. The Communists' cry was that the West and all connected with it must go. Their weapons were dacoity and murder, which they were organizing on a big scale.

The issue is still not decided.* Thakin Nu's Government is just holding its own militarily, though the administration, economy and finances of the country are increasingly breaking down under the strain. The armed forces of the Government, under the C. in C., General Smith Dun (a Karen), remain loyal, against the "White Band" Communists and rebellious members of the People's Volunteer Army (by an irony for a long time the A.F.P.F.L's. own instrument of coercion). The "Red Flag" Communists remain aloof whilst the Karen Movement is generally anti-Communist in nature.

INDOCHINA.

French Indochina is an artificial creation combining Tonkin and Annam, with a Chinese background to their civilization, Cambodia and Laos with a rather remoter Indian background and Cochinchina deriving from both of these cultures. Out of a total population of about 23,000,000 (1937), the first three provinces accounted for about 20,000,000, and Cambodia and Laos for only about 3,000,000. When a nationalist movement started in Indochina, as it did in the

* November 1948.

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15th. December 1948

toc

~~As Murray is away~~

earlier years of the present century becoming very active in the late twenties, it was practically confined to the provinces with a Chinese background and it came very much under the influence of the political developments in China, especially in the adjacent province of Kwangtung. Canton from 1920 to 1924 was under the intermittent control of Sun Yat-sen and he in the first part of this period was in liaison with Borodin and the Russian Communists. The split in the Kuomintang in 1927 had its repercussions in the Indochinese nationalist movement. And amongst the Annamite nationalist leaders the most important was Nguen Ai-quoc ("one who loves his country")—alias Ho Chi-minh—and this position he was to retain, with lapses into prison or obscurity, for another quarter of a century.

Personality of Ho Chi-minh.

Nguen Ai-Quoc was born in 1892. He worked for Borodin in Canton and was, it is said, for seven years in Moscow where he went under the name of Song Man-tcho. He is said still to retain his Soviet citizenship. Nationalism in Annam took on a more violent character than it did in other parts of Southeast Asia, but the Annam Communist party, founded by Nguen Ai-quoc, was under Soviet influence directed towards strikes and propaganda, and terrorism was not favoured at this early stage in political evolution. The Nationalists and the Communists were suppressed with great sternness by the French in the early thirties. The Communist leader Nguen Ai-quoc, was arrested in Hong Kong in 1931. It is said that he has spent one quarter of his political life in prison. After suppression by the French of Communism in Annam, Nguen Ai-quoc's career is for some years obscure, but during the rapid changes which took place in the status of Indochina towards the end of the Japanese occupation of the country, he sprang once more into prominence—this time as Ho Chi-minh, the father of Vietnam.* The original politics of a nationalist leader are, of course, no sure guide to the policy of the movement he leads, for this is decided from the elements that compose it and is modified by considerations of expediency, but there is no reason to believe that through all the stages of deadlock and compromise between France and Vietnam Ho Chi-minh's political ideals have suffered any very fundamental change from his Moscow days. Besides, the influence of this mystic and ascetic father of the Vietnam Republic was so great that he had the power to decide the current of its policy.

Deadlock.

This Survey is concerned with Communism and not Nationalism in Southeast Asia, but so much of a summary of the progress of events in Indochina is necessary to show how the present deadlock between Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi-minh and the French came about. The order of succession is, first, in 1940 the Vichy régime ; then from March 1942 the Japanese military occupation, followed at the time of the Japanese surrender by the overthrow

*Meaning the people "beyond the Southern Border."

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of the Japanese-sponsored government of Bao Dai, the (Ex-) Emperor of Annam, and the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi-minh by the Vietminh, or council of national parties. On the liberation Indochina was occupied by British and Chinese forces, who were succeeded by French forces. The northern half of Indochina was occupied by the Chinese ; this allowed Ho Chi-minh to build up his Government. The failure of the French and Annamese to find a basis of agreement turns on the French desire to retain control of foreign policy, defence and finance and the wish of the Annamese to join a Union which shall be purely economic, and wherein the relations between Vietnam and the federation shall be on something like an Eire-British Commonwealth basis. The French have rejected further negotiations with Ho Chi-minh because of his Communist affiliations and have attempted to come to an agreement with the ex-Emperor Bao Dai for the working of a provisional constitution for Indochina. In the meantime the deadlock between France and Vietnam continues. There has been for the last two years or more a perpetual state of guerilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage. The Vietnamese declared intention is to make life impossible for any Frenchman in Annam or Cochinchina.

SIAM.

The number of persons of Chinese race in Siam has been estimated to be about 2,500,000 in a total of about 15,000,000 and it may well be greater. Chinese immigrants before the present century tended to merge into the native population within three generations, but in the present century this process has been arrested by the increase in the number of Chinese immigrant women, by the rise of nationalism, and by quicker communications. The Siamese have become increasingly afraid of the economic pressure of the Chinese and of the formation within their country of an *imperium in imperio*. Up to 1932 Siam was an absolute monarchy, but since then it has been a constitutional monarchy with an emphasis on Thai nationalism. Communism has not been entirely absent from among the Siamese themselves, but by far the greater activity has been among the Chinese who predominate in the urban centres.

As elsewhere, the Chinese community in Siam has for long been divided into factions, and in recent years these factions have tended to coincide with the political divisions within China itself. The most important method of spreading political teaching is by means of the schools, and both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists have for long competed for control of the policy of these schools. The Siamese, for their part, have insisted that these Chinese schools shall not be used as forcing houses for alien ideas but have tried by legislation and control to ensure that they should teach the pupils to be Siamese citizens, especially as they will continue to live in Siam when they grow up. The struggle between the Siamese Government and Chinese Nationalism has been going on for years. When it comes to a fight between the Siamese authorities and the schools, the Chinese merchants who are mostly inclined

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OUTFILE toc

15th December 194

~~As Murray is away, I am replying for him to your letter~~
to Murray (who is away)
of the 8th December about

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towards the Kuomintang, and whose economic interests certainly do not lie with Communism, have fought for Chinese as the medium of instruction in their schools even though they must know that in many cases, if not most cases, these schools are nothing but hotbeds of Communism. The reason for this is that Communism finds a ready breeding ground among the poorly paid teachers, and whatever curriculum may be laid down, and whatever the textbooks used, the teacher can convey what he wants verbally, either in so many words or by insinuation.

These remarks apply equally to education among the Chinese in other parts of South East Asia.

Since the end of the war with Japan reports from Siam of police raids on Chinese quarters, especially in Bangkok, have been numerous ; it is rarely possible to decide from the report whether the object of the raids is to ferret out Kuomintang or Communist activity, but it is likely that the latter is far the more important at this time. Siam certainly shares in the anxiety which is common to the administrations of South East Asia. To the south Siam sees the terrorist campaign conducted by Chinese Communists in Malaya and their tactics often carry them over the Siamese border. Recently the Government has agreed to the posting of a British Consul in Singgora to watch for such happenings, and it has in other ways shown its understanding that, in this sphere, both Siam and Britain have one object in common. Simultaneously Siam is watching with some apprehension the turn of events in the territory of her Northern and Western neighbour, Burma.

Meanwhile the Government of Siam must be wondering why the U.S.S.R., taking advantage of the Siamese request for Soviet diplomatic representation in Bangkok, has established a Legation with over twenty male officials and a total establishment, including women, of over forty, in order to watch the interests of a handful of Soviet citizens.

THE PHILIPPINES.

Wherever there has been a Chinese community in South East Asia, the Communists have endeavoured to shape the Leftist sections of it into a spearhead of Soviet penetration. In the Philippines the number of Chinese to the total population is small (about 100,000 in 19,500,000) but Chinese everywhere make up in energy what they lack in numbers. Before the war the Chinese Communists in the Philippines received little support in the islands and their activity was negligible. During the first year of the Japanese occupation they got to work and created anti-Japanese organizations without at first revealing their political affiliations. They had at least one underground newspaper, and they enrolled students and young shop assistants in their societies. They started a guerilla unit which travelled through Luzon playing hide-and-seek with the Japanese. The Kuomintang also had its own guerilla unit. During the battle for Manila both the Communist and the Kuomintang guerillas aided the Americans, acting as guides and protecting bridges, and both units

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incurred the displeasure of the American High Command for their part in local politics. The Communists conducted "People's Court" trials in Manila, accusing established Chinese leaders (many of them close friends of General MacArthur) of treason. They also attacked Roxas (later President) and a number of other officials. Their underground news sheet, now emerging into the open as a fully fledged newspaper, printed full accounts of the so-called "trials."

During the occupation the Chinese Communists had established contact with the Filipino "Reds." Reports say that the latter were, in 1947 and 1948 actually directed by a Chinese Communist who worked closely with the Hukbalahaps (anti-Japanese army), or Filipino agrarian insurgents, who had risen in more active rebellion against the Government after the Philippines became independent in July 1946. Indeed, it seems likely that one section of the Chinese Communist "People's Army" has been specially designated to help these rebels. According to the established policy of the Communist Party everywhere they were endeavouring to associate themselves with any local popular discontent. Here in the Philippines the Hukbalahap movement offered itself as an obvious means of infiltration, since the insurgents had a largely genuine grievance arising out of an obsolete land policy.

What has kept Chinese Communism in check in the Philippines is the intense Filipino jealousy and suspicion of Chinese economic penetration. Chinese immigration is limited to a 500 a year quota, but large numbers enter the country illicitly, especially via the northern tip of Luzon, where the Chinese Communists are engaged in reinforcing their numbers by smuggling their comrades in. The Philippines (independent since 1946) are not a promising ground for Communist guerilla and terrorist tactics, but it is certain that if things go according to plan in other countries of South East Asia —or even if they do not—the signal will be given for striking at another unit of the "Capitalist Rear."

Appendix. The Disturbances in Malaya.

The Malayan Communist Party, the membership of which was almost entirely Chinese, decided in March 1948 to stage an armed insurrection. The way was to be paved for this by producing widespread labour unrest during April, stimulated by the intimidation (and, if necessary, stabbing) of trade union leaders who were unwilling to collaborate, the use of arms, and the burning of factories. A great political demonstration was planned for the 1st of May. Although these preliminaries misfired, it was decided nevertheless to adhere to the original programme and to give the order for an outbreak of armed violence in early June. The intention was that a revolt should start in various parts of the Federation. Terrorism directed against Europeans and Chinese who would not join the Communists was to prepare the way for this revolt inorder to create regions which would, in due course, be declared to be independent

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Draft. Mr G.F. Crawley

15th December 1948

OUTFILE + DC

~~As Murray is away, I am replying for him to~~ Your letter ID 5532/48 (W Murray (who is away) of the 8th December about sending copies of the British C[illegible]

Communist areas. These areas would be gradually extended until the whole country was under Communist control. The declaration of a Communist Republic of Malaya was timed for August 3rd, 1948.

On July 23rd the Colonial Secretary stated in the House of Commons that the Malayan Communist Party had been banned, together with three other satellite bodies which were either actively involved in the present fighting or were recruiting or supply agencies for the terrorists. The bodies were the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, the New Democratic Youth League, and a Malay organization of youth (P.E.T.A.). "We have no desire to suppress political opinion," said the Colonial Secretary, "but there can be no place in an ordered society for bodies which seek to overthrow established government by violence and to attain their ends by the murder of innocent people."

A large number of persons were detained for screening under the Emergency Regulations. Quantities of arms were captured, including a seizure by the Singapore police and the Netherlands East Indies authorities of a large cargo.

Up to the end of October, of the 343 terrorists officially reported to have been killed, 6 were Malays, 3 Indians, and 2 Siamese. The rest were mainly foreign-born Chinese.

The
British Society for International Understanding

In connection with a British-Dutch Study Conference on matters of common interest in S.E. Asia, organized by the British Society in London from Dec. 6th to 9th, 1948, there will be a

PUBLIC MEETING

on

Anglo-Netherlands co-operation in South East Asia

in the

Theatre of the Royal Society of Arts
JOHN ADAM ST., ADELPHI, LONDON, W.C.2.

at 3.30 p.m. on Thursday December 9th, 1948

ALL READERS OF BRITISH SURVEY ARE INVITED

Printed for The British Society for International Understanding, Benjamin Franklin House, 36, Craven Street, London, W.C.2. by Lamport Gilbert & Co. Ltd., Reading, Berks.

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Draft. Mr

Mr G.F. Crawley
Information Dept
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from Mr J.H. Watson

toc

~~As Murray is away, I am replying for him to~~ Your letter ID 5532/48 to Murray (who is away) of the 8th December about sending copies of the British Survey on Communism in S.E. Asia to India and Pakistan.

We think this pamphlet would be quite suitable for distribution to all information posts in India and Pakistan – and indeed in Ceylon as well. We should be glad ~~for it to get as the widest possible~~ to see it have a good wide circulation.

JHW 13/12

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

15th December, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL:

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Sgd (J.H. Watson)

G.F. Crawley, Esq.,
Information Department,
Commonwealth Relations Office.

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

5 1948

INFORMATION
RESEARCH

PR 1247/G

PR 1247/265/913G

Report by.
Mr S. S. Awberry,
and
Mr F. W. Dalley.

14 - 12 - 48.

The report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organisation in Malaya and Singapore".

Last Paper

PR1176

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Draft Despatch to H.M.'s Consulates at:-
Dakar, No. 42, Leandar, No. 24
Beira, No. 13, Lourenco Marques, No. 27
Leopoldville No. 71
Elisabethville No. 2
Antananarivo No. 32.
17/12

D/f) Si. G. Robertson, Khartoum from Mr Clutton. 20/12

(Action completed)

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See within. (Minutes.)

DW. 6/1. 5/1

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despatches

FOREIGN OFFICE,

I have not seen this report; but I think Mr Gee should see the draft.

R.E.Blackham 8/12.
S.E.Asia Dept

Mr Lee first:
This is the first I have heard of this report. Do you agree that it shd. be shown to the Americans? If so, is there any need to consult Mr Mayhew on the point?

C.F.A.S. 9/12.

Minutes.

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(H.G.GEE)
16th December, 1948.

Mr C.F.A. Warner.

Despatch duly received. Have read through with much interest.

Agree

C.F.A.S.
17/12

Nothing to b

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C.F.A.S. 17/12

(84615) Wt.34382/162 50,000 12/47 A.
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His

the whole report merits careful ... indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

17a

2 despatches

FOREIGN OFFICE,

Minutes.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

I have now been able to borrow and read a copy of this report, which came out in Singapore some time back and created a good deal of interest in London on its Press release a few weeks ago. I understand that as soon as the further copies arrive from Singapore they are to be put out as a non-parliamentary publication by the Stationery Office. I think that it would be certainly a good idea to pass copies to the State Department if they have not already got them through their representatives, and I agree that it would be useful for the Labour Attaché in Washington to give a copy to the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. I have also spoken to the Ministry of Labour to make sure that they get enough copies when they are available to send to all Labour Attachés. In view of the quite wide publicity which has already been given to the Report, I should not have thought it necessary to consult Mr. Mayhew about passing copies to the State Department.

I have made a couple of slight alterations to the draft.

(H.G.GEE)
16th December, 1948.

Mr C. F. Warner.

Despatch dafts. + returns have report ahead during Xmas holidays.

Agree

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PR1247/G

LABOUR
AND
TRADE UNION ORGANISATION
in the
Federation of Malaya and Singapore

Report by

MR. S. S. AWBERY, M.P., J.P.,
AND
MR. F. W. DALLEY

KUALA LUMPUR:
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS
BY H. T. ROSS, GOVERNMENT PRINTER.

1948.

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TABLE OF EQUIVALENTS.

1 kati	=	1⅓ lbs.
1 dollar	=	100 cents
1 dollar	=	2*s*. 4*d*.
1 gantang of milled rice	=	8 lbs. approx.

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THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

I.—INTRODUCTION.

SIR,

1. At the request of the two Malayan Governments, we were appointed by you in January last to make an inquiry into conditions in Malaya under the following terms of reference:

> "To look thoroughly into the situation of labour and the trade unions in Malaya, giving such helpful guidance as you can to the Governments and the trade unions and make a Report".

We now have the honour of submitting our Report.

2. We left London Airport on 3rd February and, after two days' delay in Cairo owing to engine trouble, arrived in Singapore on Sunday, 8th February. The same morning we conferred with the Governor, Sir Franklin Gimson, the Commissioner for Labour, Singapore, and the Acting Trade Union Adviser for Malaya, and after a further conversation later in the day with Sir Edward Gent, the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, decided on a preliminary programme to cover both Singapore and the Malayan Peninsula. This included a fortnight for meetings and discussions in Singapore and three to four weeks in the States of the Federation,* with a final stay in Singapore to clear up outstanding points.

(II).—PROCEDURE ADOPTED.

3. Our main object was, of course, to get first-hand information, and to this end we sought meetings with representatives of the Trade Unions and Employers, with District Officers, Mentri Besars, British Advisers and the Heads of Government and Municipal Departments; had private talks with individual trade unionists and rank and file workers, managers and employers, and with men and women interested in public affairs and leaders of the various political organisations, especially those who had a pre-war knowledge of Malaya and were thus able to compare pre-war standards and background with the present-day situation. We also visited factories, workshops, laundries, harbours and docks, rubber estates, tin and coal mines, hospitals, the Leper Colony, "shop houses", slums and housing estates, workers' canteens and had some of our meals in people's restaurants, as well as other cafês and private houses—in short did our best in the limited time at our disposal to get a complete picture of the lives of the different types of Malayan workers.

Our Itinerary and Day-to-Day Diary is given in Appendix No. 1.

4. Generally speaking, our inquiries were welcomed. There was, at first, in some quarters, suspicion as to the purpose of our inquiry and of our motives and of those who had asked for the inquiry. These suspicions existed not only in political circles but amongst some employers and trade unions. The two Malayan Governments, therefore, felt it desirable to issue a statement to the Press and we each gave a short broadcast describing our mission.

These appear in Appendix No. 2.

* We shall refer to "MALAYA" when writing of both the Colony of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya and the "FEDERATION" when referring to the States and Settlements of the Peninsula.

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

5. Sensing this attitude of suspicion, we decided to hold separate meetings with the various Unions and with Employers' representatives and to hold them in private in the absence of the Press and with no others present save, when necessary, interpreters, in order to create confidence and to ensure that all concerned should be able to speak frankly and, if they wished, confidentially and free from embarrassment. We gave a Press conference at intervals to ensure that an accurate and reasonable account of our proceedings was given to the general public.

In addition, we asked for written statements on:

(*a*) Present wage rates, hours of duty and general conditions of employment.

(*b*) Pre-war wage rates, hours of duty and general conditions of employment.

(*c*) Whether collective bargaining was in operation and, if so, whether signed agreements existed.

Eighty-two trade unions sent in memoranda, in addition to giving verbal evidence, and altogether we held upwards of fifty group meetings with trade unions and employers, apart from individual conversations and discussions.

6. The fact that at nearly all the meetings with trade unionists and at a few with employers, we had to make use of interpreters, made our task more formidable. At a majority of the talks with trade unionists, most of the speeches and remarks (including our own) had to be interpreted three (occasionally four) times—into Malay, Chinese and Tamil (sometimes two Chinese dialects were in evidence and we had Telegu Indians as well as Tamils), but we believe that our own background and trade union experience and the informal methods adopted helped considerably to remove suspicion, to avoid too much "speaking to the gallery" and to enable us to get to some extent at any rate into the minds of the workers. Throughout, we had constantly in mind how far the policy of encouraging trade unionism had been a success and to what extent responsible organisations for collective bargaining had been established and developed.

(III).—GENERAL BACKGROUND.

7. Malaya comprises:

(1) the newly-formed Federation embracing the nine Malay States of the Peninsula: Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perak, Pahang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Johore, and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca under a High Commissioner, a Federal Executive Council and a Federal Legislative Council, and

(2) The Colony of Singapore under a Governor, an Executive and a Legislative Council.

Matters of common policy in these territories and the British territories in Borneo are co-ordinated by a Commissioner-General.

As will be described, the population of Malaya is of remarkable variety of race, religion and culture, and we were to find that this variety, or "plural society" as it has been called, especially when it is largely illiterate, makes not only administration but trade union organisation much more difficult than when a society is homogeneous. The races numerically most important are the Malays, Chinese and Indians. The Malays are looked upon as the original inhabitants, and the Chinese and Indians are immigrants. The Chinese had trade and diplomatic contacts with Malays from an early period but their

permanent settlements apparently began about the 17th century and grew rapidly in the 19th when they came flocking to the tin mines especially in the 'fifties. The Tamils (South Indian) were brought over in large numbers to develop the rubber plantations. Since the liberation, the entry of aliens has been governed by individual permits.

(1).—THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

(i).—Area, Cultivation and Population.

8. The territory covered by the Federation is approximately 50,850 square miles (i.e., about the size of England) and is part of the southernmost extension of the continent of Asia. The Peninsula is divided by a series of mountain ranges running north-south. To the east and west of the outside ranges are the coastal plains, mainly alluvial and in the south is a region of lowland broadly comprising the State of Johore. Settlement and development have taken place chiefly in the west. About 80 per cent. of the whole area is still primeval jungle, mountain or swamp; 14 per cent. under rubber; 2.4 per cent. under padi and 2.1 per cent. coconut and oil palms.

9. The latest census (1947) shows the total population to be 4,877,678. Of this number 2,135,811 (43.7 per cent.) are Malays; 264,630 (5.4 per cent.) Malaysians; 1,882,874 (38.6 per cent.) Chinese; 534,148 (11.0 per cent.) Indians, whilst the remainder consist of 9,115 (0.2 per cent.) Europeans; 9,989 (0.2 per cent.) Eurasians and 38,671 (0.9 per cent.) others.

(ii).—Population, Distribution and Density.

10. The main groups are unevenly distributed. In Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Johore, the Chinese form the largest section, whilst in Malacca, Pahang, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis the Malays predominate. The population density, of course, varies considerably. The mean is 95.7 per square mile. Broadly, the whole territory may be classified under five heads:

(*a*) Urban areas—density several thousands to the square mile.
(*b*) Continuous mining areas—approx. 700 to the square mile.
(*c*) Continuous small holdings—approx. 700 to the square mile.
(*d*) Estate and discontinuous small holdings—approx. 180 to the square mile.
(*e*) Virgin forest and swamp—with negligible population.

The areas (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) are on the west side of the mountain ranges.

(iii).—Racial Characteristics and Labour Distribution of Races.

11. The three principal races, Malays, Chinese and Indians naturally have quite different backgrounds, traditions and characteristics. So far as the workers generally are concerned, these differences express themselves to some extent in their choice of occupation and their attitude and reactions to authority, to methods of work and to trade union organisation.

12. We were greatly interested and much impressed by the fact that each race had its champions amongst employers and Heads of Government Departments. The Malays were described to us as "Nature's Gentlemen", fond of "the simple life"—agriculture and fishing—and only slowly adapting themselves to modern industrial conditions. They have pleasing and attractive personalities, much native intelligence, are reliable and under stress of necessity are now taking more readily to certain types of industrial work. They

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report (paragraphs 80 - 190) is perhaps striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

make very good chauffeurs and car drivers, but prefer working on the estates or in Government Departments to factories, and rural pursuits to either. The uniformed police are mostly Malays.

13. The Chinese, notwithstanding their recognition of their obligations to their family and particular "clan" are great individualists. They are pushful, even aggressive, in business, industrious and hard working—both men and women—and amazingly hardy and adaptable although in some matters curiously conservative. Both European and Chinese employers speak with admiration of their capacity, industry and adaptability—except when they are intimidated, or are interfered with by their secret societies.

14. The Indians—mostly Tamils from the South of India, although there are a few Malayalees and Telegus—are, no doubt because of their origin and previous environment, more dependent, far more conservative as regards food, less hardy and much less individualistic than the Chinese. In general the Indian prefers and works more satisfactorily on day work whilst the Chinese are keener on piece-work.

15. As will be seen from Appendix No. 3 (A), the Indian labourers outnumber all the other races on the estates and Government work, but very few enter the mines and factories, whilst the Chinese outnumber all in the mines and factories, are very well represented on the estates, and largely eschew Government employment. Goodly numbers of the Malays work on the estates and for the Government, but only a few enter the factories and mines. It is also clear from the comparatively small total numbers of them shown as wage-earners in these occupations as compared with the other races, that considerable numbers of Malays are "otherwise gainfully occupied." They are perhaps more difficult to classify than the other races, for a Malay peasant may plant padi, grow coconuts, vegetables and fruit trees, fish and tap rubber in the padi off-season.

(2).—SINGAPORE.

(i).—Area and Population.

16. The total area of the Colony of Singapore (including the small adjacent islets) is approximately 220 square miles, the municipal area occupying about 1/7th of this area, or just over 31 square miles. The total population (1947 census preliminary figures) is 940,756, 679,953 of whom live in the municipal area. According to reliable estimates the "squatter" population of the Island is at least 100,000.

Of the full total 73,802 (7.9%) are Malays; 42,781 (4.5%) Malaysians; 728,523 (77.5%) Chinese; 71,300 (7.6%) Indian; 8,790 (0.9%) Europeans; 9,012 (0.9%) Eurasians, and others 6,548 (0.7%).

(ii).—Population, Distribution and Density.

17. Taking the Singapore municipal area as approximately 20,000 acres, the overall density is 34 persons per acre. This compares with 57 persons per acre in Greater Bombay and 53 persons per acre for the County of London (the County of London Plan would reduce this number to 33). In the town of Singapore itself, however, 300,000 are crowded into an area of 1,000 acres giving a density of no fewer than 300 persons per acre. We are making further reference to this question in Section VI, "Housing".

(iii).—Racial Characteristics and Labour Distribution of Races.

18. The characteristics of the three races are dealt with in paragraphs 12-14, but it seems desirable to add here that the Singapore labourers classed as Malays in Appendix No. 4, are mostly not of the same stock as those in the Federation. They come from the Islands

surrounding Singapore, from Sumatra, Java, and the Celebes, and the number of real Malays among them is small. It will be seen, from the figures given in paragraph 16, that nearly 4/5ths of the population of Singapore are Chinese. Reference to Appendix No. 4 will show that, as in the Federation of Malaya, the majority of the labourers* in factories, mills, transport and commercial enterprises are Chinese. The Indians, who number only 1/10th of the Chinese, actually outnumber them in the Government and Municipal Services.

(IV).—WAGES AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.

(1).—GENERAL.

19. In considering wages and general conditions of employment, we have borne in mind that Asian, rather than Western European, standards of living must be taken into account; also that the whole of Malaya (sharing this fate with Burma, Hong Kong, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei only amongst the British Colonies and Protected States) was over-run and occupied by the enemy during the War and that only two years or so have elapsed since the capitulation and the resumption of British Government.

20. It seems to be generally agreed that, if the standard of living of the workers in Malaya in pre-war days was low, it was better than in the surrounding countries, that it was being steadily improved and that there was widespread contentment. There was no lack of employment, and rice, the chief food of workers of all types, was plentiful and cheap, costing only five cents per kati. A heavy worker consumed up to 36 katis a month, costing a mere $1.80. The War and the Occupation, of course, changed all this and threw everything into confusion. Although there was comparatively little destruction, there was widespread disorganisation and disintegration, and wholesale decay in property and machinery, due to misuse and lack of renewal. There was also terrible under-feeding of large sections of the population. In the later stages of the Occupation and prior to the establishment of law and order, there was much looting.

21. With the physical upset and changes, came an inevitable corresponding change in the outlook and mental attitude of the population. We are dealing in greater detail with some of these changes in later sections of our report. Here, in giving a broad outline of the general conditions of employment, we would draw attention to one or two matters which have a general bearing.

22. The increase in the cost of living over pre-war is officially estimated as between 300 and 400 per cent. Only in a small minority of cases, however, have wages been increased by this percentage; generally the increase is two to three times the pre-war rate. In exceptional cases, the increase has been as much as five to eight times, but these are rare and there are many anomalies. Clerical and salaried workers have been badly hit, not least in Government employment where increases have been both tardy and inadequate. The bulk of the workers naturally contend that these wage increases have not kept pace with the actual increase in the cost of living, whilst the employers contend that many of the rates are quite uneconomic. Many employers agree that the standard of living of the unskilled worker is low, but add that wages in relation to output are very high. They admit that there is still some weakness owing to under-feeding during the Occupation, but assert that this is by no means sufficient to account for the low output.

* The word "labourer" as defined in the Singapore Labour Ordinance covers all types of Asian workers who earn their living by their hands or by recruiting or supervising labourers, but does not include domestic servants.

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report (paragraphs 60 - 67), the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

23. It should be said that this estimated cost of living increase does not take into account the fact that a large portion of food and other necessities is bought in the open ("black") market. The official cost of rice for example is 30 cents per kati, but as only a limited ration—2 katis* per week plus 2 katis for heavy workers—is available at the controlled price, rice is bought in the open market where it costs anything from 60-90 cents per kati. In all our discussions we got back sooner or later to the same point. "If only", said employers, workers and officials alike, "there was a sufficient supply of rice at a reasonable price, industrial troubles would be solvable."

24. Then the housing situation has been greatly worsened by the almost universal modern tendency of workers to flock into the towns. In Malaya this tendency was intensified because of the population's felt need for greater security and the better possibilities of food and employment afforded by the towns during the War; also by the Japanese policy of herding people into towns where they were more easily kept under surveillance. In Singapore, a most striking example, the population has practically doubled since the outbreak of War, and is now about one million whilst housing accommodation is even less than it was prior to the Occupation. Judged by Asian standards the overcrowding is intense and to Western eyes incredibly bad.

25. The Labour Ordinance of the Straits Settlements and the parallel legislation in the Federation lay down a nine hours limit but broadly speaking, the eight-hour day is in operation throughout Malaya in both public and private employment. Extra pay for overtime is prescribed by the labour legislation of the two territories which also provides for a six-day week. Before the War it was the normal practice of most Chinese employers to provide food for their workers. The shortages caused by the War and the consequent rationing of rice inevitably made a big change, but a fair number still provide one meal. Others buy rice at the open ("black") market prices and sell to their employees at the official price as the best and sometimes only way to secure a contented staff. A fair number still provide one, others two, and a few, but these are rare, even three meals a day.

26. Housing accommodation is also provided by a large number of employers. Reference to Appendix No. 5 will show that in the Federation provision of housing is usual on Rubber Estates, and both accommodation and food to tin mine employees (dredging and hydraulic); both also to those engaged on the coconut, oil palm and tea plantations and in forestry, the saw mills and general engineering. Appendix No. 6 gives corresponding particulars for Singapore.

27. One of the minor but exasperating troubles complained of by employers arises from the varying holidays, rest days and holy days, of the different races—the Friday of the Mohammedan, the Sunday of the Christian, the New Year of the Chinese and so on. Some employers consider there should be some standardisation laid down by ordinance. On the other hand certain Christian workers complained bitterly that the Government had, by introducing regulations of this kind, compelled them to take holidays on Hindu, Mohammedan or Chinese "Feast Days" which had no significance whatever for them, instead of giving them a choice as previously allowed. Such difficulties are of course avoided in establishments employing, for example, all Chinese or all Indian; but it is difficult to see and apply a complete remedy where several races or religious sects are

* We understand the rice ration has been increased since this report was prepared.

employed. A Scotsman employed in a factory or on British Railways in Scotland may have January 1st and 2nd as holidays in lieu of Christmas and Boxing Day. South of the Border he has, generally speaking, to conform to the English practice.

28. Employers, with Government co-operation, might well agree, however, as some do, on a general scheme of recognised holidays to include a minimum number of days with pay.

(2).—PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES.

(A).—THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

(i).—*Rubber and other Plantations.*

29. Rubber is classed as the principal export of Malaya (40 per cent. of the world's rubber is produced in the Federation) and as a goodly proportion of Government revenue comes from the industry, it has a special place in the economy of the country.

30. We visited several rubber plantations including Kirby and Dublin estates. Incidentally the latter alone pays $230,000 a year as export tax on its rubber. We spent some hours on these estates, were shown the budgrafting and the whole process of rubber production from the tapping to the despatch of latex in tanks, or after its manufacture into sheets of crepe rubber. We also inspected the housing accommodation, hospitals and schools.

31. A searching and objective investigation into the conditions of Indian Labourers working in the rubber industry was made by the late Right Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, P.C., C.H., in 1937 and his observations are largely true to-day notwithstanding war-time changes and differences. He reported that the "Labour Department in Malaya has established an effective control over employment, particularly on estates. It operates mainly in the interests of the Indian labourer, and renders him sympathetic and efficient service". He went on to point out that in 1928 a standard wage for men was 50 cents and for women 40 cents per day (55 and 46 respectively in special areas), but substantial cuts were made during the depression of the 'thirties and that it was not until 1937 that the standard rates reached 45 and 36 cents. These standard rates were enforced in certain key areas only. Mr. Sastri urged that the 1928 standard should be universally established and continued. At the time of our enquiry wage rates were roughly three times pre-war but we were informed that, after conversations with the unions, new rates are to be put into operation on the majority of the estates—that is on those whose owners are members of the Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association—as from the 1st May. These standard rates will be the subject of a Directive, not the result of collective bargaining as the M.P.I.E.A. contend that notwithstanding the formation of a number of Rubber Workers' Unions, a suitable reasonable body with whom to negotiate a national agreement has yet to be formed. We should explain that the figures given in Appendix No. 5 (which are being superseded) are based on returns from employers and give only a general average. While they correspond in the main to those supplied by the Unions, they do not apply on all the estates, particularly the smaller ones.

32. The old type of housing accommodation ("the coolie lines") was condemned before the war by the Labour Department and a modern cottage-type of house began to be provided. Progress on this reconstruction has inevitably been delayed by the war and, particularly on the smaller and less prosperous estates, by the high and rising costs. Buildings which normally cost $300 a room now cost, we were assured, $1,200. Skilled carpenters in particular are at a premium.

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33. Medical attention and Hospital services are generally good and on the better managed estates excellent. It is the practice even on the largest for several of the estates to combine in order to enable the best of skilled attention to be available. The hospitals we visited were first-class, but on some of the smaller estates medical services are inadequate and far from satisfactory. The free provision covers employees and their families.

34. On certain of the coconut, oil palm and tea cultivation estates where wages and overtime rates were similar, food as well as accommodation was provided but the estimated total value is not higher than the accommodation provided on the rubber estates.

35. We should explain that it is laid down in the labour legislation of Malaya that on all large estates, schools for the children of estate employees must be provided by the employers. The latter therefore build and maintain the schools and it is the Government's policy to supply and pay the teachers.

(ii).—*Tin Mining.*

36. Tin is classed with rubber as a principal export and revenue producer. The mines are prosperous and the Chinese employers provide food as well as accommodation for their workers. European employers do not provide food but pay higher wage rates to compensate for this. Overtime is paid at the rate of time-and-a-half as compared with a lower rate on the plantations but there is a legislative requirement of double pay after nine hours work. The main credit for the earlier development of the industry must go to the Chinese. In 1912, Chinese mines were responsible for 80 per cent. of the country's output, but thereafter British enterprise, with its greater resources took the lead (the Chinese whilst displaying great ingenuity do not take readily to the introduction of modern scientific equipment) and by 1940 was producing about 70 per cent. of the total output. Most of the tin comes from alluvial deposits but one of the largest lode tin-mines in the world is in the State of Pahang. We were able to visit dredging and gravel pump mines, the former European and the latter Chinese owned, the labour being mostly Chinese. The effect of the war on tin production was much more serious than on rubber: dredges were sunk and great damage done to hydraulic and gravel pump mines. The production of tin-ore in 1939 was 44,627 long tons; in 1946 8,432 and in 1947 36,078—*see* Appendix No. 3 (B). Labour relations we found to be reasonably good. There had been more unrest in the Chinese than the European mines, but the strikes were apparently "unofficial".

(iii).—*Coal.*

37. The Batu Arang Coal Mine is the only one in the whole of Malaya. It is worked partly open-cast with a 40 ft. seam and partly underground. There are 3,000 employed at the mine and they are organised in three Unions catering for the staff, engineers and the coal-face workers. The Unions and the Management carry out collective bargaining and enter into agreements. Of the total workers 60 per cent. are Chinese and 40 per cent. Indian: there is an insignificant number of Malays. The whole of the employees live in the Company's houses on the estate. The output of coal averages 1,000 tons a day. The Company has built several schools in the village catering for the different nationalities and, as on the estates, pay for their upkeep although the Government provides teachers and pays their salaries.

38. The coal cutters both underground and on the surface are paid on the tonnage rate and receive between $3 and $7 a day underground, and $2.50 to $6 on the surface. Timber men receive $6 to $10; shot firers $2; labourers $1.30; Grade I fitters $3.20 and

carpenters $3 per day. There is an extra rice ration for the heavy manual workers and these receive 60 cents a day cost-of-living bonus. Those who do not receive the extra rice, have a cost-of-living bonus of 80 cents a day. The employer supplies their living quarters, lighting, water, three days' holiday with pay, and half wages up to 14 days in case of sickness.

(iv).—*The Malayan Railway.*

39. The Malayan Railway has its Headquarters at Kuala Lumpur, where workshops extend over some 50 or 60 acres. Prior to the war, the permanent way, locomotives, rolling stock and general equipment were of a high standard, considered quite equivalent to Western European standards, but the war played havoc with all four. Very creditable efforts are being made to restore the prior standards.

40. All races without discrimination are employed by the Railway, and we received excellent reports of them. They are organised in six Unions, viz., The Locomotive Enginemen's Union, The Malayan Railway Traffic Operating Union, All-Malayan Railway Workers' Union, The Permanent Way Officers' Union, The Signalmen's Union and The Malayan Railway Junior Officers' Union.

41. Rates of pay and general conditions of service are set out in official circulars printed in English, Malay, Tamil and Chinese, so that all workers may be adequately informed. The procedure for dealing with discipline cases is also good. A special feature of the Service is the work of a Social Welfare Officer responsible direct to the General Manager. The first officer to occupy this post is now the Trade Union Adviser to both the Federation and Singapore Governments and his successor also from the British Railway Service and the National Union of Railwaymen has likewise secured the confidence of men in all grades. Other Government Departments and large private firms employing considerable numbers would do well to follow this example of appointing a Personnel Officer.

42. While we were in Malaya special consideration was being given to the formation of Whitley Council machinery to cover the whole of the Railway and we had an opportunity, of which we were glad to take advantage, to attend a meeting of the Sub-Committee considering a suggested scheme. The officers of the various unions displayed a good knowledge of the matter and considerable acumen in providing for likely difficulties. We are glad to say that the full scheme has now been approved and arrangements are in hand to link it up at the highest levels with other Departments of the Government Service. The only Union remaining outside the scheme as drawn, is that of the Junior Officers, who claim, not without some justification, that their grades, having had a good education, ought not to have their claims considered and settled by a preponderance of unions whose members do not understand their conditions and have not had the same training and education. We do not think they should remain outside the scheme altogether, but should come into the general arrangements at a higher level. A distinction is generally drawn by the two Governments between the wages and salaried staffs—e.g., by the appointment of two Commissions, the "Silcock" to consider wages, and the "Trusted", salaries. Probably an arrangement along the lines of the British Railway arrangements whereby salaried staff have their own sectional council but are linked up with the other grades at the top level by a National Tribunal might with advantage be adopted.

(v).—*Harbours and Ports.*

43. Malaya's most important port, that of Singapore is dealt with below, but reference may be made here to Penang Harbour, Port Swettenham and Malacca. *PENANG HARBOUR* is a State-owned port which employs 750 casual men for the loading

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and discharging of vessels. There is a jetty at which two fairly large vessels can berth, but most of the discharging is done in mid-stream, overside, from and into barges. The 510 wharf workers are paid on a piece-work basis and earn on an average $1.80 a day of 8-hours, plus food to the value of 54 cents. These are considered to be heavy workers and are granted an extra allowance of rice each week which is purchased by the contractor and supplied free. Overtime is paid at double rates. Contractors supply all the labour. The 240 stevedores aboard ship receive on an average $2.20 per day, with food valued at 54 cents. As with the wharf workers, the men are supplied by labour contractors who are paid a tonnage rate by the Harbour Board and who pay the men daily rates. The men are members of the "Harbour Board and Waterfront Workers' Union." They are casual workers and work about 25 days a month. A sub-contractor receives the orders for work and passes them on to the gangs of men. The number of men per gang in the hold of a vessel is usually 10 or 12. The sub-contractor arranges a piece-work rate with the Harbour Board from which he pays the gangs of labour required. He also supplies the men with one meal, the cost of which he receives from the ships' agents. No rent allowance or living quarters are provided. When men are called out by night to await a vessel and she does not arrive, the men are not paid. We were informed that the workers desire that this port should follow the lead of Singapore (*see* below) and the Harbour Board employ labour direct.

44. *PORT SWETTENHAM* is also Government owned. It is a long jetty with a series of small ones. The ocean liners anchor off shore between the mainland and the islands and discharge their cargoes overside into barges which are then towed to the jetties. The smaller vessels berth alongside the jetties. The annual trade of the port is approximately 600,000 tons in equal quantities of imports and exports. The chief article of export is rubber in sheets or latex. The number of men employed in the port is over 1,000. The docker works an 8-hour day for which he receives $2.20. There are two contractors who do the work aboard the ships; one stevedore contracts for 90 per cent. of the labour and the other for 10 per cent. The men working on the wharf are guaranteed 26 days a month (this is an exceptional arrangement desired by other workers) and the men employed aboard, 20 days. They work an 8-hour day and are paid at a daily rate, which for the board worker varies from $1.60 to $2.45; for labourers $2.50 to $2.95; for deckmen $2.90 to $3.35, with $4 to $6 for mandores. Meal hours are paid for at overtime rates of double time. Sunday work carries a little extra above the ordinary day.

45. The men are supplied with all meals when working and have house, water and light provided free. They receive free medical and hospital treatment. A funeral allowance is paid to the relatives of a deceased employee and all men are covered by insurance for workmen's compensation. First half day=7.30 a.m.-11.30 a.m.; 2nd half= 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. Work from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. counts for a full day.

46. The contractor to the Malayan Railway, who supplies the labour for loading and unloading at Port Swettenham, doing mainly the shore work, employs 40 gangs of men, 38 of them Indian and 2 Chinese with a *mandore* each, 58 lightermen and 8 *kepalas*. They are guaranteed 26 days' wages a month. They have one day each week off without pay. If they are required to work on their day off, they are paid time and a half. Each gang has the same day off every week. The rates of pay per day are *mandore* $2.80; labourers $2.20; lighterman *mandore* $2.80; lighterman $2. Overtime is paid for at approximately double time. The wages are paid monthly on the 2nd of the month, and the employer supplies 3½ gantangs of rice free per worker per month. Men sustaining accidents at work and those suffering from malaria or pneumonia receive free medical

aid and pay. The wives and children also receive free medical aid when sick. Funeral expenses up to $30 are paid on the death of a labourer and the gang is given the day off with pay. Housing accommodation is provided or housing allowance in lieu thereof. The contractor undertakes to pay the two teachers at the school for the dockers' children. He assists in obtaining passages for labourers back to India. He also agreed that when extra gangs are taken on, it shall be done through the Harbour Trade Union, and when a substitute is appointed to take the place of a *mandore* who is going on leave, he shall be nominated by the Union.

47. The port of *MALACCA* is very small, the large vessels are anchored off shore and the cargoes are discharged overside into barges. The barges are then towed into the harbour and discharged at the wharf. All the work is done on a piece-work basis. There are three gangs of 35 in a gang each with a leading ganger. These three, who are elected by the men, and are also President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Union, negotiate with the employers and fix a piece-work rate which is accepted by the men, all of whom are Chinese. The foreman as ganger receives a share-and-a-half for responsibilities. All the men are casually employed and work on an average 20 days a month. There are no cranes or winches on the wharf and all the discharging and loading is done by hand. They work an 8-hour day, and Sunday is only worked in cases of emergency when the men receive double rates. About 30 of them live communally in lines, situated in the dockside, and all contribute towards the cost of the food consumed.

(B).—SINGAPORE.

(i).—*Singapore Port and Harbour.*

48. The free port of Singapore is the unloading and distributing centre for the Malayan archipelago, the gate-way from Europe and India to the Far East and Australia, and the largest port east of Suez—indeed one of the world's finest ports. It was taken over by the Government in 1905 and placed under the control of the Singapore Harbour Board. The Board is a statutory body, and the whole of its capital is owned by the Government. Its constitution is identical with that of the new Colonial Development Corporation, though, of course, its duties and powers are different. It has two main operating departments. One is the Traffic Department which is responsible for the loading and unloading of ships and the handling of cargo in general. The other is the Dockyard Department which is concerned with the repair of all ships and the building of small local vessels. These two operating departments are served by a Secretariat, Accounts Department, Civil Engineering Department and Electrical Engineering Department, all of which are common to them both.

49. There are approximately 6,000 men engaged in handling the cargoes, of whom 60 per cent. are Chinese, 30 per cent. Indian and the other 10 per cent. mostly Malays. They have an eight-hour day on a double shift basis and work Sundays as well as weekdays. All discharging is done by winches from ships on the wharf or into lighters and the goods are then drawn by hand-trucks to godowns or warehouses. The men on the wharf work in gangs of 25 under a leader known as a *mandore*, and in the ships' holds in gangs of 20, also under a *mandore*. Generally speaking, each gang consists of men of the same nationality—Chinese or Indian—and these gangs both work and eat separately. All are on day-work; there is no piece-work. The average output per gang is 7½ tons. In pre-war days, we were informed, it was approximately 11 tons. This, if correct, goes to support

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

60. A special feature of both Departments has been the establishment of people's restaurants and kitchens; sponsored restaurants; approved and family restaurants and free meals for children. The work done in this connection is admirable. The Department in the Federation set up 65 people's restaurants throughout the States and dozens of feeding centres, where cheap, wholesome, well-balanced and even free meals in special cases were and are still being provided. In Singapore the Department entered the "food-business" early in its career operating under the open market on a self-supporting strictly business basis. The Government loaned the capital but there was no subsidisation. In six months the Department cooked and served 1,321,115 meals for the people of Singapore, and an equivalent number of meals was provided under the ancillary sponsored schemes. Food contractors were excluded so that the full effect of all economies was passed on to the customer. The highest price charged for a meal was 35 cents (approximately 10*d*.) but in a few months lunches were sold at 15 cents and breakfast snacks at 10 cents; later still a meal, with China tea thrown in, for 8 cents! These meals were both tasty and nutritious. We ourselves paid an unexpected visit and had a balanced and satisfying meal for 35 cents served in one of the restaurants used by clerical workers.

61. The full story of these successful experiments, including sponsored restaurants and people's kitchens (supplying daily in Singapore at the height of the food shortage nearly 40,000 mid-day meals) and of their continued value is told by the Departments in their reports. Among the fine indirect effects of this work have been the lowering of prices in other restaurants, the countering of inflationary tendencies and the improvement, to some degree at any rate, of the conservative and unbalanced feeding habits of sections of the population.

(VI).—HOUSING.

62. The post-war housing problem is world-wide and certainly Malaya has it to contend with in an aggravated form for, as already stated, to the usual Asian overcrowding, and the universal modern tendency (unless checked by proper planning) of populations to crowd into urban centres, there has been added the extra congestion caused by country-dwellers flocking into the towns for security during the war—*see* para. 24. As in the case of other dependent territories, planning in the modern English sense has not been studied until quite recently, nor have the Governments and Municipalities possessed the necessary powers to deal adequately with the situation. Although as already pointed out, many employers, including the Government and Municipalities, have provided housing accommodation for their work-people and the Labour Departments have condemned the old "coolie lines" and insisted on accommodation of a better type being provided, only the fringe of the problem has been or can be touched by such limited methods.

63. We visited a number of housing sites in the Federation and Singapore and all we saw confirmed us in this view. Improvement is slow and the death-rate is high. In Singapore for example the death-rate is between three and four times that of London. About one-sixth of these deaths are due to T.B., and no less than one-third to chest diseases. These figures are a revelation of over-crowding and show how serious the problem is from the health point of view. We were shown some excellent work by the Local Authority at Kuala Lumpur in transferring people from the slums (which were then pulled down) to a new housing estate, and the much larger schemes undertaken by the Singapore Improvement Trust; but clearly much bigger and better schemes are needed and these will necessitate greatly extended powers as well as finance. It is not only a question of housing but of planning, with the necessary adaptation to Malayan needs and outlook,

on the lines made familiar in this country by the Barlow, Uthwatt, and Scott reports, the series of Planning Acts and the Abercrombie and other plans which have not only been drawn but are surely, if all too slowly, being applied.

64. Singapore is an outstanding example of what is needed. Here is an island with a population approaching a million—nearly double that of pre-war. Out of this million, there are at least 100,000 "squatters" living for the most part in unsatisfactory dwellings with neither proper drainage nor sanitation. Then, although there is ample living space for all the inhabitants, nearly half of those in the municipal area are crowded into 1,000 acres giving a density of 300 to the acre. This teeming population is living mainly in over-crowded out-of-date shop-houses, in themselves most unsatisfactory. These areas and dwellings fully deserve the description in the Housing Report as depressing and soul destroying slums. The overcrowding in these dwellings must be seen to be believed. One cubicle 12′ × 12′ housed and slept sixteen persons and two other larger and better-class rooms we visited ten persons each. These were not exceptional.

65. Special mention should be made of the Singapore Improvement Trust formed after the first World War under a special ordinance of 1927 to deal with this problem which was recognised to be too big for the Municipality. The Trust functions over the whole Island. Its members comprise five who are *ex officio*, two Municipal Commissioners, one member from the Rural Board and five independent members appointed by the Government. It is largely Government financed and carries out Government policy. The Trust has been making a brave attempt (interrupted by the War) to tackle the problem. The ideas are there and the work they have been doing and the plans they have formulated as shown in the latest housing report, indicate that they are working on sound lines. The position is, however, that the Trustees have not the requisite powers. De-centralisation is essential if the slums are to be demolished and proper living space take place of congestion. Open spaces for playing-fields for children's play-grounds and public gardens as well as properly planned housing are all sadly needed. The land is available but the cost of acquiring it is prohibitive in view of its potential building value under obsolete laws. The area of open spaces at present administered by the Municipal Commissioners is less than 100 acres and the area under Government control may also be said to be negligible.

66. We understand that a pre-war plan of the Trust to acquire land for slum clearance and housing was frustrated by the power of the Courts and an appeal to the Privy Council by the land-owners, who secured a verdict in their favour. The decision was aptly described as a veritable landlords' charter. Promotion of a Bill to remedy this state of affairs was stopped by the war but another is now being drafted. It should be drawn on the lines of the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 and carried through without delay. The matter is certainly one of extreme urgency.

(VII).—COST OF LIVING.

67. In the Report of the Joint Wages Commission, Chairman Dr. T. H. Silcock (issued July, 1947), the causes of unrest in Malaya are given as "disappointment and disillusionment, shortages of supplies, lack of houses and amenities, high prices and low wages and the ferment of new political ideas." It would be difficult to better that statement and, of course, "high prices and low wages" are not the least of those "causes". One of our difficulties, and we notice that the Joint Wages Commission came up against the same obstacle, was to get a clear idea of the wage needed to maintain the lowest-paid labourer above subsistence level, or to secure for the skilled labourers and clerical workers a

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estimate of an increase of between 300 and 400 per cent. is on the low side. To what degree this is offset by the smuggling of rice *out* of the country and the over-issue of ration cards we cannot say and we doubt if it is possible to form a reliable estimate.

75. There can we think be no doubt that the rationing of rice was necessary and that on the whole notwithstanding the intense individualism of the Chinese and some other sections of the population, it has been a success, but its antecedent development should be appreciated. For example during the Japanese Occupation of Perak the issue of ration cards was limited to 273,000 out of a population of 1,000,000. During the B.M.A. regime such limitations were, of course, abandoned, but there was a lack of care in issuing new ration cards and the rationing scheme got quite out of hand. There was, it should be understood, no registration and the census itself had its grave limitations, but there was undoubtedly a very large overissue of cards. So much so that the difference between the number of ration cards issued and the census was as high as 1,100,000—now reduced by 100,000—the discrepancy being greatest in the Chinese areas.* An authoritative opinion expressed to us that neither the census nor the ration card issue is accurate. There was undoubtedly an overissue of cards but probably the true population figure lies somewhere between.

76. To complete this general picture, a few comments are needed on (*a*), the international allocation to the Asian countries and (*b*), the Malayan rationing scheme more especially as our own approach to the problem was with the British control and rationing scheme in our minds and that *prima facie* there should have been more adequate control and more extensive rationing.

77. We are not convinced that Malaya receives its full quota under the I.E.F.C. arrangements or that some of the allowances are not made on political grounds as well as economic needs. We should point out in the first place that, so far as we know, Malaya is the only Eastern country which publishes proper figures of production and has a rationing scheme in operation—a scheme which covers hospital and public services as well as the general population. This means that other countries are apt to benefit from their own lack of discipline and records. It is reported to us, for instance, that Japan, an ex-enemy country enjoys a ration of nearly 3 2/3 katis per week more per head of population than Malaya. Both are rice-growing as well as rice-consuming countries. Again, we were informed that the Philippines received an allocation of 60,000 tons in 1947 but as they were not using this they supplied Malaya with 20,000 tons, but only at the exorbitant price of $700 a ton. Two-and-a-half months later, the Philippines reported a food crisis and were supplied with 15,000 tons, at the international price, from Siam—Siam which shipped to Malaya 72,000 tons, instead of the 103,000 tons allocated under the I.E.F.C. scheme.

78. It was strongly urged in evidence before the Joint Wages Commission that an effective system of price control should be instituted, but, except in regard to a few foodstuffs, cigarettes and certain textiles, nothing has been done in either the Federation or Singapore beyond this partial control of rice. There is we understand a regulation laying it down that shop-keepers must clearly ticket the sales price of their commodities. This seems to have been generally obeyed but we cannot see that the practice has either significance or value. The Joint Wages Commission came to the conclusion that "price control appears to be inevitably ineffective without rationing" and that "an

* Since this was written the discrepancy has been reduced by a further 160,000. Much of this reduction has been effected by voluntary surrender in the Malay areas and from Estate Labour.

extensive rationing scheme is obstructed by the apparent impossibility of securing enough co-operation to operate a 'points' system''. We are not sufficiently acquainted with Malaya to comment on this, but we notice with cordial approval that a further observation by the Commission ''that the possibilities of redistributive taxation are impeded by the unco-operativeness of the public'' has not deterred the Governments, notwithstanding a storm of protest, from instituting income tax in Malaya.

79. We have reached the following conclusions:

The rationing of rice was essential. Within its limitations it has worked well, and if it were abolished there would be great hardship particularly in the Malay areas. (We stress this latter point, as in addition to pressure for the free movement of rice within Malaya which in the circumstances is probably now desirable, there is the usual propaganda for the complete abolition of control).

The existence of the open market for the sale of rice at anything up to three times the controlled price (itself six times the pre-war price) is a grave blot on the rationing scheme. With our limited knowledge of Malaya and in the absence of a much more detailed inquiry we are not able to confirm or refute the contention that a complete rationing scheme and a stricter control of prices has been and is impracticable.

The complaint from several quarters that Malaya is not receiving its fair share of rice under the I.E.F.C. scheme should we think be specially investigated by the British Minister of Food.

The world food supply, with a constantly increasing population (especially in the rice-consuming countries) is, as Sir John Boyd Orr is constantly reminding Governments, in grave jeopardy. So far as Malaya is concerned the increase of rice production, whether by an increased acreage being put under padi cultivation; by an extension and improvement of irrigation; by mechanical aids to production (with due regard to the preservation of soil fertility) or by all or any of them is clearly of the first importance. We understand that a special investigation is now being made. We can only stress its urgency and reiterate that the solution of many, if not most of Malaya's industrial troubles depends on the availability for consumption of more and cheaper rice.

(VIII).—THE TRADE UNIONS.

(1).—GENERAL BACKGROUND: TRADE UNION ORIGINS.

80. The Trade Union Movement in Malaya is a complex one, and it goes without saying that to understand it one needs to know something of its background and history as well as its present-day status and component parts. Unlike the British Trade Union Movement, it lacks a common tradition. On one side, it derives from, or rather perhaps we should say has its connection with, the old-established Chinese Guilds and even Secret Societies; on another, it has its roots in the pre-war Societies, Associations and Clubs, many of which were registered under the Societies Ordinances of 1889 and 1895 and had social rather than industrial functions (in so far as they exercised the latter, some might well have been described as ''house unions''); on a third, from the Anti-Japanese Fighting Units of the Occupation period, and lastly, there are the largely-new organisations formed under the Trade Union Ordinance (Straits Settlements) and Enactment (Federated Malay States) of 1940, which, however, did not come into effective operation until 1946. In the main although, as will be described, the Chinese Guilds and Social Clubs and Societies carried out to a limited extent the functions of Trade Unions, employers until well after the first World War, dealt with their own largely un-organised work-people direct.

(2).—THE PRE-WAR POSITION.

(i).—Chinese Secret Societies.

81. The secret or Triad* Societies of the Chinese immigrants had their roots deep in Chinese history, but in comparatively recent times (the 17th Century) the Triad came into prominence as a political power in China and was proscribed. From then onwards it developed an intricate ritual similar to that of Freemasonry and indeed in its origin—with the motto of "Obey Heaven and Work Righteousness"—it appeared to have had similar aims. It developed into a powerful organisation having the power of life and death over its members, and wherever the Chinese settled, branches or lodges of the Triad Societies were established. (It may be added that wherever they were established there was trouble). They flourished in Singapore and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca throughout the greater part of the 19th Century as branches of large, powerful, mutual benefit and protection Societies covering the whole of the Chinese population. The lodges were, in fact, the only Civil Government recognised by the bulk of the Chinese. They settled disputes between members, whether criminal or civil, by arbitration and in any disputes between members of different societies the resources and the fighters of the rival societies were available. Serious fights occurred during the 19th Century involving at times the deaths of hundreds of participants.

82. In 1890 the Triad Societies were required by the Government of the Colony to dissolve. They continued to fuction illegally, however, and some of these unlawful societies with their hooligan activities still persist, particularly in Singapore; and groups of their members have infiltrated into the Trade Unions where their pernicious practices are a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the ordinary law-abiding workers and to the more responsible Trade Union members and officers.

(ii).—The Chinese Guilds.

83. The societies much more nearly akin to the Trade Unions as we know them are the Chinese Guilds. These, too, have existed in China for many centuries and their membership, like the European Craft Guilds of the Middle Ages included master-craftsmen, journey-men and apprentices. The usual type was governed by a committee of employers and employees. The Guilds settled rates of wages, hours of work, holidays and terms of apprenticeship, and in addition provided friendly benefits.

84. Legislation providing for the registration of Societies was passed in Singapore, Penang and Malacca in 1889 and in the Federated Malay States in 1895, and included among the Societies registered in the early years was a large proportion of guilds—each one as a rule being restricted to a particular tribe—Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkiens, Hailam, etc.

85. With rare exceptions, however, it was not until the 1920's that organisations specifically for employees began to be established. These were almost wholly Chinese and owed their inspiration to Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the father of the Chinese Republic. The period of enthusiastic and militant development of the Labour Movement in China was from 1924-1927 and as the stronghold of the Movement was the Province of Kwangtung, from which the majority of Chinese labourers in Malaya are drawn, it is not surprising that during this period the idea spread in Malaya that workers should have their own societies.

* Triad means "Three United"—Heaven, Earth and Man. With these three in unison there is complete peace and harmony.

(iii).—Clubs and Associations and House Unions.

86. In the meantime, with the passing of the Registration of Societies legislation, a stimulus was also given to the Mutual Benefit Societies, Clubs and Associations whose main purpose was social rather than industrial, but whose ulterior or secondary motive was the maintenance or improvement of the status and conditions of their members as employees. Some of the best and most democratic of present-day Unions began in this way.

87. In 1928, after a period of caution due to the revolutionary developments of the Unions in China the Malayan Governments decided to proceed with the registration of societies on a wider scale, ruling out only those organisations of a subversive character. Many of those registered under this new dispensation, although preserving the outward signs of mutual benefit societies and social clubs, became definitely Trade Union in function if not in name and took an active part in improving the conditions of employment. Skilled mechanics were among the first to develop their associations along trade union lines. The Selangor Engineering Mechanics Association which early began to exercise trade union functions and to bargain collectively was a typical example. The Chinese Engineering Mechanics Association which had a fairly long history and had almost a 100 per cent. membership in Singapore was another. Employers used that Union as a recruiting Agency, dealt with it in disputes and discussed mutual problems with it. The Clerical Union registered as long ago as 1920—an exceptionally well-conducted union—may also be cited. It may be said, therefore, that between 1928 and 1940 there was a development of embryo Trade Unions in Malaya. We should add that quite a number of employers said to us that, even so, there were few of what to-day would be called trade unions. They were mostly "House Unions" and the "family spirit" still prevailed.

88. At any rate in 1939 there were 427 Societies which came within the category of trade unions as defined in the later Ordinances: 191 catering for employers only; 92 employees only and 144 guilds (both). Of these, 175 (49 for employees only) were in Singapore. The large majority, in fact all but 70, were purely Chinese organisations, the 70 comprising mainly mixed bodies—e.g., Estate Owners' Associations, Staff Associations of Firms or Estates, Teachers' Associations, etc. A notable exception amongst the workers' trade unions was the Singapore Traction Company Employees' Association with a very cosmopolitan membership. Broadly speaking it may be said that with the exception of Estate and Mining labourers, there were few industries employing Chinese which were without some kind of organisation.

(iv).—Organisation amongst Indian Labourers in Malaya.

89. Among Indians in Malaya the great majority of whom come from the Madras Presidency and adjoining Indian States, there was not the same effort to form associations until shortly before the last World War. Then the development was along anything but Trade Union lines. Associations were formed for members of a particular caste or calling or for residents of a particular territorial division of Southern India and their objects were social, educational or cultural or, as was usually stated in applications for registration, the "general improvement" of the members. The underlying purposes appear to have been nationalistic and political—to induce Indians to improve their knowledge and widen their interests and activities, heighten their standing among the peoples of the country, to represent their interests and association with each other and to qualify themselves to play an increasing part in public affairs. The main body was the Central Indian Association.

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There were associations of Indians in which the majority of members were labourers but whose objects did not specifically include the betterment of their working conditions, and there were mixed associations, such as the Batu Arang Labour Association, which was formed to represent the labourers in negotiations with the employers of Malayan Collieries but in which the number of Indian labourers was small. There was no purely Indian association which could easily and rapidly have developed into a Trade Union, and Indians as a whole do not appear to have appreciated the value of such organisations to anything like the same extent as the Chinese. Maintenance of a proper standard of working and living conditions among Indian labourers was secured by special legal provisions which were a condition precedent to the Indian Government's permission of emigration from that country, and improvements in those conditions were obtained largely through the efforts of Labour Officers and the more progressive employers. Constant representations were made by the Government of India on broad policy and by their Agent in Malaya in individual cases.

(3).—THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND THE BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PERIOD.

(i).—General Effect on Trade Unions and the Workers.

90. The Japanese Occupation and the ensuing disruption and not less the period of the B.M.A. (British Military Administration) during which order was gradually restored preparatory to the Civil Government taking over once again, naturally and inevitably had a profound effect on trade union developments—as on the general life of the people. During the Occupation there was the negative effect—i.e., the prevention of the steady growth of the nascent unions (in some cases these were practically eliminated) and there was the positive side, viz., the new-found sense of freedom and the new direction given to Labour ideas which came with the liberation. With the release from the fear of the invaders there was a tremendous up-surge of feeling—a sense of freedom from control which found expression at times in acts of lawlessness. The War and the Occupation disrupted the economy of the country, but it also affected profoundly the outlook of its inhabitants. It is a commonplace, but one too often disregarded, that the post-war situation can be understood and appreciated only if the significance of the mental as well as of the physical changes which took place during the war period is grasped.

91. During the Occupation the workers of Malaya had no rights except the right to die, but during this period the Chinese and Indian workers saw powerful political organisations growing before their eyes—the Chinese noted the M.C.P. (Malayan Communist Party) organising groups of armies, and the Indians the growth and development of the Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army—anti-British organisations which encouraged Indian nationalism and worked with the Japanese. Some young Indians, it is true, were forced into these organisations but many others enjoyed this new-found power and prestige and were encouraged by the Japanese and by broadcasts. To oppose any of these organisations was extremely dangerous.

92. For our knowledge of the circumstances under which Labour had to live and work during the Occupation, particularly the activities of the resistance groups, we have drawn freely on official records. In addition, however, and this was an invaluable aid, we discussed with and received information not only from those who suffered under the Japanese and helped the partizans, but from those who actually took part in the guerilla warfare and consequently have an intimate knowledge of how this was conducted, and what post-war

plans were made by the leaders of the guerillas. To make the position clear it is necessary to give a brief history of the Malayan Communist Party which of course originated in China and during the Occupation undertook under British direction, the organising of these guerillas.

(ii).—The Influence of Chinese Communism and the Rise of the Malayan Communist Party.

93. From 1924 onwards, under the policy inaugurated by Sun Yat Sen, Russian Advisers to the Chinese Government and Russian Instructors for the army were appointed, and Russian Communist influence spread very rapidly. The C.C.P. (Chinese Communist Party) which began as a society of students and intellectuals in 1920, naturally blossomed out under this encouragement into a fully-fledged open Party and recruited members with extraordinary rapidity until in 1927 the Military leaders took alarm at the Party's encroaching power, a stand was made by the authorities, a "purge" took place, there was a general exodus of Chinese and Russian Communists and the National Party, the K.M.T. (Kuomintang) was re-formed free from Communist elements. By this time, the Chinese Labour Movement too had come under the control of the Chinese Communist Party and the National Government suspended the workers' and peasants' associations, and Labour activities practically ceased until the Labour Union Law of 1929, after which the movement was brought under the direct supervision and control of the Kuomintang.

94. The Malayan Communist Party was formed in 1928. It was not registered under the Societies legislation and remained a secret and illegal organisation until after the outbreak of World War 2. It was fairly-well organised and was behind some serious strikes in Malaya in 1937. When the War began in Europe before the Russians came in, it was, in accordance with the universal Communist instructions, impeding the War of the "Imperialists" by organising and fomenting strikes in the tin and rubber industries. These activities, again in accordance with Communist policy, ceased abruptly when Russia was invaded. When the Japanese invaded Malaya the Malayan Communist Party offered its services to the Governments and the offer was accepted. It was decided to organise groups of Communists and train them to operate as saboteurs and fifth columnists behind the Japanese lines. These groups were all Chinese.

(iii).—Organisation of the Guerillas and the Communist Forcing-House.

95. The guerillas were organised into seven "independent armies" and each army into separate "patrols" of about 50 men. The High Command was theoretically in the hands of a committee consisting of representatives of the M.P.A.J.A. (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army) (the fighting troops) and the anti-Japanese Union (the underground organisation) and the Malayan Communist Party. Actually it was undisguisedly in the hands of a nebulous Committee which was the High Command of the Malayan Communist Party. The rank and file were drawn almost exclusively from the lower-paid classes. The minor officers were the same with a sprinkling of more educated enthusiasts from whose ranks the higher officers were chosen. They were nearly all young men, still in their teens mostly, and they joined from a genuine desire to do something against the Japanese. But once in the jungle they found themselves in a veritable Communist forcing-house. Each control was a Communist cell with a military commander and a political commander on approved lines, and for the three odd years they lived in the jungle, these young men, ignorant and inexperienced, were given a thorough-going Communist education and filled up with the most crude and blatant lies about the War and conditions in the outside world.

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(iv).—The Post-War Plans of the Malayan Communist Party.

96. The object of this education was frankly stated to be the preparation for a Communist Republic of Malaya, and there is also the evidence of written documents. The methods to be used naturally enough included as a most important object the infiltration into all labour movements and places of employment. The most rigid discipline was enforced and all the guerillas whether members of the Malayan Communist Party or not, were subject to direction from the Party in all aspects of their lives, and the evidence goes to show they still are.

(v).—The Interim *de facto* Government.

97. Several weeks elapsed between the surrender of the Japanese and the arrival of the British Forces and the establishment of the British Military Administration in September, 1945. During this interim period the guerillas, who were approximately 90 per cent. Chinese, came down from the hills. The organised forces under British Officers and the unorganised groups thereupon obtained control of practically all areas. They were to all intents and purposes the *de facto* Government of the country. Not unnaturally, they spread the legend that they had driven the Japanese out and thus gained an added prestige. Those forces which were under good discipline and had British Officers attached to them behaved fairly well during this period, but there were many excesses committed under the name of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army and these destroyed to a very large extent the respect and affection with which the groups were regarded at any rate by the great majority of the Chinese community.

98. A disarmament and disbandment policy was steadily and considerately carried out, but numbers of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army did not readily abandon the methods which served them so well throughout the War and brought such power and material advancement to them during this interim period. Some turned to banditry and were no better than gang-robbers, but the better educated and more intelligent turned their attention to trade union organisation as described below in paragraphs 100-101.

99. The British Military Administration and later the Civil Administration worked under grave difficulties in their attempts to give every facility for the exercise of the freedoms of a democratic country—including freedom of speech, press and association, while preserving law and order. Our view, having had access to official documents and having made inquiries of a representative cross-section of the public is that on the whole a very reasonable balance was maintained and that due regard was paid to the aspirations of the people of Malaya and to the progressive policy of His Majesty's Government. Particular encouragement was given to the formation of responsible democratic trade unions and as a special help in this connection a Trade Union Adviser's Department was established. This was a unique development in Colonial Welfare and we refer to it again in more detail under Section IX.

(vi).—The Formation of the General Labour Union.

100. The Malayan Communist Party, however, continued with their post-war plans—plans matured and drilled into the guerilla groups during the Occupation as already described. Long before the end of the year, indeed by the time the British Military Administration took over in September, 1945, they had set up "cells", dubbed "trade unions" for every type of trade and worker—from miners and rubber workers to cabaret girls. None of these were in the smallest degree representative or democratic; and the evidence is conclusive, both as regards their activities and the men appointed to hold

office, that they were just mouthpieces of the Malayan Communist Party. Their organisation was well tried and powerful; they had money and they had contacts with other countries which provided them with plenty of efficient propaganda of a popular kind. They took the line that what the Labour Government in Britain meant was that they (the Malayan Communist Party) should have more power and that they were the people who should represent the rights of the workers in Malaya. They staged demonstrations throughout the country demanding their type of "democracy" and called upon the British Government to accept them as the representatives of the workers and the people of Malaya.

101. The above-mentioned "unions" were linked up and controlled by a General Labour Union, which accepted both unions and individuals into membership, and the few genuine Unions which had come down from pre-war days and were largely confined to the more skilled trades and clerical workers found themselves faced with a determination on the part of the Malayan Communist Party to allow no rival unions. The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army itself was disbanded but it continued to exist (and still does) in the form of ex-Comrades Associations and there was little attempt to disguise the connection between these Associations and the controlled unions.

(vii).—Government Policy: Encouraging Trade Unionism.

102. We met quite a number of people—not only employers—who expressed the opinion that "it was a great mistake immediately after the war to fling open the gates to trade unionism. The workers," they said, "did not understand trade unionism and were not ready for it". It is, of course, arguable that it might possibly have been wiser if, instead of putting the Trade Union legislation of 1940 into operation as it stood and giving entire freedom for unions to be formed as the workers chose and built up entirely voluntarily (as was the case with the British Unions), the Registrar had been empowered to draw lines of demarcation and to restrict the formation of any particular union to a specific industry or employment. This was done to some extent in respect of Government employments, but not elsewhere. On the larger question of the desirability of allowing and even encouraging the formation of trade unions, however, there can, we think be no two opinions. In the first place organisations claiming the right to represent the workers were already in being. It was therefore just a question whether, (*a*) responsible trade unions for collective bargaining should be encouraged or (where not in being) established under a proper system of registration; or (*b*), the field should be left entirely to the Malayan Communist Party; or (*c*), the whole Movement be driven underground. The Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Malayan Governments chose the first course, and, we are convinced, chose wisely.

(viii).—The General Labour Union and the Pan-Malayan Federations.

103. A Pan-Malayan Headquarters covering the whole of Malaya was established by the G.L.U. (General Labour Union) and a fairly considerable number of full-time officers and organisers appointed. When the registration of trade unions under the Ordinances of the two Governments began, however, difficulties were experienced in getting the General Labour Union registered, as its constitution did not comply with the separate regulations of the two Governments. In an attempt to get over the difficulties, a Trade Union Federation with two divisions was formed—one, the S.F.T.U. (Singapore Federation of Trade Unions) having its headquarters in Singapore and the other the P.M.F.T.U. (Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions) with headquarters in Kuala Lumpur—and these superseded the General Labour Union as the central organisations.

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(4).—THE PRESENT-DAY POSITION.

(i).—The Independent Unions and the Affiliated Unions.

104. Both in Singapore and the Federation, it is usual to separate the existing trade unions into two categories: first, the unions which are *not* affiliated to the Trade Union Federations mentioned above. These include all the unions catering for Government and municipal employees and also the non-Government Unions—chiefly those of skilled mechanics or clerical workers and a few manual workers' organisations established prior to the War—which decline to affiliate to or be associated with the aims and objects of the Federations, or to be dominated by their officers. Then, second, there are the unions which *are* affiliated, and more or less act under Federation instructions.

105. We ourselves had to recognise this distinction in our enquiries, as the two groups met us separately, and although in the case of the non-federated unions we sometimes met individual unions separately at their own request, those in the Federations were too disciplined to do other than meet under the Federations' auspices. We, of course, were anxious to fall in with any reasonable request, but in one case, after being pressed by an affiliated union to see its officers separately (they made two written applications and paid a personal visit to secure this interview), we arranged to see them but they did not turn up and sent no apology. They duly came to the group meeting, however, and instead of frankly stating that they had come to the conclusion (or had been "advised") that it was better to attend along with the rest of the affiliated unions, sheepishly pretended that they had had to go to work!

(ii).—The Trade Union Federations.

106. There has been and still is considerable doubt as to the legitimate trade union character of these so-called Federations. We were at first inclined to see a parallel between them and the abortive Grand National Consolidated Trades Union of early English trade unionism. It will have been noted how the General Labour Union, the progenitor of the Federations, took in as members all categories of workers—trishaw and rickshaw pullers, artisans, rubber and tin workers, coal miners, barbers, clerical workers, dance hostesses and cabaret girls and so on. However, the comparison soon broke down because of the different circumstances, the different relations of the constituent parts of the Federation to the central organisations and as we discovered, the peculiar activities of the Federations. It seemed to us desirable to make enquiries on these points and we had special conversations with affiliated and non-affiliated unions; with the Federations (from whom we requested information as to the aims, objects, activities and balance sheets); with the Trade Union Advisers, the two Registrars of Trade Unions; the British Advisers in the various States and with employers who had had dealings with the Federations and their affiliated unions.

107. The Singapore Federation of Trade Unions is registered under the Singapore Trade Union Ordinance, but the rules of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions were deemed not to comply with the Enactment of the Government of the Federation of Malaya and consequently that organisation which is, in effect, a Federation of State federations, has not been registered.

108. The Federation Government considered it desirable, in any event, to limit the amount of fees paid by individual unions to the Federations, as the latter were exacting a large percentage of union contributions—20 per cent. was usual, although in some instances the Federation officers were actually collecting the subscriptions. This limit was fixed at 10 per cent. of a Union's income—exclusive of the income used for benefit purposes. A limitation of some sort was undoubtedly wise but this new maximum, which naturally both the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions and the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade

Unions called upon affiliated unions to pay as a *standard* contribution, is preposterously high. The result is, that whilst affiliated unions with their responsibilities to their members have practically no funds and find it difficult to officer and staff their unions, the Federations are in clover. They naturally carry on an extensive propaganda through their agents in every district but apart from this, perform few, if any, of the ordinary functions of a trade union or even of a federation of trade unions and carry no genuine responsibilities. They call strikes but pay no strike pay or similar benefits; frame demands but carry out no negotiations, preferring to remain in the background and to act as the "power behind the throne" while pushing forward union leaders whom they interfere with and often intimidate. They claim to give unions advice and help, but in practice they leave the officers of affiliated unions to do the negotiations and then prevent settlements being made when, as is usually the case, they disagree with the provisional agreement arrived at. The genuine union authority and the members themselves are disregarded throughout these skirmishings.

109. We recognise that this is a heavy indictment to make against the Federations and incidentally against some of the affiliated Unions, but it accords with the evidence. The Federations disclaim Communism, but their methods are those of Communists the world over; they maintain contact with Communist organisation in Malaya, China, Australia, India and elsewhere; work to Communist directives and welcome communist speakers to their platforms. It has been claimed on their behalf that their errors are largely, if not solely, due to youthful zeal and inexperience. This is true of some of the individual unions but as a general explanation it will not hold water. Some of the Federation Officers and organisers are without doubt young and zealous and we hope and believe that their youthful energy and enthusiam can be directed into fruitful channels, but they have been "grounded" in the manner we have already described and those who direct their activities are neither simple nor inexperienced. One of the most illuminating and outstanding illustrations we can cite is the struggle which the older unions catering for the Singapore Harbour Board workers have had in order to maintain their organisations against the tactics and methods of intimidation we have described. British trade unionists may find it hard to credit the accuracy of the account we record in Appendix No. 7. We have been at some pains to get at the truth, as, at the outset, we were sceptical of the charges which were made against the Malayan Communist Party and the Federations. We are well aware of the tendency which exists—and not only amongst reactionary employers—to lump together under the term "Communist" (and in consequence to condemn wholesale) all those whether Communist, nationalist, genuine reformers or merely "bad hats", who actively oppose Colonial rule; and as regards the Federations we knew that their "programme", if not unexceptionable, was at any rate legitimate. Whenever, therefore, charges of communism or intimidation were made, we immediately demanded evidence. We do not doubt that most of those actually concerned in intimidation know little, if anything, of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, or even of Sun Yat Sen, but they know how to intimidate Asians, and they know how well violence and threats of violence succeeded during the period of guerilla warfare. We have talked with those who fought as guerillas; those trade unionists who have resisted intimidation and infiltration; those who have been threatened and injured, and whose wives and families have also been threatened and we are convinced that the short history given in Appendix No. 7 can be relied on. It is, moreover, typical of what has been happening in both Singapore and the Federation.

110. It is asserted in favour of the Federations that they genuinely look forward to becoming the T.U.C. of Malaya. No doubt they do, but we cannot accept this as a justification of their activities. A genuine T.U.C., or Federation for that matter, springs

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tions under Communist control. While Section VIII of the report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

out of the desire and need of unions to meet together for counsel, mutual aid and encouragement. The origin of these Federations was entirely different as has already been made clear. They were not and are not genuine Federations of democratically-governed organisations, having a readily recognisable common occupational or industrial interest; rather are their affiliated units in many cases mere branches of a dominating central organisation claiming power without responsibility. To put it another way, the "Federations" were first formed and the constituent parts, the "Unions", followed after.

111. Although this imposition from above has been exposed and condemned there seems to have been little recognition either in Government circles or on the part of the trade unions, of the excessive character of this 10 per cent. affiliation fee. For purposes of comparison we give the figures from the 1947 Balance Sheet of a British Trade Union with a good average subscription and a specially large number of affiliations, and to meet the point of excluding income for benefit purposes (although we doubt whether either Unions or Federations strictly obey this regulation), we have taken subscription income only, or about 75 per cent. of total income. On this basis the amount paid in affiliation fee by this Union to the T.U.C. is less than 1 per cent. of this reduced income, whilst the amount paid altogether in affiliation fees to the British and Scottish T.U.C's, the Labour Party, Workers' Educational Association, National Council of Labour Colleges, National Federation of Professional Workers, International Transport Workers' Federation and a few other affiliations, such as trades councils, *is less than 3 per cent.* We are, therefore, of opinion that if the maximum affiliation fee is fixed at twice the above T.U.C. percentage, that is at 2 per cent. this should be ample for all legitimate Federation purposes.

(iii).—Strikes and the need for Negotiating Machinery.

112. Although the post-war circumstances in which the trade unions were free to develop made it almost inevitable that many of them would fall into the hands of the Malayan Communist Party and the less desirable elements in Malaya (and we have felt it necessary not to minimise these facts) there is another side to the picture and this should not be overlooked. Industrial grievances were very real. Many of them were remediable, but remedies were mostly unapplied until employees struck work. It should also be remembered that there was a great political ferment among all classes and workers were particularly affected—ideas of nationalism, self-government and so on sprang into new life; and, regrettably, race antagonism, previously practically unknown in Malaya but fostered by the Japanese, became rife in certain parts of the Federation.

113. In all the circumstances, and especially considering that two years only have elapsed since the re-establishment of Civil Government, the trade union position is as good as we had hoped and much better than we had feared. Some of the unions, notably the clerical and some of the older-established organisations have a good grasp of essentials, are organising on sound lines under democratic leadership, and have successfully resisted intimidation and attempted domination by the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions and the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. The majority of the unions, however, are immature and lack a knowledge of trade union method. Some are exploited by bad leadership and are used for other purposes than those of maintaining and improving the conditions of the working lives of their members. There is, again almost inevitably, a strong tendency amounting almost to an obsession to look upon the strike weapon as the only one in the trade union armoury. This is partly because strikes have brought results, but also because of the survival of war-time "jungle-justice" and the lack of other effective means of ventilating grievances and getting constitutional remedies applied—in short because of the absence of satisfactory collective bargaining machinery, local, regional and national.

(iv).—Employers and Trade Unionism.

114. The views expressed by union representatives about employers and their attitude towards trade unions and trade unionism inevitably varied with the treatment they had themselves received, as well as according to their preconceived notions of the place and functions of employers in a modern Malaya. Men who have been exhorted to look forward to the establishment of a Workers' Republic and have been told that "employers are a cancer on the body politic" and who are consequently out for revolution, are not likely to be attracted by proposals for establishing constitutional negotiating machinery in "a decadent and dying capitalist system". We allowed for this, but we also took stock of complaints of the non-recognition of unions desirous of establishing collective bargaining, and of employers and managers who were determined to manage "their business" in their own way and to brook no interference from "outsiders".

115. We have ourselves acted not only as trade union negotiators, but as representatives of public bodies and other employing organisations. We therefore know something of the difficulties of negotiations from "the other side of the table" as well as the early difficulties of trade unions striving to organise workers and to secure recognition from reluctant and autocratic employers. We consequently closely questioned trade unionists, employers and managers, and heads of Government Departments on all these points and came to the following conclusions:

116. Many employers and managers were far from being unsympathetic to their employees after the war. They were keenly alive to the hardships under which their workers had suffered and the weak and emaciated condition many of them were in (many employers and managers had themselves suffered under the Japanese) and they were full of admiration for those who had fought with the guerillas. Employers themselves had great difficulties to overcome, however—as had the British Military Administration and the new Civil Administration—in order to effect the speedy rehabilitation which the country needed. Moreover, the abnormal barbaric conditions of the Occupation had left the labourers undernourished. They had also lost the habit of regular work, and the fixed hours and standards and conditions of pre-war days had been completely upset. Food, particularly rice, and clothing were scarce. There had been wholesale looting, houses and labourers' quarters had been neglected and water supplies damaged. Generally, life had relapsed to a primitive level.

117. It must be said, none the less, that many of the employers and managers (and this applied to some minor chiefs in Government Departments) were slow to adapt themselves to the new conditions. Private enterprise in Malaya, particularly among the Chinese, is intensely individualistic and employers were quite as backward as the workers in shaping up machinery for collective bargaining. A minority of Europeans, too, resented the idea of trade union "interference", and they were fortified in this attitude by unreasonable demands from the G.L.U. and its units in the early days. As one employer put it to us in a burst of candour, "I claim the right to employ whom I like, when I like, pay what I like and discharge when I like," and then, as a sort of afterthought, "of course within reason". We freely and gladly admit this was exceptional, but it is true to say that quite a good few employers were satisfied, if not eager, to take advantage of their fellow-employers' difficulties.

118. We have authentic examples of this. One case was that of employers paying a trade union official to supply at so much per head workers who were on strike against another employer—a sordid "racket" which we feel was far more discreditable to the

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employers than to the blameworthy trade union official who feathered his own nest at the expense of his members, many of the latter who left their homes were left "high and dry" by the affair. Another section, desirous of doing the right thing by their employees, and willing to negotiate with responsible and authentic leaders, found themselves faced with men who knew nothing whatever of the conditions of the industry they were to discuss or of the work of the men they were supposed to represent. Often these self-styled leaders were mere puppets of the Malayan Communist Party manœuvring behind the scenes and in any event were mere ignorant mischief-makers. Agreements could not be reached with them or if reached were immediately repudiated. We were given authentic instances which we verified, e.g., of young irresponsible workers "planted" not elected, as shop stewards in a rubber godown making unreasonable demands; of the employer sending for a trade union representative who promptly repudiated the claim as unjustified, but who has never since been allowed to negotiate, while the so-called stewards continue their practices and any "interference" with them is met with threats of a strike. Some employers after undergoing this kind of experience declined "to have any further truck with unions" and some went so far as to threaten their employees who joined any trade union.

119. The more far-sighted, however, recognised that the old order had gone never to return; that whilst the illiteracy of the bulk of the workers and their ignorance (and that of their leaders) of trade unionism on the one hand, and the mischief-making of the Malayan Communist Party and its fellow-travellers on the other, would make the transition period difficult, some form of collective bargaining was both necessary and desirable. They saw that so far as they were concerned the first thing to do was to put their own house in order and to establish suitable organisation amongst employers, so that from their side, collective bargaining machinery could be set up and suitable arrangements be made for dealing with disputes.

120. These employers urged, and we agreed, that what is needed is the freeing of the unions from dictatorship and intimidation; the voluntary linking up of some of the unions on lines of common industrial and occupational interest (there are too many unions and far too few trade unionists); the widespread establishment of negotiating machinery (this postulates the organisation of employers as well as workers) and the education of the rank and file in democratic methods and sound trade unionism.

121. It must be recognised, however, that the workers—many of whom have had a surfeit of strikes and long to be rid of terrorism—will only be convinced by results. So long as employers cling to their individualism, refuse recognition to unions adopting constitutional methods—as they do for example to the clerical unions, decline to make concessions until there is a stoppage of work and then weakly give way, so long will exhortations to workers to cease striking be so much whistling down the wind.

122. In general, we would urge that employers will be considerably helped if more of them would conquer their individualistic outlook and cease trying to take advantage of each other; will combine with their fellow-employers and register their organisations, accept frankly collective bargaining, take their workers into confidence and cease the practice of declining reasonable claims and then weakly yielding to threats or actual stoppages of work. The workers and their unions—and this applies particularly to the Federated unions—will be wise if they recognise that strikes constantly and *immoderately indulged in* not only damage the industry on which they depend for a livelihood, not only result in losses of

employers than to the blameworthy trade union official who feathered his own nest at the expense of his members, many of the latter who left their homes were left "high and dry" by the affair. Another section, desirous of doing the right thing by their employees, and willing to negotiate with responsible and authentic leaders, found themselves faced with men who knew nothing whatever of the conditions of the industry they were to discuss or of the work of the men they were supposed to represent. Often these self-styled leaders were mere puppets of the Malayan Communist Party manœuvring behind the scenes and in any event were mere ignorant mischief-makers. Agreements could not be reached with them or if reached were immediately repudiated. We were given authentic instances which we verified, e.g., of young irresponsible workers "planted" not elected, as shop stewards in a rubber godown making unreasonable demands; of the employer sending for a trade union representative who promptly repudiated the claim as unjustified, but who has never since been allowed to negotiate, while the so-called stewards continue their practices and any "interference" with them is met with threats of a strike. Some employers after undergoing this kind of experience declined "to have any further truck with unions" and some went so far as to threaten their employees who joined any trade union.

119. The more far-sighted, however, recognised that the old order had gone never to return; that whilst the illiteracy of the bulk of the workers and their ignorance (and that of their leaders) of trade unionism on the one hand, and the mischief-making of the Malayan Communist Party and its fellow-travellers on the other, would make the transition period difficult, some form of collective bargaining was both necessary and desirable. They saw that so far as they were concerned the first thing to do was to put their own house in order and to establish suitable organisation amongst employers, so that from their side, collective bargaining machinery could be set up and suitable arrangements be made for dealing with disputes.

120. These employers urged, and we agreed, that what is needed is the freeing of the unions from dictatorship and intimidation; the voluntary linking up of some of the unions on lines of common industrial and occupational interest (there are too many unions and far too few trade unionists); the widespread establishment of negotiating machinery (this postulates the organisation of employers as well as workers) and the education of the rank and file in democratic methods and sound trade unionism.

121. It must be recognised, however, that the workers—many of whom have had a surfeit of strikes and long to be rid of terrorism—will only be convinced by results. So long as employers cling to their individualism, refuse recognition to unions adopting constitutional methods—as they do for example to the clerical unions, decline to make concessions until there is a stoppage of work and then weakly give way, so long will exhortations to workers to cease striking be so much whistling down the wind.

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wages which take a long time to recover even when strikes are successful but, especially when they fail, cause a reaction amongst members, first against strikes and then against trade unionism. We desire to save them from learning this by bitter experience by directing their attention to a more excellent way of maintaining and improving their conditions of labour—viz.: by building up from their side collective bargaining machinery: representative and responsible trade union committees local, regional and national, capable of negotiating and settling wages and conditions of service, with reference to national tribunals in case of failure to agree. The right to strike should be retained but strikes should be called only as a last resort when other means have failed. The more frequently the strike weapon is used, the less effective it becomes. We refer to the "federated unions" because the Federations have undoubtedly instigated and called strikes for purposes other than trade union and industrial purposes. Such actions are bound to bring a nemesis and gradually to alienate responsible trade unionists.

123. There are, we are glad to say, encouraging signs that these matters are much better understood than they were two years or even twelve months ago. For example disputes have been less frequent in the tin industry than in some others, due to the establishment and successful operation of the Malayan Mining Employers' Association which was able to institute uniform wage levels and conditions of work on both European and Asian-owned undertakings—a quite substantial achievement. Then the situation in the planting industry, where there were no less than seventeen strikes in six months, has been changed by the formation of the M.P.I.E.A. (Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association) able to give a directive to employers throughout the industry. The Estates Staff Association also covers the industry, friendly relations have been established and trade union recognition should follow. It remains for the Rubber Workers' Unions to link up as rubber workers and establish suitable machinery able to deal in a responsible way with the employers locally, regionally and nationally.

124. One of the complaints made on behalf of a Rubber Workers' Union was that trade union officials were not allowed to visit workers on rubber estates but were treated as trespassers. We made very careful inquiry into these complaints and found, as is usual, that there were two sides to the question, and that both sides had ground for dissatisfaction. Employers and Managers said that men whom neither they nor their employees knew wrote insulting letters; came on to the estates (private property) without either permission or notification, interfering with men at their work, sometimes intimidating them and claiming that as trade union officials they had a right to go where they liked and no one could stop them. Their own employees asked to be protected from these men. (We have confirmed all these charges). The unions claim that they should be allowed reasonable facilities to organise employees working on rubber estates, that in certain districts they cannot do so without going on to "private property" (the workers live as well as work on the estates in many cases and there are no suitable meeting places elsewhere) and that when workers are organised they (the officials) should be allowed to visit and hold meetings and transact union business. These are all reasonable proposals.

125. The Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association have agreed to recommend all their members to agree to the following terms: "That reasonable facilities be granted responsible trade union officers, provided that such officials are provided with a pass, with a photograph, 'chopped' by the Labour Department as to their being *bonâ fide* officials of their Union and that the Estate Manager is notified beforehand of their visit". In all the circumstances we agree that this proposal should meet the situation.

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

126. As a further example of changed relations, we may mention a very prolonged strike at the Batu Arang Colliery which was eventually settled by arbitration and negotiation. Regular meetings between Management and Unions are now held, and relations are much more cordial.

(v).—The Federation Government as Employer: Whitley Council Machinery.

127. In para. 42 we refer to the agreement between the Management of the Malayan Railway and the Railway Unions on a Whitley Council Scheme. This is a notable step forward and should have far-reaching results if the example is followed by employers and unions in private industry. During the discussions we attended, it emerged that the railway scheme is part of a larger one which is gradually being evolved. There is already in existence and has been for some time a body known as the Interim Joint Council. This was established in August, 1946, on the initiative of the Trade Union Adviser. It was designed to provide recognised machinery for negotiations between official representatives and representatives of Government employees on matters affecting pay and conditions of service; it has a written constitution and was proposed as an interim measure pending the development of more comprehensive machinery on the lines of the United Kingdom Whitley Councils. This Interim Joint Council has had marked success—regular meetings have been held between Departmental heads and Union representatives in the Public Works Department (Penang), Electrical, Telecommunications and Postal Departments and the Railways while special meetings have been arranged to discuss group grievances in other Departments. We recommend the Unions to perfect their own negotiating machinery and to co-operate with the Government to get the arrangements completed. The same applies to Singapore where the same Government willingness exists. In the smaller Departments less elaborate and more informal arrangements may suffice but a full Whitley Council Scheme should be evolved with provision for prompt settlement at the highest level of important issues.

(vi).—The Right to Strike: The Willan Judgment.

128. Among the events which had a decided influence throughout Malaya as regards strikes was a judgment delivered in the Supreme Court of the Malayan Union by the Chief Justice Sir Harold Willan in October last. At nearly every meeting we had with trade unionists we were asked to give our views on this decision; whether it meant the workers no longer had the right to strike and what the law was in England in regard to "the Right to Strike."

129. The case arose out of a strike of rubber tappers against a reduction in wages. Three women tappers were among the strikers and they stopped work on July 11th, 1947, for three days. On July 12th, their employer told them to return to work, but they did not do so until July 14th. The Labour Code lays it down that a month's notice is required on either side for termination of service, but absence *with a reasonable excuse* does not constitute a breach of contract. When the women returned to work, the employer told them he no longer required their services. The women appealed to the Labour Department and the Deputy Commissioner for Labour ruled that as the strike was not illegal the women had not broken their contract and could not be dismissed without a month's pay in lieu of notice. The employer appealed to the Court and the Chief Justice reversed the decision. He pointed out that the women of their own volition absented themselves from work for the purpose of a strike; that, although the strike was quite legal they had consequently broken their contract of employment and had not been dismissed by their employer.

130. We could, of course, simply say that so far as we could see, a similar judgment would have been given in Great Britain had such a case ever got as far as the Courts; and that it was recognised in our own movement that a strike was nothing more than a collective refusal to go to work. Provided proper notice was given a strike was perfectly legal but it was none the less a breaking of contract. Reinstatement after a strike depended not on its legality but on its success, or the willingness of the employer to reinstate.

(IX).—GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS SPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH TRADE UNION CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, ETC.

131. Each of the Governments of the Federation and Singapore has, (1), a Commissioner for Labour and (2), a Registrar of Trade Unions; and there is also (3), a Trade Union Adviser covering the whole of Malaya. His Department is separately organised from those of Labour and Registration and he is directly responsible to the two Governments.

(1).—The Labour Departments.

132. The Head of each Labour Department is the Commissioner for Labour and his functions might be said to combine some of those of a Home Secretary, a Minister of Labour and a Poor Man's Lawyer. His duties may, however, be summed up as (1), to advise the Government on Labour matters; (2), to enforce the Labour Laws; (3), to prevent labour disputes and to assist in their settlement when they arise; (4), to act as the link between labourers or employers when desired. Many of these functions are to a great extent implicit in the Labour Code, Ordinances and Enactments—very elaborate legislation in both the Federation and Singapore.

(i).—The Federation of Malaya.

133. The present Labour Code of the Federated Malay States was enacted in 1933, and with subsequent amendments is a diverse and comprehensive measure reflecting the diversity of labour in the Federation. A considerable part of the Code relates to the immigration of labour, Chinese, Indian and Indonesian and to the Indian Immigration Fund. A second, and large part deals with the housing of immigrants which has to be provided by the owners of Mines and Estates, etc.; medical treatment; provision of schools and so on. Finally, there are the sections dealing with wages, and methods and times of payment; limitation of hours and overtime; women and child labour; offences against labour, e.g., molesting a labourer while at his work; wrongful detention; the separation of families and kindred personal matters. Penalties are prescribed for offences against the provisions, and in certain disputes a labour officer before whom the dispute is brought is given magisterial powers to decide the issue.

134. Other Labour legislation includes: (1), the Industrial Courts Enactment (1940); (2), the Wages Councils Ordinance (1947); (3), the Workmen's Compensation Enactment (1933); (4), the Mines and Machinery Enactments, and (5), the Children and Young Persons Ordinance (1947).

The first provides for the establishment of an Industrial Court of Inquiry in connection with trades disputes and makes other provisions, including arbitration, for the settlement of such disputes.

No. 2 makes provision for the fixing of minimum wage rates in cases where there is no collective bargaining machinery functioning.

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No. 3 defines the Workmen's Compensation terms and circumstances of application. Its provisions for the calculation of compensation were revised in 1947.

No. 4. These Enactments provide for the safety of labourers in mines, factories and work-shops and prohibit the employment of women and children underground; and No. 5 consolidates and amends previous legislation governing the employment of children and young persons.

135. The Commissioner for Labour is the Government's principal adviser on labour matters and is the Chairman of the Labour Advisory Board of the Federation. He has an extensive department. There are three Deputy Commissioners at Headquarters at Kuala Lumpur; also Deputy Commissioners with their inspectorates and staff covering all the States. These keep the Commissioner advised of the trend of events and through his instructions, ensure that there is uniform application of the Government Labour policy throughout the Federation.

136. We were greatly impressed with the variety of the work done by the Labour Department, the activities of its Officers covering every nationality of labour and practically every aspect of the labourer's life; also by the understanding, patience, sympathy and knowledge displayed in handling these matters, which range from criminal offences to industrial disputes and private—even family—grievances. We even had it suggested to us that there was no need for trade union so long as there was a good Labour Department—a view repudiated by the Commissioner no less firmly and emphatically than by ourselves, but indicating a noteworthy appreciation in certain quarters of the Department's work. We can confidently add that such appreciation is widespread amongst employers and workers alike, and that criticism of the Department and its officers was confined to details and isolated incidents.

(ii).—SINGAPORE.

137. The general functions of the Singapore Commissioner for Labour are similar to those of the Federation as already described but he has, of course, a lesser (about 1/5th) and a more concentrated population to deal with, and his Department and staff are consequently smaller. There are no large Estates or Plantations in Singapore as in the Federation, but leaving out the Harbour Board and the Government and Municipal employments, there is much greater concentration of commerce and a larger variety of small commercial establishments. As will have been noted, the Chinese constitute nearly four-fifths of the population, and it may be safely said, therefore, that individualism is more in evidence, and individual cases and small disputes numerous.

138. Before the war, when demands were made on employers one or other party always made a report to the Labour Department. The break caused by the Japanese occupation and the fact that there were no officers in the British Military Administration Labour Department with knowledge of local Chinese dialects and labour conditions, resulted in the pre-war practice being dropped. It has been resumed, and the Department is readily appealed to (almost too readily) in case of difficulty both by employers and trade unions. Whilst both, and especially the trade unions, look to have their own cause espoused, our enquiries go to show that there is widespread appreciation of the Department's activities and judgment. One of the principal functions of the Chinese Secretariat until the fall of Singapore in 1942 had been the settlement of every type of dispute, including Labour disputes, by conciliation methods and the officers of the Chinese Secretariat have, therefore, had much experience of this work.

139. The Departments of the Registrar and Trade Union Adviser are considered in subsequent sections, but we may say here that the Singapore Commissioner for Labour appears to have been overloaded and handicapped recently by being called upon to undertake the work of both these Departments in addition to his own.

(2).—THE REGISTRARS OF TRADE UNIONS.

140. As explained in Section VIII (ii) and (iii) of this Report, provision for the registration of Societies already existed prior to the formation of trade unions as such. The Registrar under this legislation was the Secretary for Chinese Affairs who had assistants throughout Malaya to register and advise such societies on the conduct of their affairs, as well as to settle disputes as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It was recognised, that new methods and new legislation would be required to cope with trade unions framed on modern lines and both Governments began to prepare for this in 1939.

141. The authority for the appointment of a Registrar of Trade Unions for the Federation was set out in "An Enactment to provide for the Registration and Control of Trade Unions" (September, 1940), which also defined his powers, duties and functions. This enactment, covering the then Federated Malay States only, did not apply to the Straits Settlements or to the Unfederated States which had legislation of their own. In 1946, however, the provisions of the Federated Malay States Enactment were applied throughout and under this law all unions in existence on 1st July, 1946, were required to apply for registration within three months, and all other unions within one month of formation. By the end of 1946, 83 registered employees' trade unions were on the Registers and by December, 1947, 270, with 101 outstanding applications. Employers' organisations registered in 1946 numbered 7, increased by 12 in 1947, making a total of 19.

142. Similar provision was made for Singapore under the Trade Union Ordinance of February, 1940, but again registration was postponed until after the war, the date of registration for existing unions being fixed as within three months of August, 1946.

143. The duties and responsibilities of the Trade Union Registrars in a country like Malaya including as they do (1), the supervision of the administration of trade unions in their areas in accordance with their object and rules; (2), the practical checking of books and accounts and the register of members of trade unions in order to ensure that they are correctly kept and entered up, (3), checking to ensure that the funds are administered in accordance with the union rules and trade union legislation and (4), guidance of trade unions generally in accordance with the Trade Union Enactments are clearly of the first importance. Generally speaking the visits of the Registrar's Inspectors and Assistants in the Federation are welcomed by the trade unions and we are of the opinion that these duties are being carried out with efficiency and with due consideration for the inexperience of the union staffs and of the difficulties which some of them have in keeping accounts in a proper fashion. We say this because some of the unions of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and Singapore Federation of Trade Unions object both to registration and to this supervision. Doubtless some objections spring from a desire to be independent of any Government Department and also probably from a recognition that the staffs are not fully competent, and do not wish to have their shortcomings exposed. There has, however, been a good deal of malversation of funds and much illegitimate expenditure, and we cannot disguise from ourselves that in some cases there is resentment that "leaders" are not to be allowed to spend Union Funds exactly

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as they think fit. However, this resentment should die down amongst all responsible trade unions as it becomes clear that the visits are friendly, are made in the interests of the members of the unions, and that guidance and instruction is given in order to ensure that funds are used for legitimate trade union purposes and that the law is not disregarded either deliberately or in ignorance.

144. We were concerned to find that, at the outset, the work of registration in Singapore had apparently not been given the same importance as in the Federation. By the end of 1946, out of over 100 in existence only eleven trade unions had been registered, including one employers' organisation. When the work was taken up in earnest and an officer seconded from the Labour Department in March, 1947, the work proceeded more rapidly. By the 1st June, 102 and at the end of 1947, 163 employees' trade unions had been registered. The work was not followed up as in the Federation, however, which is hardly surprising seeing that no less than eight officers have held the post of Registrar or Assistant during two years which have elapsed, since the Ordinance was put into force. A competent Chinese Officer has recently been appointed but the work is much in arrears and if he is to carry out efficiently the duties we have described, his Department will need to be strengthened.

(3).—THE TRADE UNION ADVISER.

145. A new departure is the appointment of a Trade Union Adviser for Malaya independent of the two Labour Departments, and responsible direct to the Governments of Singapore and the Federation. This post is the only one in the dependent territories separate from the Labour Department and we were consequently keenly interested in seeing how it worked in practice, more especially as there had been and still is some difference of opinion as to whether the separation was justified and has proved to have been wise.

(i).—THE APPOINTMENT OF EXPERIENCED TRADE UNIONISTS.

146. The present Adviser, Mr. John Brazier who gained his trade union experience as a local officer and Executive Committee member of the National Union of Railwaymen, went to Singapore in October, 1945, along with the British Forces, to take up an appointment as Labour and Welfare Officer, Malayan Railway. The following month he was asked to advise the Authorities on trade union organisation and to assist in the settlement of the numerous disputes which were occurring almost daily. For some time he undertook both sets of duties but it soon became evident that he should be confirmed in the post of Adviser, that another Railway Welfare Officer should be appointed and that other officers with trade union experience should be recruited to assist him. These selections were duly made, but it was not until the middle of 1946 that these new officers arrived from Great Britain, Mr. Brazier's headquarters were then transferred to Kuala Lumpur with one assistant, Mr. Caddick, formerly of the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers' posted to Penang to cover Northern Territory and the other Mr. Garrett in Singapore.

147. The Trade Union Adviser himself was home on extended sick leave when we arrived in Malaya and his Singapore assistant, Mr. Garrett, had resigned and left the Colony. Mr. Caddick met us on arrival however and was exceedingly helpful and informative. We have also since our return had several conversations with Mr. Brazier covering the work of his Department.

(ii).—The Directive Defining their Functions.

148. The job of giving advice to actual and potential trade unions in a country like Malaya is undoubtedly exacting and onerous. The Adviser with his assistants acts under a Directive issued jointly by the two Governments and although he works in close co-operation with the Trade Union Registrars and Commissioners for Labour, his functions are distinct and he is not responsible for Labour policy, or for the enforcement of the provisions of the Trade Union legislation, or for the administration of the Labour laws. The Directive, which we reproduce as Appendix No. 8, is a comprehensive document and a perusal of it will show that the Adviser's task is to advise the Unions on how they can best build up their membership, finance and leadership; to instil the principles of self-government and democracy and generally to foster the growth of organisations capable of maintaining and improving the conditions of labour of their members and of carrying out negotiations with employers on a footing of equality.

149. From our conversations with a very representative cross-section of the community, official and unofficial, and the many enquiries we made and the information vouchsafed to us by employers and workers in every industry and most occupations, we are satisfied that a very fine piece of work has been accomplished amidst many handicaps; that the confidence of the organised workers in the advice and help given is steadily growing, and that a future long-term programme on sound lines is being mapped out. We were pleased, too, with the admirable way in which the Asian officers and staff, Indian, Chinese and Malay, in the Department are associated with the work and are being trained for the highest posts. The selection of such Staff is a task requiring great care and discretion and we took note of the zeal, efficiency and integrity of those already appointed. These men have themselves come from the trade union ranks; they know the native languages and can understand the ways and enter into the thoughts of their fellow-countrymen in a manner possible to only a select few Europeans. It was a pleasure to exchange experiences with these men (and the same may be said of those in the Labour Department) and we cordially approve of the course of training in this country which has been prepared for them on the initiative of the Trade Union Adviser and worked out by him, the Colonial Office and the T.U.C.

(iii).—The Education of the Rank and File.

150. We cannot stress too strongly the need for developing that side of the Trade Union Adviser's work which consists in the trade union education of the rank and file as well as the officers of the Unions, although naturally the local officers have to be given prior attention. With the lessening of industrial tension and the proper staffing of the Department (we understand that two assistant advisers from this country have been appointed and will shortly take up their new duties) it will be possible to devote more attention to this work.

151. Apart from elementary training of the main office bearers in finance and book-keeping—done in co-operation with the Registrar's Department, there is the task of bringing home to the ordinary worker his responsibilities as a trade unionist and how a trade union functions. Pamphlets in plain simple language "You and Your Union" with translations into Chinese, Tamil and Malay have already been published and others are in preparation. Assistance of this character is also being given by the Department of Public Relations which publishes free a fortnightly Tamil and Malay newspaper which contains simple instructions on trade unionism and related subjects—a commendable activity of good service.

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152. There remains, however, the vast illiterate section who can only be reached by the spoken word, or pictorially. The native field officers of the Department, already mentioned, are undertaking this task and last year addressed some 144,000 Tamil workers on 150 Estates in their own language. We also record with much interest that the Trade Union Adviser's Department wrote and produced, with the help of the Public Relations Department, a Tamil Play on Trade Unionism which was presented to a large audience of Tamil and other Estate Workers. There is also projected in consultation with the Public Relations Department cinema shows of a similar educative character. These should prove of great value.

153. We suggest that an interchange of these ideas and the literature published be arranged with the Labour Departments and Trade Union Advisers in all British Protected Territories and Colonies.

(iv).—The Value of an Independent Trade Union Adviser.

154. It is our view that a Trade Union Adviser independent of all other Government Departments has worked well in Malaya and we find it difficult to believe that he could have done quite such good work if he had been an officer of the Labour Department. We are convinced, moreover, that even if this policy was wrong at the time, it would be a grave error to try to change it now. We gathered from our conversations that this view is shared by both employers and workers, and even by the officers of the Trade Union Federations who object to both the Trade Union Adviser's advice and activities. We understand that our opinion is shared by both Governments.

(X).—DEVELOPMENT OF ADULT EDUCATION.

155. We recommend the further development of adult trade union education in Malaya (distinct from the work of the Trade Union Adviser) for the leaders and potential leaders, local and district as well as national officers—education in which the Asiatic staff of the Department should play a part, first as students and later possibly as lecturers. We have not had opportunity to go fully into the matter but what we have in mind is a scheme on the lines of the Workers' Educational Association in this country.

156. We were informed of the existence of the People's Education Association founded by a graduate of Raffles College, and learning that Dr. Silcock, Professor of Economics at the College, was its President, we discussed our proposal and some of its difficulties with him. We were pleased and encouraged to learn that the Association has already been asked unofficially by one of the English-speaking Unions for a course on the History of Trade Unions, for even though the Association was not able to give it, the application revealed the potential demand.

157. We appreciate that the difficulties are considerable but we do not think they are too formidable, especially in view of the extra-mural work recommended in the Carr Saunders Report on University Education in Malaya. The chief difficulties will probably arise from the suspicion any European is likely to be up against from Malayan trade unionists—suspicion from which we were certainly not immune—and the bridging of the gap between the workers who speak little or no English and the University. We recommend that the matter be pursued on the following lines:

(1) The person at the head of the Scheme, to have academic qualifications and experience in Adult Education and the Labour Movement.

(2) He must be independent of the Government not merely formally but in fact—able to criticise Government policy, if necessary publicly, from a Labour point of view.

(3) This proposal would fit in admirably with the Carr-Saunders Report on University Education in Malaya—*see* Chapter X "Extra-Mural Work" and section 3 of the draft constitution which if adopted would confer "ample powers to provide extension courses in any part of the country and to engage in extra-mural work on any scale it may think fit".

(4) Contact between the Labour Movement and the University might be achieved in the first instance through the People's Education Association, the independence of which should be preserved. Any Government assistance should take the form of an extension of the present help given by the Department of Social Welfare in providing buildings. The University should be given funds to provide staff, and organisation should be financed by subscriptions and fees, and by the trade unions and similar organisations.

(5) A Senior Lecturer or Lecturer in Labour Relations would need to be appointed in the Department of Economics whose main duties would be extra-mural Adult Education.

(6) Appointment to the post to be on the advice of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies. We would not advocate any lowering of academic standards but the Council might be asked to give preference to one whose own education was in part through the Tutorial Classes of the Workers Educational Association.

(XI).—THE TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICS.

158. Section 41 of the Singapore Ordinance for the Registration and Control of Trade Unions (Straits Settlements No. 3, February, 1940), stipulates that "The funds of a registered trade union shall not be applied either directly or indirectly in payment of contributions to any political party or for any political purpose". The same prohibition applies in the Federation (Section 41, Enactment No. 11, September, 1940). This prohibition was first brought to our notice by the Malayan Democratic Union (a political organisation) a few days after our arrival in Singapore. Many trade union representatives subsequently mentioned it, asked about the position in Great Britain and protested against this restriction of trade union liberty.

159. We found there was a good deal of misconception as to the position in Great Britain and, among some of those who wished to be free to use trade union funds for political purposes, exaggerated ideas regarding the proportion of funds which were and in their view should be devoted to such purposes. Further, they had, when pressed, no clear idea which of the many Malayan political parties should be supported. Some who admitted they had no wish to enter the political field at the moment objected "on principle" to any restriction. We also discovered that others believed Section 41 prevented them as individual trade unionists from taking part in politics or contributing to a political fund. We consequently felt it incumbent on us at the outset to remove these misconceptions.

160. First, we explained that we knew of no Ordinance which prevented individuals from contributing to a political fund or belonging to a political party. On the contrary, we understood there were ten or a dozen parties already in existence (athough there was no

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

Labour Party such as we had in Great Britain) and that subscriptions to them were being collected from trade unionists and others. Certainly, Section 41 of the Trade Union Ordinances did not and was not designed to prevent such contributions or such membership. We ourselves had belonged and contributed to a political party at a time when our trade unions had no authority to establish a political fund. Second, British trade unionists both historically and in present practice believed their unions to be primarily industrial; consequently the political levy (which we described) was only a small proportion of the full trade union contributions, and the percentage paid in affiliation fees to the National Labour Party was smaller still.*

161. Finally, we expressed the view that at this stage in the absence of a Labour Party (and we pointed out that the British Labour Party only came into existence after the Trade Union Movement had become thoroughly established), it would be a disservice to the Trade Union Movement if before the unions had established themselves and built a solid industrial foundation, the time and energy which should be devoted to recruiting trade union members; to trade union education; formulating industrial claims and building up collective bargaining machinery were spent on advocating the claims of the various conflicting political bodies to be financed from trade union funds and to be accorded trade union support.† In conversations with some leaders who had advocated the repeal of Section 41 of the Trade Union Ordinances, they admitted the grave dangers of fierce political strife among members who would otherwise unite on a common *industrial* basis, and that it was probable such strife would at this stage militate against the growth and consolidation of the Trade Union Movement.

162. We were greatly interested to learn subsequently that the Singapore Commissioner for Labour had expressed a similar view before our arrival. His statement was reported in the *Malaya Tribune* as follows:

> A unified Labour Party for the Colony is advocated by the Commissioner for Labour, Mr. R. P. Bingham.
>
> While he does not think the formation of such a Party will be the panacea for all the ills of workers in this country, he thinks it should go a long way in improving their general conditions along legitimate lines.
>
> Elaborating on the subject, Mr. Bingham said that workers in Singapore, be they labourers or clerical staff, should join together and form a political party on constitutional lines, and then put up a candidate or candidates to contest the forthcoming elections to the future Legislative Council for Singapore.
>
> Explaining away a general misunderstanding among trade unionists in regard to the correct interpretation of Section 41, Ch. VII of the Trade Union Ordinance of 1940, Mr. Bingham pointed out that this section only forbids the use of union funds "directly or indirectly in payment of contributions to any political party or for any purposes."

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* The Transport and General Workers' Union subscription is 7*d*. per week; the political levy 1/- per member per annum. That of the Railway Clerks' Association is 1/- per week, including 1*d*. political levy. The trade union affiliation fee to the National Labour Party is 6*d*. per member per annum.

† We find there are the following political Parties in Malaya although several of them are a cloak for the Communist Party: China Democratic League; Kuomintang; Malay Nationalist Party; Council of Joint Action; New Democratic Youth Corps; Singapore Women's Federation; Progressive Party, Indian Muslim League; Malayan Democratic Union; Malayan Indian Congress; Malay Union; Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army Ex-Comrade Association; Malayan Communist Party.

There was nothing whatever (he said) to prevent any unionists from forming a constitutional political party, or raising special subscriptions, if all members so desired, to meet the expenses, in this particular case, of financing candidates for election.

"They can take as much part in politics as they like, and there is nothing to prevent them", Mr. Bingham explained.

163. We are of opinion that the formation of such a Party on a voluntary basis, with the trade unions building up the industrial side for the next year or two will result in a more rapid advance, industrially or politically than if the Unions, many of whom have practically no funds and have yet to build up a reasonable representative membership and institute democratic procedure, were to enter immediately into the political arena, and dissipate their funds among several different and probably opposing parties.

(XII).—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

164. Our views and recommendations run through the whole of this Report, but it may be convenient if we sum up our chief conclusions:

(1) The Trade Union Movement in Malaya derives from several sources, and comprising as it does several races and lacking a common tradition is far from homogeneous. It is this variety of race, religion and culture, this "plural society" which makes trade union organisation so much more difficult than it would be if there were only the Malays or the Chinese or the Indians to organise.

(2) The War, the Occupation and their aftermath caused a revolution in the attitude of mind as well as in the material circumstances of the workers of Malaya. There has been a great ferment of ideas, an upsurge of feeling—ideas of nationalism; or self-determination; of opposition to "imperialism"; of the emancipation of the workers. These ideas are not the less potent because they lack clarity or convey different and even contradictory notions to the three principal races of Malaya.

(3) Having regard to this great ferment and to the activities of the guerillas during the war as saboteurs and fifth-columnists (activities which were officially encouraged and directed but not altogether controlled and disciplined) it is not surprising that, since the war, Malaya should have had a series of industrial and political strikes, many of them illegal and accompanied by acts of violence and lawlessness—some of them spontaneous, unpremeditated acts by the ignorant and ill-informed, disillusioned and upset by the high cost of living and the shortage of rice; some by ill-disciplined ex-guerillas or youths fired by their example, loath to abandon an easy way of getting a living; some undoubtedly deliberately inspired and directed by the disciplined and moneyed Malayan Communist Party whose object was the overthrow and supersession of the Government.

(4) In all the circumstances the trade union position is nearly as good as we had hoped and better than we had feared. It is to the credit of the Administrations and a tribute to the good sense of the majority of the population that in the short space of two years, so much should have been accomplished in the way of restoring and maintaining order, rehabilitating industry and improving the health and conditions of the workers with so little restriction of personal liberty.

(5) Some of the Trade Unions, particularly the old-established, have a good grasp of essentials and are organising on sound lines under democratic leadership.

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

(6) The majority, however, are immature; the members know little of trade unionism, some of them are exploited by the unscrupulous, and much educational work needs to be done. There is, almost inevitably, a strong tendency amounting to an obsession to look upon the strike weapon as the only one in the trade union armoury. This is partly because strikes have brought results—although there have been some costly failures—but also because of the lack of knowledge of any other method and lack of effective collective bargaining machinery.

(7) Collective bargaining involves, first, the organisation of a substantial proportion of workers in each particular industry into appropriate unions and similar organisation on the part of employers. Employers, with less reason have been as backward as the workers in recognising this, but a change is gradually taking place. Second, suitable representative bodies, on the lines of the Whitley Councils, local, regional and national, able to speak authoritatively for the employees on the one hand and employers on the other. Organisation is still sporadic; education, guidance and encouragement are still urgently needed, as is the cultivation of self-reliance. This can only be done by building up from below. We are satisfied that the Trade Union Adviser and the Commissioners for Labour are working on sound lines in these matters and giving appropriate advice to the trade unions and the employers. Unions, however centralised their machinery, must be based on the local branch—on the workers in the mine, on the estate, in the factory, the go-down, the office, so that local and minor troubles can be dealt with promptly, and grievances removed and so prevented from developing into serious disputes causing widespread dissatisfaction and dislocation. That is why the Whitley Council arrangements, based throughout on democratic trade union machinery, as outlined in paras. 42 and 127 are so valuable.

(8) If negotiating and conciliation machinery on these lines is built up in the principal industries, it will need supplementing by national tribunals to which important issues may be referred when agreement between employers' and workers' organisations is not reached. We formed the opinion that both employers and workers would resist the imposition of compulsory arbitration and we do not ourselves favour it. The Ordinances already provide for arbitration when both sides agree to this course, but little use has been made of the provision, partly because the procedure is not understood and partly because of lack of confidence. We recommend the setting up of a panel of arbitrators, or chairmen of tribunals, who have the confidence of both sides of industry. When there is an agreed case to be submitted, a single arbitrator should be chosen from the panel and upon him should rest the sole responsibility for issuing an award. He should, however, be assisted by assessors selected from persons nominated by the Employers' Associations and the Trade Unions.

Alternatively, such a tribunal (as is the case with the British Railways) could issue a "finding" it being an obligation on both employers and workers to refer any dispute to the tribunal before any strike or lock-out takes place. This alternative requires good organisation and mutual confidence.

(9) Other Government departments, in addition to the Railways, and large firms should consider whether the appointment of a Welfare and Personnel Officer would not be an advantage (Para. 41).

(10) It is anticipated that when the Whitley schemes of the Governments are in working order, a speeding-up of the consideration of claims will take place. We appreciate that the spending of public money is a matter for care, but public employment

should at least be on a par with the good type of employer and it is not at all creditable that claims made by workers in private enterprise are dealt with so much more speedily than those of public employees. The Joint Wages Commission Report was dealt with reasonably quickly, but the Trusted Report is another matter and the long delay is the more unsatisfactory because salaried staff have received far less proportionate cost-of-living bonuses than wages staff. The speed with which police conditions were improved as compared with indoor staff is another notable example.

(11) The Service Departments appear to be a law unto themselves in the matter of Whitley Council or similar negotiating machinery for their civilian employers, and we do not consider the arrangements satisfactory. The attention of the Secretary of State for War might be drawn to this as we understand the restriction on Whitleyism for civilian employees emanates from London.

(12) We do not approve of either the form of organisation or the activities and methods of the Trade Union Federations. Apart from the origin of these bodies and the objects for which they were founded (which are sufficiently condemnatory in themselves) we do not think conglomerate federations of this character perform a useful trade union function. They are neither federations of trade unions having a common industrial or occupational function and able to evolve a common policy or give suitable advice—such as, for example, a federation of rubber workers' unions, or a federation of unions catering for different forms of transport would be—nor do they constitute a proper basis for a General Workers' Union which would cater for unskilled labourers in various industries having a common interest. In our view maximum bargaining strength comes from unions linking up or associating closely with others catering for grades in their own industry or occupation. Federations of this sort may lead to amalgamation, but whether this follows or not, each union's representatives meet others who know the industry and the conditions of labour, they have confidence in each other's knowledge and can then talk authoritatively and present a united front to their own employers. This is certainly not the case with the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions or the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions whose officials cannot reasonably claim any familiarity with the industries or occupations of the workers in the affiliated unions.

(13) We give reasons in paras. 106-111 for disapproving of the methods of the Federations and why we conclude that fees for affiliating to Federations should not in any event exceed two per cent. of an affiliated union's general income.

(14) *Intimidation* during industrial disputes has undoubtedly been rife. Employers have not been guiltless, but their methods have been less open than those of the Unions; they have consisted of discouraging membership of unions, ignoring legitimate representations and only occasionally threatening dismissal of trade unionists. *Generally speaking the intimidation of both workers and employers (mostly Asian) has come from the unions.* Many young men—by no means all ex-guerillas although fired by their example—have been encouraged to resort and have resorted to intimidation and to threats and acts of violence. As the morale of the police has improved and more persons convicted of criminal violence suitably punished and, if aliens, deported, open violence has diminished, but intimidation still continues on a scale surprising to those unfamiliar with Asians or with the history of Chinese Societies.

(15) We consider the Governments justified in using their lawful powers (including deportation) to the fullest extent to prevent this nefarious practice, and, in the event

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tions under Communist control ... II of the report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and

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of workers or others intimidated being unwilling through fear to give evidence in Court, in holding inquiries *in camera*. We spoke to quite a number of those who had been threatened and some who had actually suffered violence and they one and all admitted they were afraid (some said on account of their wives and families) to give evidence in Court even when they knew their assailants—mostly they didn't.

(16) We have made very careful inquiry into the procedure adopted in deportation cases and are satisfied that the investigations are carried out with care and with due regard to safeguarding the liberty of the subject. We do not see how else the public can be protected against these criminal activities. Responsible trade unions cannot function in an atmosphere of violence and intimidation, and workers who intend to build up responsible organisations will need to support the authorities in this matter and to rid themselves of men who resort to or encourage such methods.

(17) Unions have every right, it is indeed their duty, to afford protection and legal aid to members but they must make it clear that they cannot and will not afford protection to those guilty of criminal violence, nor allow them to hold office. On the other hand employers must not act on the assumption that notice or even the threat of a strike is either illegal or amounts to intimidation, and the authorities must give no countenance to such an assumption.

(18) Some of the most serious disputes and intimidatory activities have taken place on rubber estates, and, on some, employers and managers have taken steps to prevent "strangers" trespassing on what is private property. They declare they have no wish to refuse reasonable facilities to *bona fide* trade union officials and we agree with the Commissioners for Labour that the pass system outlined in para. 122 should give reasonable protection to both employers and trade unions.

(19) The abolition of the sub-contractor system at the Port of Singapore (para. 51) and the compilation of a register of dock workers with a view to decasualisation of labour was a great step forward. We recommend the consideration of introducing a system of piece-work such as is operative in most parts of the world and has, we believe, proved highly satisfactory. This would give an incentive for a quicker turn-round of ships.

(20) The present method of signing on Ships' crews is very unsatisfactory, being reminiscent of the procedure in operation in the United Kingdom a century ago. The *ghaut serang* or sub-contractor system should be abolished and all seamen engaged through a Labour Office or Exchange established exclusively for this industry, with a Joint Advisory Board nominated by ship-owners or brokers and the Unions.

(21) Other employers are also recommended to consider in consultation with the appropriate unions, the abolition of the practice of sub-contracting and, where suitable, the introduction of piece-work. Such changes are, we understand being considered on the rubber estates.

(22) Although the general education system is outside our terms of reference we draw attention to the many requests we had from trade unionists for the introduction of a compulsory national educational system. We do not see how a common citizenship can otherwise be created.

(23) There is a great need for establishment of technical classes—there are very few and these not of the best. Moreover youths become apprentices but are unable to read. Much needs to be done if full advantage is to be taken of native ability.

(24) There is no national contributory social security scheme in Malaya—such benefits as payment during sickness, maternity allowance, hospital and medical treatment if provided at all are for the most part borne entirely by the employer. Unions pressed for a scheme similar to that of the United Kingdom but it was clear they had not appreciated they would have to pay substantial contributions. If a start is to be made it would probably be best to cover unemployment and then proceed to sickness benefit. Death benefit and old age pensions would make a great appeal.

(25) The terms of Workmen's Compensation were revised last year, but in our view the payment is still too limited both as regards amount and period of duration.

(26) The present method of calculating and paying maternity benefit to the married woman worker lends itself to abuse—both by deception of the employer by the worker, and by collusion between employer and employee for the former to pay a lesser amount than stipulated, provided the latter continues at work. It would be better to pay a fixed amount.

(27) Housing schemes are urgently needed involving finance, planning and powers akin to those in the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947—paras. 62-65.

(28) Definite cost-of-living indices are not available, but we are understating rather than overstating the position when we declare that increases in wages have not kept pace with the rising cost-of-living and that salaries in Government service and elsewhere have lagged still farther behind.

(29) A list of current prices in Singapore is given in Appendix No. 9.

(30) In the absence of further rationing and a system of price control with subsidies on certain necessities, on which we are not in a position to make a recommendation every effort must be made to bring down the cost-of-living. Increased rice production and distribution is the crux, and we stress the urgency of the matter. The complaint that Malaya is not receiving its fair allocation under the I.E.F.C. scheme should be investigated (paras. 77 and 79).

(31) Strong complaints were made, particularly by the Clerical unions, of the decisions of the two Governments to insist that the public services should be organised by unions catering only for such services. On the whole, we think this was a wise decision and should lead to more effective collective bargaining. We see no reason, however, why the two sections should not collaborate, exchange information and when the time is ripe for its formation affiliate to the same Trades Union Congress.

(32) In view of their terms of service the teachers are justified in organising on a Pan-Malayan basis, and we recommend arrangements for registering their union be speeded up. Registration has been unduly delayed.

(33) We note with satisfaction that representation of leading trade unionists on legislative councils and other public or semi-public bodies is being granted. We think such representation should be increased whenever suitable opportunities occur.

(34) The proper keeping of trade union accounts is essential. The Trade Union Adviser and Registrars are helping with advice and guidance but the unions have difficulty in providing competent book-keepers, and the fees of auditors are an additional burden and some auditors are not as reliable as they should be. The practice adopted in some Colonies, of the Government providing an auditor might be considered.

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Probably the Registrars' Staffs might be able to do the work; they could insist on proper standards while giving special consideration to young organisations. We may say that the system works well in Trinidad and is welcomed by the trade unions.

(35) The appointment of a permanent Registrar in Singapore is to be commended but the Department needs strengthening. (Para. 144).

(36) The policy of appointing a Trade Union Adviser separate from the Labour Department was fully justified and should be maintained. (Para. 154).

(37) The education of the rank and file trade unionist is most necessary. Good work is being done and with the strengthening of the Trade Union Adviser's Department should be considerably developed. The Asian Staff are proving themselves and we believe the policy of training them for the highest posts is sound and should be pursued. (Para. 149).

(38) We recommend the further development of Adult Education and have outlined suggestions in para. 157.

(39) The Unions are prohibited from using funds for political purposes or for supporting political parties. There is full freedom for individuals to indulge in political activities. The formation of a Labour Party is likely to be undertaken in the near future. In the meantime it would, we think, be unfortunate if the Trade Unions became divided and failed to get on with laying the foundations of their industrial organisations.

(XIII).—APPRECIATION AND THANKS.

165. We desire to express our thanks for all the willing help given to us during this Inquiry: to Sir Edward Gent, the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, and Sir Franklin Gimson, Governor of Singapore, and the Colonial Secretary, for the way they smoothed our path for us, to Sir Ralph Hone, Deputy Commissioner-General, for information regarding the British Military Administration period and to both employers and trade unionists who were so frank and friendly and stinted nothing in their desire to ensure that we should get a complete picture of the working conditions throughout Malaya.

We are specially indebted to the Commissioners for Labour of the Federation and Singapore, their deputies and assistants, to the Trade Union Advisers and to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, who gave most freely of their valuable time and stores of information to assist us in our work.

We are grateful also to the many trade union leaders who gave us their full confidence. If we appear to be more critical than they anticipated we would say that this arises out of our belief that the movement in Malaya is at the cross roads and it is our earnest desire that it should take the right path, that it should be prepared to accept responsibilities as well as put forward claims, demand rights and accept privileges. It should assist to build up industry and commerce as well as insist that the workers receive their full share of the product.

(Sgd.) STAN. AWBERY.

(Sgd.) FRED. W. DALLEY.

10th June, 1948.

APPENDIX No. 1.

DAY TO DAY DIARY AND ITINERARY.

SINGAPORE.

8-2-48 (Sunday)	8.00 a.m.	Arrived Singapore Airport.
	10.45 a.m.	Discussion with the Governor, the Commissioner for Labour and Acting Trade Union Adviser.
	9.00 p.m.	Discussion with the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya.
9-2-48 (Monday)	9.30 a.m.	Press Conference.
	10.30 a.m.-11.45 a.m.	Labour Department.
	12.00 noon	Called on Secretary-General.
	2.30 p.m.	Meeting with Labour Advisory Board, Singapore.
	4.00 p.m.	Meeting with President, Indian Seamen's Union.
10-2-48 (Tuesday)	9.30 a.m.	Meeting with Secretary of Association of Engineers and Secretary, Merchant Captains' Guild. (Chinese New Year Holiday).
	6.30 p.m.	Discussion with Committee of Association of Engineers.
11-2-48 (Wednesday)	—	(Chinese New Year Holiday).
	11.00 a.m.	Conversation with Member of Advisory Council.
	12 noon	Lunch with Colonial Secretary.
	5.00 p.m.	Chairman of Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
12-2-48 (Thursday)	9.00 a.m.	Manager of Dunlop Rubber Co.
	1.00 p.m.	Lunch with Secretary-General.
	2.30 p.m.	Singapore Harbour Employees' Union.
	3.30 p.m.	President of Harbour Employees' Union.
	7.45 p.m.	Dinner with Chairman, Singapore Harbour Board.
13-2-48 (Friday)	9.30 a.m.-1.00 p.m.	Visiting: Kim Guan Hin Oil Mills. Singapore Steam Laundry. "Soo Bee" Rubber Godowns. "Thye Hong" Biscuit Factory.
	3.00 p.m.	Malayan Democratic Union (Political Organisation).
14-2-48 (Saturday)	9.15 a.m.	Singapore Harbour Board. Tour of inspection.
	4.00 p.m.	Meeting and Tea Party, Public Services Unions (eight).
	9.00 p.m.	Teachers Social and Dance.
15-2-48 (Sunday)	9.30 a.m.	Building and Construction Workers' Union.
	11.30 a.m.	Rubber Workers' Union.
	2.30 p.m.	Coal Labour Union.
	4.30 p.m.	Sawmill Employees' Union.
16-2-48 (Monday)	9.30 a.m.	Godown Labourers' Union.
	11.30 a.m.	Sago Workers' Union and Sago Factory.
	2.30 p.m.	Drivers' Union.
	5.30 p.m.	Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union.

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17-2-48 (Tuesday)	9.00 a.m.	Chinese Rubber and Chinese Rubber Shoe Factories.
	3.00 p.m.	Municipal Daily Paid Workers' Union.
	5.30 p.m.	Singapore Municipal Services Union.
18-2-48 (Wednesday)	9.00 a.m.	Talk with Officer of Public Works Department and visit to Hospital.
	2.00 p.m.	Singapore Federation of Trade Unions.
19-2-48 (Thursday)	9.15 a.m.	Dunlop Rubber Co's Godown. Talks with Managers, Shop Stewards and men and women workers.
	10.00 a.m.	Singapore Harbour Board Unions.
	11.00 a.m.	Governor of Singapore.
	1.00 p.m.	Lunch and talk with Chairman of Chinese Chamber of Commerce and representative employers.
	3.00 p.m.	European and Indian members of Chamber of Commerce.
	5.00 p.m.	Chinese members of Chamber of Commerce.
	6.00 p.m.	Secretary of Clerical Union.
20-2-48 (Friday)	9.30 a.m.	Labour Office.
	5.00 p.m.	Singapore Traction Employees' Union.
21-2-48 (Saturday)	10.00 a.m.	Recording for Broadcast.
	11.00 a.m.	Indian Exhibition.
	2.15 p.m.	Government and Municipal Labour Union.
	8.00 p.m.	Left Singapore by Train for Kuala Lumpur.

FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

22-2-48 (Sunday)	—	Talks with the High Commissioner.
23-2-48 (Monday)	9.00 a.m.	Discussion with Commissioner for Labour.
	11.30 a.m.	Discussion with Acting Trade Union Adviser.
	4.00 p.m.	Press Conference.
24-2-48 (Tuesday)	10.00 a.m.	Opening Ceremony, Federal Legislative Council.
	11.30 a.m.	General Manager and Chief Officers of Malayan Railway.
	5.00 p.m.	Clerical Workers' Union.
25-2-48 (Wednesday)	9.00 a.m.	Trade Union Adviser.
	10.30 a.m.	Controller of Immigration.
	11.30 a.m.	Secretary for Chinese Affairs.
	2.00 p.m.	Registrar of Trade Unions.
	4.00 p.m.	Representatives of Government Trade Unions.
26-2-48 (Thursday)	10.00 a.m.	Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions.
	4.00 p.m.	Representatives of other Trade Unions.
27-2-48 (Friday)	9.15 a.m.	Chief Social Welfare Officer.
	10.00 a.m.	Representatives of United Planting Association of Malaya and Malayan Planting Industries.
	11.30 a.m.	Employers' Association.
	11.30 a.m.	Representative employers in the Tin Industry.
	2.30 p.m.	Visit to Batu Arang Coal Mine.
28-2-48 (Saturday)	9.30 a.m.	Visit to the Choultry.
	10.30 a.m.	British Adviser and Mentri Besar (Prime Minister).
	11.30 a.m.	Town Hall and Kampong Satu (Housing Estate).
	3.00 p.m.	Leper Colony.

29-2-48 (Sunday)	—	
1-3-48 (Monday)	9.00 a.m.	To Johore Bahru by road.
	10.00 a.m.	British Adviser and Mentri Besar.
	10.45 a.m.	Deputy Commissioner for Labour.
		Tin-making Factory and United Malayan Pineapple Factory.
	2.30 p.m.	Representatives of Planters from South and Central Johore.
	3.30 p.m.	Representatives of Trade Unions from South and Central Johore.
2-3-48 (Tuesday)	Morning	To Kluang by road.
	2-3.00 p.m.	Deputy Commissioner for Labour.
		Government Workers' Representatives, Kluang.
3-3-48 (Wednesday)	8.30 a.m.	Muar Trade Unions Representatives.
		To Malacca by road.
	12 noon	Resident Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner for Labour.
	2.30 p.m.	Trade Union representatives.
	5.15 p.m.	Addressed Rotary Club.
4-3-48 (Thursday)	10.30 a.m.	Employers' representatives.
		Visited Wharf and Warehouses, Malacca.
	Afternoon	To Seremban by road.
5-3-48 (Friday)	9.00 a.m.	British Adviser, the Mentri Besar and the Deputy Commissioner for Labour.
	10.00 a.m.	Visit to Kirby Rubber Estate.
	1.00 p.m.	Deputy Commissioner for Labour.
	2.30 p.m.	Trade Union representatives.
	Evening	Mentri Besar.
6-3-48 (Saturday)	9.00 a.m.	Employers' Representatives: Rubber Estates' Small Holdings, Tin Mines.
		To Kuala Lumpur by road.
7-3-48 (Sunday)	12.00 noon	Estates Staff Workers' Union.
	2.00 p.m.	Visited Port Swettenham Harbour and Repair Sheds.
	4.00 p.m.	Tea Party, Estates Staff Workers' Union.
8-3-48 (Monday)	Morning	To Ipoh by road,
	Afternoon	British Adviser, Mentri Besar and Deputy Commissioner for Labour.
9-3-48 (Tuesday)	9.00 a.m.	Government Employees' Unions. Clerical Workers and non-Government Employees' Unions.
	11.00 a.m.	Tin Mining, Rubber Estate and Hydro-Electric Employers.
	2.30 p.m.	Trade Union Representatives (13 Unions).
10-3-48 (Wednesday)	Morning	Visit to two Tin Mines: Gravity Pump and Dredgers.
	Afternoon	To Penang by road. Visited living quarters.
11-3-48 (Thursday)	10.00 a.m.	Government and Municipal Workers' Unions (ten)
	12.00 noon	Visit to Docks.
	3.30 p.m.	Employers' and Rubber Traders' Association.

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

12-3-48 (Friday)	8.30-10.00 a.m.	Penang Free School and Chung Ling High School.
	10.00 a.m.	Penang Federation of Trade Unions.
	2.30 p.m.	Visit to Eastern Smelting Works.
	4.00 p.m.	Clerical and Administrative Staff, Engineering and other non-affiliated Unions.
	6.00 p.m.	Press Conference.
13-3-48 (Saturday)	—	To Kedah by road. Visit to Rubber Estate and meeting with Rubber Planters.
		To Ipoh by road.
14-3-48 (Sunday)	—	To Cameron Highlands by road.
		Discussions with Commissioner for Labour and Acting Trade Union Adviser at Cameron Highlands.
15-3-48 (Monday)	—	At Cameron Highlands, Discussions.
16-3-48 (Tuesday)	—	Visited Boh Tea Plantation and interviewed Manager and Workers.
17-3-48 (Wednesday)	Morning	To Kuala Lumpur by road.
	Afternoon	The High Commissioner, Chinese Dinner.
18-3-48 (Thursday)	9.30 a.m.	Meeting of Joint Committee to consider Whitley Council for Railway.
	2.30 p.m.	Controller of Supplies.
	4.00 p.m.	Press Conference.
	8.15 p.m.	Night train to Singapore.
19-3-48 (Friday)	—	Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Singapore.
		Singapore Traction Co. Employees' Union.
20-3-48 (Saturday)	9.30 a.m.	Visit to Laundry.
	4.30 p.m.	Malayan Teachers' Union.
21-3-48 (Sunday)	—	Reviewing Evidence.
		Welfare Officer and People's Restaurant.
22-3-48 (Monday)	9.00 a.m.	Singapore Registrar of Trade Unions.
	10.30 a.m.	Head of Security Service.
	12.00 noon	Commissioner of Police.
	7.00 p.m.	Adult Language Class—Evening School.
23-3-48 (Tuesday)	9.30 a.m.	Manager, Rubber Godown.
	10.30 a.m.	Colonial Secretary and Economic Adviser.
	12.00 noon	Chairman of Singapore Commissioners and Improvement Trust.
24-3-48 (Wednesday)	11.00 a.m.	Governor of Singapore.
25-3-48 (Thursday)	11.00 a.m.	Recording for Broadcast.
	12.00 noon	Secretary-General.
26-3-48 (Good Friday)	11.30 a.m.	Visited Singapore Slums and Housing Estates with Manager of Improvement Trust.
	2.30 p.m.	Press Conference.
	6.00 p.m.	Editor of *Straits Times*.
27-3-48 (Saturday)	6.30 a.m.	To Airport; Left 8.00 a.m.

Appendix No. 2.

PRESS AND BROADCAST STATEMENTS.

(*a*).—PRESS RELEASE BY THE MALAYAN GOVERNMENTS.

After a review of the Trade Unions established in this country since the War, the Malayan Governments last year decided to arrange at the Governments' expense for a visit of men of acknowledged experience in the practice and procedure of Trades Unionism in the United Kingdom to look thoroughly into the situation of labour and trades unions in Malaya, and to give both to the Governments and to trades unions the benefit of their information and advice, and for this purpose to make a report.

Mr. F. W. Dalley and Mr. S. S. Awbery, M.P., arrived accordingly in Singapore on 8th February, and have now reached Kuala Lumpur. They will be visiting various parts of the Federation for the purpose of meeting and conferring with officers of the Government and representative leaders of Trades Unions, and they expect to return to Singapore on their way back to the United Kingdom on March 18th.

The expenses of the mission are shared between the Federation and Singapore, and the Federation share is estimated to be not more than $7,000.

(*b*).—BROADCAST TALK BY Mr. F. W. DALLEY, RADIO MALAYA, SINGAPORE.

1. Listeners will be aware that Mr. Awbery and I have been appointed to serve on a Trade Union Mission to Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. There still seems to be some misapprehension in certain quarters, however, as to the sort of work we have been asked to do and in any event, at the end of the first fortnight of our visit, it would appear to be well worth while to say why we are here and what we hope to accomplish.

2. Now the Secretary of State for the Colonies is anxious that the Trade Union Movement in these colonies should develop in a responsible, orderly and fruitful way, side by side with the constitutional progress he hopes to see on the political field, so he has asked us as experienced British Trade Unionists, to come out here to inquire into trade union and labour conditions and to report to him on our return.

3. We know a good deal of our own Movement, for between us we have a total of upwards of 70 years trade union and labour experience; firstly, as members of the rank and file, then as local honorary officers and finally we have between us served nearly 60 years as full-time negotiating officers of our respective Unions. I have myself worked as a farmer's boy, as a shop assistant, as an hotel clerk and then as a railway clerk in District and Headquarters offices before I became a full-time negotiating official of my Trade Union, and my colleague has had a similar wide and varied experience.

4. Now, we are not here to settle disputes, or to interfere with the trade union movement or to attempt to compel either trade unions or employers to conform to British standards. We are here to inquire, to advise, and to co-operate—and then to report.

5. Of course, as is quite natural, we find conditions very different from those in Great Britain. *Our* trade union movement is more than 150 years old. It did not spring into existence overnight, but, like Topsy in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, it "just growed".

6. We made many mistakes, but we profited by those mistakes. Our first great task was to induce the workers themselves to see the value of collective effort; to appreciate that by banding themselves together in societies they could do collectively what they could not do individually.

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

7. Then, we taught ourselves self-government which is the secret of all good government. Then we had to convince the State, the Government and the employers that Unions should be given a legal status (for up to that time trade unions had been illegal organisations) and that collective bargaining was a better way of fixing wages and standards than that of arbitrary action by the employers.

To-day, the British Trade Union Movement, in spite of its human failings, is recognised over all the world as capable of, and actually making an invaluable contribution to the economic life, stability and progress of the country.

8. Here, conditions are similar in some respects and in others very different from those of Great Britain a few generations ago. The bulk of the workers both by hand and brain in Malaya have yet to be convinced of the desirability and necessity of trade unionism. They require to be organised—that is persuaded, but not compelled, to join their trade union. Although the enthusiastic pioneers have yet to convince the bulk of the workers, to say nothing of the employers, of the value of trade unionism, they have, unlike the early British trade unions, a legal standing and encouragement from both the Home and Colonial Governments to organise industrially. That is very valuable.

9. So far as our inquiries have gone, we have seen representatives of a large number of the principal trade unions. There is hope and enthusiasm there but although some of the unions have been organising and are establishing themselves on sound lines, others have yet to learn some of the first principles of trade unionism. We hope and believe, however, and our inquiries go to support this, they are willing and anxious to learn and feel that they are not receiving the right sort of encouragement. We have been told of their efforts to organise, and the difficulties they have been encountering. We have heard much of the wages they receive (which it is contended are not adequate to meet the increased cost of living) and of their unsatisfactory living conditions. Then we have visited factories, workshops, docks and mills and have also seen representative employers. Some of these complain of the irresponsibility of some of the unions and their lack of knowledge of trade unionism and of the difficulty they (the employers) have in making agreements which will be adhered to by the workers and their unions. Now although my colleague and I are anxious that employers should accept their full responsibilities towards their workers we are not unmindful of *their* difficulties, for we have both served as employers' representatives on Joint Negotiating Bodies. So we know that all the statements which have been made to us have to be examined and reviewed, and we are steadily collating the facts and sifting them to get a true picture.

10. If there are in Singapore representative bodies of workers or employers whom we have not yet consulted, and who would like to put their views before us, we hope they will communicate their desire to us through the Commissioner for Labour in Havelock Road.

11. Now we are going into the Malayan Federation and shall make similar inquiries there, after which we shall come back to Singapore to complete our inquiries and to prepare our report for the Secretary of State.

(*c*).—BROADCAST TALK BY MR. STAN AWBERY, M.P., RADIO MALAYA, SINGAPORE.

Seven weeks ago my colleague, Fred Dalley, and I came to Malaya, under a commission from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to inquire into the development of trade unions, to examine the labour conditions in this part of the Empire, to give guidance and advice where they were desired, and then to report to him the results of our investigations.

During our inquiries we have interviewed a good cross-section of the community, among them scores of representatives of trade unions and a large number of employers.

They have supplied us with numerous facts and figures. They have given unhesitatingly, much assistance and advice out of the great knowledge and experience they have gained from many years in Malaya. These all co-operated with us magnificently and by so doing have helped us to understand the position here more clearly, than when we arrived.

We watched the stevedores at the docks loading and discharging cargoes for, and from the ends of the earth. We visited rubber plantations and saw the skilful hand of the tapper cut the bark of the tree and the milklike rubber fluid, which is so valuable to-day in earning dollars in the United States of America, flowing into the small receptacle. We passed a few hours on a large tin dredger and also saw the gravel pump system of tin dredging in operation. We spent a little time on a tea plantation and in the tea factory. We have visited numerous factories and many homes of the workers, also schools and hospitals. These have made the problems and difficulties of the people of Malaya very real to us.

We are deeply grateful for all the help that has been afforded us by Trade Unionists, employers and Government officials. We desire, before we leave this very fine country with its many hospitable friends, to express our sincere thanks and gratitude for the warm reception given to us everywhere, particularly by all those who wish to see a strong, healthy, constructive trade union movement develop in Malaya. We leave behind us, now that we are returning, a host of very fine friends on whose loyalty to trade union principles we can confidently count and who will always be before our minds' eye when Malaya is mentioned in the Home country.

We did not come with the intention of telling the employers or workers of Malaya what they *must* do, or that they *must* travel the path we indicate to them. We had no intention of leading them by the hand. We came with the idea of giving advice which we felt we could give from our long and varied experience in the Trade Union movement in the United Kingdom, and by so doing help the Trade Unionists to choose the right road along which their movement should progress, and to lead it democratically, confidently and courageously.

I have spent 25 years as an official of the largest Trade Union in the world. I have negotiated thousands of agreements and have led a few strikes, some of which were successful and some failures. I have learned during this long period that the calling of a strike is not the sole or even the most important function of a trade union, in fact it is a very ruinous one, and should not be embarked upon without serious thought and consideration of the possible consequences, and, after every other means of settling an industrial problem has failed. Strikes bring poverty and misery to thousands of people both in the industry concerned and outside of it. I do not suggest that the strike weapon should never be used. If that had been the policy of the Trade Unions in the United Kingdom we would have achieved very little. I do, however, emphasise that it should be resorted to only after every other means of achieving agreement has failed and, when it has been started it should be brought to an end as quickly as possible to avoid unnecessary suffering. Many avoidable mistakes were made by us in the early period, many grievous errors were committed in our immature days because we were inexperienced. We are anxious that other workers forming trade unions should learn from our experience to avoid them.

The Malayan trade union movement is now passing through its birthpangs. It appears as if it is like a blind man groping and seeking for the right direction. If, through confusion of thought, or lack of a clear-sighted policy, it takes the wrong turning now, it may have to retrace its steps with much sorrow and suffering to its members. This can be avoided if it has wise guidance and leadership at this critical period, and if it will look to the future

as well as to the present. If we have by our talks with trade unionists in Malaya, or through the report which we shall give to the Colonial Secretary, done anything to further the progress of this movement, and if by our advice we have helped to give it direction, we will feel that our task has not been in vain.

It is inevitable that some strikes should take place in the early stages of this movement, especially at this time in Malaya. For some years the enemy occupied this country, and lawlessness was more or less encouraged in order to frustrate the occupying powers. A resistance movement grew which was to resist the established law of the oppressor. When the enemy was forced to withdraw, these men found that this method of living which they practised must now cease. It was no easy task to change quickly. It had to be a slow process and some of them turned their attention to the formation of unions, using the strike weapon to force their demands whether reasonable or unreasonable. They had learned to use force and were frequently successful but they did not understand clearly the idea and principles of arbitration, conciliation and negotiation—so essential in re-establishing our national economy and rehabilitating the country.

I have seen copies of letters sent to employers making demands for increased wages and improved conditions, accompanied by a threat that if they were not conceded in a few days all the workers would strike. This is not the method adopted in the United Kingdom by the Trade Unions. Applications are forwarded to the employer for increased wages, and with them a request for the holding of a conference of both sides of the industry. Employers and workers should meet in conference so that the trade union can verbally explain the reason for making such demands.

In the event of the union failing to convince the employer that they have a good case, and he consequently rejects their application or claims, that is not the end of the negotiations or the signal to call a strike. The negotiations now pass to a higher level, to a committee with wider powers. In the event of further failure, at the higher level, then the case can be sent to arbitration which is conducted by someone who is impartial. This is not a one-sided process. The same procedure is adopted if an employer makes an application for a reduction of the wage rate or a worsening of the conditions of his workers. He can't lock his men out until he has exhausted the negotiating machinery. This kind of wage structure has become almost a part of our economic life, and without it our complex social life could not work smoothly.

The strike weapon is rarely officially used in the United Kingdom now, because we have learned that negotiations are more effective and less costly to the workers. It is essential, I think, at this stage in the development of the Malayan trade union movement that it should concentrate on setting up such excellent machinery. A few industries have already adopted the principle. Some days ago I sat with the representatives of most of the grades of the Railway workers thrashing out in a thoroughly businesslike manner the rules to govern the working of this machine. I want to recommend, both to the employers and workpeople, in other industries, that they should now meet each other to set up such a machine. If industry is to be run for the benefit of the nation, as it should be, there must be established mutual respect and understanding between those engaged in it. There is as much need for the development of this spirit of conciliation among the employers as among the workers. Both sides are slow to learn that in the game of life it is necessary to give as well as take.

To blame the other fellow always, whether employer or worker, for creating a problem and not being sensible about it is not the best way to solve it. An honest examination of both sides, and a facing up to the facts are more likely to bring about a permanent

solution, than by adopting the principle of the proverbial ostrich by putting its head in the sand and pretending that it doesn't exist. I was always convinced in my own mind that I had an incontestible case until I heard the other side, and then I was not quite so sure. My first lesson as a Trade Union Secretary was to learn that there were two sides to every question and that it was my duty to understand both of them.

I have been deeply impressed by the strong desire expressed by many of the groups of workers we have met, for a system of compulsory education. This is a clear indication of the progressive character of the people, and must be encouraged in every way. From many of the estates we visited we ascertained that 90 per cent. of the children attended school. I could not help thinking as I watched the children going happily and willingly to school, that these will be the democratic leaders of Malaya in a few years. Education is the foundation of a sound democracy and it is being laid firmly in this part of the Empire. Every obstacle which retards its development should be quickly and ruthlessly removed.

I want to close this talk with an appeal to the workers and the employers. They are both important parts of industry. They are inter-dependent one of the other. The one invests his money and the other invests his life, or works in it in order to obtain a living. Both have moral obligations to each other that they cannot avoid or pass on to someone else. The employee is engaged to produce wealth and the employer must see that the return for that labour is adequate to give him a reasonable standard of living. He must not think that this standard should never change. As civilisation develops, the desires, ambitions and aspirations of men increase and must be met. Men are spiritual and moral beings and should be treated as such if the maximum is to be obtained from their labour.

Great changes are taking place in the economic life of the people. These cannot be stopped. We must accept this fact that they are inevitable. They are the evidence of a stirring among the peoples. The most important factor in these important and critical days for the democracies of the world is that they should be directed into the right channels. If we can avoid the rocks and shoals during the next few years, we can, I am convinced, launch out into the open sea of a full and free democracy, and with it build a strong, virile, healthy Trade Unionism which will take its full part in the economic life of the nation and of the world.

APPENDIX No. 3.

(A)—LABOUR POPULATION BY RACES—FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

Industry.	Indians.	Chinese.	Malays.	Javanese.	Others.	Total.
Estates	164,492	93,870	51,450	16,782	508	327,102
Mines	4,704*	24,707*	5,577	93*	294*	42,677†
Miscellaneous	—	—	—	—	—	—
Factories, etc.	5,161	18,063	3,790	1,287	180	28,481
Government Departments ..	31,366	4,846	17,247	2,439	478	56,376
TOTALS ..	205,723	141,486	78,064	20,601	1,460	454,636

* Return not complete. † Total complete.

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so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working
analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in
a colonial country and the precautions and remedies
required./

(B)—NUMBER OF WORKERS EMPLOYED IN SOME OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIES—FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

Industry.	Number of workers on 31-12-47.	Number of concerns, acreages and other details.	Output in 1947.
Rubber cultivation ..	327,102	Estates 2,100,494 acres Small holdings 1,360,629 ,, *	359,865 long tons
Coconut cultivation ..			285,364 ,,
Oil Palm cultivation		600,882 acres †	‡Oil 51,186 long tons ‡Poonac 40,760 ,,
Tea cultivation ..		77,981 acres	Oil 39,115 long tons Kernels 5,737 ,,
		9,015 acres	1,244,074 lbs.
Tin Mining	12,493 .. 30,184 ..	Dredges (56) .. .. .. Others, Gravel Pump, Open Cast	17,103 } tons of 18,975 } tin-ore
Timber	17,000 approx. ..	— ..	974,000 tons

* Less than 100 acres. † 1940 Estimate. It is considered that the area has not suffered to any great extent through the occupation. ‡ Output of mills only. This figure does not take into account the output of a very considerable cottage industry.

APPENDIX No. 4.

CONSOLIDATED TABLE.*

LABOUR DISTRIBUTION BY RACES—SINGAPORE.

	Chinese.	Indians.	Malays.	Javanese, Sumatrans.	Others.	Total.
Government, Municipality, Harbour Board and Services	12,589	17,620	5,845	4,046	407	40,507
Factories, Mills, Transport and Commercial ..	67,311	6,637	6,266	3,374	149	83,737
TOTALS ..	79,900	24,257	12,111	7,420	556	124,244

* FOOTNOTE.—These figures do not include clerical workers, domestic workers, shopkeepers, or petty traders, and are incomplete even in respect of other "labour".

APPENDIX No. 5.

STATISTICS OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK, FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1947.

CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS.		HOURS OF WORK.		WAGES.		ALLOWANCES.			HOLIDAYS.		OVERTIME.
Industry.	Occupation.	Normal hours worked per worker daily.	Average hours actually worked per worker daily.	Scale of wages paid daily.	Average wage actually paid per worker monthly.	Average family allowance paid per worker monthly.	Whether in receipt of allowances in kind, e.g., food accommodation.	Estimated average value per worker monthly.	NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM. Paid.	Unpaid.	Per cent. rate paid.
Rubber Cultivation	TAPPERS.										
	Indians, Men	7	6	1.50	40	..	Accdn.	6.40	3	9 –	120*
		On contract, 9 to 24 cts. per lb. of rubber collected			50	..	,,	6.40	..	..	..
	Women	7	6	1.30	30	..	,,	6.40	3	9 –	120
	Young Persons	7	6	.80	23	..	,,	6.40	3	9 –	120
	Chinese, Men	On contract, 9 to 24 cts. per lb. of rubber collected			75	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Women	Do.			70	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Malaysians, Men	7	6	2.10	50	..	..	..	3	9 –	120
		On contract, 9 to 24 cts. per lb. of rubber collected			75	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Women	7	6	1.35	40	..	..	..	3	9 –	120
	WEEDERS AND FIELD WORKERS.										
	Indians, Men	8	7½	1.55	37	..	Accdn.	6.40	3	9 –	120
	Women	8	7½	1.10	27	..	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,
	Young Persons	5	5	.80	19	..	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,
	Chinese, Men	On contract		..	65	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Women	Do.		..	50	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Malaysians, Men	8	7½	1.60	39	..	..	..	3	9 –	120
	Women	8	7½	1.05	26	..	..	..	3	9 –	120
	Young Persons	5	5	.75	18	..	..	..	3	9 –	120

* In most cases a bonus is paid for work over a certain fixed figure. The percentage figure quoted covers cases where an hourly rate is laid down.

N.B.—These wage rates were superseded as from 1st May this year by new ones contained in a directive issued by the M.P.I.E.A.—*see* para. 31—but we cannot say whether they apply on all plantations.

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report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

APPENDIX No. 5—(*cont.*).

STATISTICS OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK, FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1947—(*cont.*).

CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS.		HOURS OF WORK.		WAGES.		ALLOWANCES.			HOLIDAYS.		OVERTIME.
Industry.	Occupation.	Normal hours worked per worker daily.	Average hours actually worked per worker daily.	Scale of wages paid daily.	Average wage actually paid per worker monthly.	Average family allowance paid per worker monthly.	Whether in receipt of allowances in kind, e.g., food accommodation.	Estimated average value per worker monthly.	NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM. Paid.	NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM. Unpaid.	Per cent. rate paid.
Rubber Cultivation —(cont.).	FACTORY WORKERS.										
	Indians, Men	8	10	1.90	50	..	Accdn.	6.40	3	9—	120
	Women	8	10	1.67	40	..	,,	,,	3	9—	120
	Chinese Men	8	10	3.23	77	..	..	..	3	9—	120
	Women	8	10	2.55	64	..	..	..	3	9—	120
	Malaysians, Men	8	8½	1.97	47	..	..	..	3	9—	120
	Women ..	8	8	1.80	43	..	..	..	3	9—	120
Tin Mining, Dredging	CHARGEMEN, KEPALAS AND FOREMEN	7	7	3.65	135	..	Food and accdn.	18	..	12	150
	SKILLED WORKMEN.										
	Fitters	8	8	3.66	110	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Turners	8	8	4.28	106	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Boiler Makers	8	8	3.00	97	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Blacksmiths	8	8	3.30	112	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Welders	8	8	3.44	104	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Carpenters	8	8	3.10	110	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	SEMI-SKILLED WORKMEN.										
	Painters	8	8	1.70	51	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Winchmen	8	8	2.95	102	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Hammermen	8	8	2.00	54	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Engine Driver	8	8	3.15	84	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Boilermen	8	8	3.00	78	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Electricians	8	8	Monthly	85	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Apprentices	8	8	2.24	58	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,

Registry

FOREIGN OFFICE,

House Terrace,

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Appendix No. 5—(*cont.*).

STATISTICS OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK, FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1947—(*cont.*).

Classification of Industries and Occupations.		Hours of Work.		Wages.		Allowances.			Holidays.		Overtime.
Industry.	Occupation.	Normal hours worked per worker daily.	Average hours actually worked per worker daily.	Scale of wages paid daily.	Average wage actually paid per worker monthly.	Average family allowance paid per worker monthly.	Whether in receipt of allowances in kind, e.g., food accommodation.	Estimated average value per worker monthly.	Number of days per annum. Paid.	Unpaid.	Per cent. rate paid.
Tin Mining, Dredging—(cont.)	General Labourers:										
	Washers, Deck Hands, Samplers, Greasers, Firemen, etc. Men ..	8	8	2.60	73	..	Food and accdn.	18	..	12	150
	Women ..	8	8	1.30	33	..	"	"	..	"	"
Tin Mining, Hydraulic	Chargemen, Kepalas and Hang Kong	8	10	Monthly rates	110	..	"	"	..	"	150*
	Skilled Workmen:										
	Fitters	8	10	4.60	120	..	"	"	..	"	"
	Motor Attendants ..	8	10	3.00	77	..	"	"	..	"	"
	Pump Fitters	8	10	3.00	78	..	"	"	..	"	"
	Semi-Skilled Workmen:										
	Pong Shau	8	10	2.00	58	..	"	"	..	"	"
	Engine Drivers	On contract		..	94	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Lorry Drivers	8	8	Monthly rates	75	..	Food and accdn.	18	..	12	150
	General Labourers:										
	Tin ore dressers, Tsap Kung, Kung si Kung, Dulang washers, grass cutters, etc.										
	Chinese, Men	8	10	1.28	34	..	"	"	..	"	"
	Women ..	8	8	1.05	25	..	"	"	..	"	"
	Indians, Men	8	8	1.55	40	..	..	..	..	"	"

* In most cases a bonus is paid for work over a certain fixed figure. The percentage figure quoted covers cases where an hourly rate is laid down.

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APPENDIX No. 5—(*cont.*).

STATISTICS OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK, FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1947—(*cont.*).

CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS.		HOURS OF WORK.		WAGES.		ALLOWANCES.			HOLIDAYS.		OVERTIME.
Industry.	Occupation.	Normal hours worked per worker daily.	Average hours actually worked per worker daily.	Scale of wages paid daily.	Average wage actually paid per worker monthly.	Average family allowance paid per worker monthly.	Whether in receipt of allowances in kind, e.g., food accommodation.	Estimated average value per worker monthly.	NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM. Paid.	NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM. Unpaid.	Per cent. rate paid.
Coconut Cultivation	TINDALS	6	6	1.50	48	..	Food and accdn.	6.40	..	12	120*
	HARVESTERS	6	6	2.50	60	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	HUSKERS	8	8	3.00	72	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	KILNMEN	8	12	1.25	45	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	PACKERS	7	7	2.50	60	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	GENERAL LABOURERS.										
	Shellers, weeders, slashers, etc.										
	Men	7	7	1.50	38	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Women	7	7	1.50	38	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
Oil Palm Cultivation	TINDALS	7	7	1.75	44	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	HARVESTERS	7	7	2.50	67	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	WEEDERS.										
	Men	7	7	1.20	28	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Women	7	7	1.05	25	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Young Persons ..	6	6	.60	14	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	FACTORY WORKERS.										
	Skilled	8	8	3.00	86	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Semi-skilled	8	8	1.85	45	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	GENERAL LABOURERS.										
	Men	8	8	1.55	36	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Women	7	7	1.30	30	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,

* In most cases a bonus is paid for work over a certain fixed figure. The percentage figure quoted covers cases where an hourly rate is laid down.

APPENDIX No. 5—(*cont.*).

STATISTICS OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK, FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1947—(*cont.*).

CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS.		HOURS OF WORK.		WAGES.		ALLOWANCES.			HOLIDAYS.		OVERTIME.
									NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM.		
Industry.	Occupation.	Normal hours worked per worker daily.	Average hours actually worked per worker daily.	Scale of wages paid daily.	Average wage actually paid per worker monthly.	Average family allowance paid per worker monthly.	Whether in receipt of allowances in kind, e.g., food accommodation.	Estimated average value per worker monthly.	Paid.	Unpaid.	Per cent. rate paid.
Tea Cultivation	PLUCKERS :										
	Men	7	7½	1.50	39	..	Food and Accdn.	6.40	..	12	120*
		On Contract			67	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Women	7	7½	1.50	39	..	Food and Accdn.	6.40	..	12	120
									..	,,	
	WEEDERS :										
	Men	7	7½	1.40	36	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
		On Contract			65	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Women	7	7	1.20	31	..	Food and Accdn.	6.40	..	12	120
	PRUNERS :										
	Men	7	7	1.50	39	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Women	7	7	1.20	31	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	FACTORY WORKERS :										
	Men	7	7½	1.55	40	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Women	7	7	1.40	36	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
Forestry Sawmills	CHARGEMEN	8	8	8.00	206	..	Food and Accdn.	18.00	..	12	150*
	SKILLED WORKMEN :										
	Master Turners, Fitters, Saw Repairers, etc. ..	8	8	7.00	170	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,

* In most cases a bonus is paid for work over a certain fixed figure. The percentage figure quoted covers cases where an hourly rate is laid down.

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STATISTICS OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK, FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1947—(*cont.*).

CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS.		HOURS OF WORK.		WAGES.		ALLOWANCES.			HOLIDAYS.		OVERTIME.
									NUMBER OF DAYS PER ANNUM.		
Industry.	Occupation.	Normal hours worked per worker daily.	Average hours actually worked per worker daily.	Scale of wages paid daily.	Average wage actually paid per worker monthly.	Average family allowance paid per worker monthly.	Whether in receipt of allowances in kind, e.g., food accommodation.	Estimated average value per worker monthly.	Paid.	Unpaid.	Per cent. rate paid.
Forestry Sawmills —(cont.)	SEMI-SKILLED WORKMEN :										
	Saw Bench Hands ..	8	8	4.60	120	..	Food and Accdn.	18.00	..	12	150*
	Engine Drivers	8	8	4.50	118	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Lorry Drivers	8	8	Monthly	115	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Fellers	On Contract			122	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Carriers	8	8	3.80	100	..	Food and Accdn.	18.00	..	12	150
	Apprentices	8	8	1.15	30	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	GENERAL LABOURERS ..	8	8	3.80	100	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
General Engineering	CHARGEMEN	7½	7½	7.25	173	..	Food and Accdn.	18.00	..	12	150
	FITTERS	,,	,,	4.50	108	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	TURNERS	,,	,,	4.15	100	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Moulders	,,	,,	4.10	99	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Blacksmiths	,,	,,	5.30	138	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Pattern Makers	,,	,,	5.87	141	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Welders	,,	,,	3.85	92	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Boiler Makers	,,	,,	4.15	100	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	Apprentices	,,	,,	1.90	47	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,
	GENERAL LABOURERS :										
	Foundry and Machine Shop Labourers, Greasers, Cablemen, etc.	,,	,,	2.55	61	..	,,	,,	..	,,	,,

* In most cases a bonus is paid for work over a certain fixed figure. The percentage figure quoted covers cases where an hourly rate is laid down.

APPENDIX No. 6.

SINGAPORE.

(A).—HOURS OF WORK, SUNDAY AND OVERTIME RATES.

(As based on Returns from Employers.)

	Hours per day.	Normal days per week.	Overtime rate.	Sunday rate.	Night rate.
Army and R.A.F.	8	6	1½	1½	—
Bakers	8	7	1½	1	—
Brickworks	8-9	7	1½	1-1½	—
Building	8	6	1½	1	—
Bus Drivers—					
Rural	9	6	1½	1	—
Town	8	6	1½	1	—
Cigar Making	8-9	6-7	1	1	—
Damar Stores	8	7	1	1	—
Engineering	8	6	1½	2	—
Glass	8	7	1½	1	—
Government	8	6	1½	2	—
Metal Works	8	6	1½	1½	—
Motor Repairs	8	5½	1½	2	—
Municipality	8	6	1½	2	—
Naval Base	8½	5½	2	2	—
Oil-Mills	8	6-7	1	2	—
Printing	8	6	2	1	—
Quarrying	8	7	1½	1	—
Rattan	8	7	1	1	—
Rubber Packing	8	6	1½	1	—
Rubber Goods	8	7	1½-2	1	—
Rubber Milling	8	7	2	1	—
Sago	8-9	6-7	1	1	—
Sauce	8	7	2	1	—
Shoes	8	6	1½	—	—
Singapore Harbour Board—					
Wharf	8	7	2	2	3
Others	8	6	1½	2	2
Soap	8	7	1½	1	—
Steam Laundry	8	6	1½	2	—
Tin Smelting	8	6	1½	2	—
Woodwork—					
Sawmills	8	7	1	1	—
Vehicle Building	8	7	2	1	—
Furniture	8-9	7	1	1	—

NOTE.—

1. Those places of employment in which there is a seven day week are almost all Asian owned. In an Asian place of employment the discipline is less strict than in European places of employment, and it is the normal practice for labourers to be absent several days a month. Where men work in gangs, the gangs have extra men to allow for this.
2. Wharf and Stevedore Labour is casual labour. A man will usually work for one main employer but will find work with others when his regular employer does not want him. They probably average 20-25 days a month.
3. Carrying labour (e.g., rice carriers who load rice sacks into lorries), work no fixed hours. Their piece rates are very high, and 3-4 hours work a day will earn them $5-$10. But the work while it lasts is extremely heavy, especially with the low ration.

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tions under Communist control. While Section VIII of the report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

(B).—LIST OF INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES WHICH PROVIDE HOUSING FOR ALL OR PART OF THEIR EMPLOYEES.

1. Asiatic Petroleum Company.
2. Bakeries.
3. Biscuit factories.
4. Box-makers.
5. Breweries.
6. Brickworks.
7. Building and construction.
8. Estates.
9. Fishery.
10. Government.
11. H.M. Naval Base.
12. Ice works.
13. Municipality.
14. Potteries.
15. Quarries.
16. Rattan washing.
17. Rubber mills.
18. Sago factories.
19. Sawmills.
20. Singapore Harbour Board.
21. Soap works.
22. Tin smelting,

and in almost every small Asian business which is carried on in shop-houses, e.g., tailors, washermen, furniture makers, dry-cleaners, shoe-makers, etc.

APPENDIX No. 7.

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF TRADE UNIONISM AMONG SINGAPORE HARBOUR BOARD WORKERS.

The employees of the Board include:

(*a*) 6,000 wharf and stevedore workers.
(*b*) 1,700 Dockyard workers.
(*c*) 800 road and railroad workers.
(*d*) 800 clerks.
(*e*) A considerable number of miscellaneous workers.

All are now organised in one or another of eight Trade Unions. These are:

Singapore Chinese Engineering Association. (Subsequently referred to as S.C.E.A.U.).	(Skilled shipyard workers).
Singapore Engineering Workers Union. (Subsequently referred to as S.E.W.U.).	(Skilled and unskilled shipyard workers).

S.H.B. Engineering Workmen's Union. (Subsequently referred to as S.H.B.E.W.U.).	(Skilled and unskilled engineers of Malay and Indian extraction).
Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association. (Subsequently referred to as S.H.B.S.A.).	(Clerical staff).
Singapore Harbour Labourers Union. (Subsequently referred to as S.H.L.U.).	(Wharf and stevedore workers, road and railway workers. Largely Indians).
Singapore Wharf and Ship Labour Union. (Subsequently referred to as S.W. & S.L.U.).	(Wharf and stevedore workers. Mainly Chinese of Cantonese extraction).
Singapore Harbour Board Employees Union. (Subsequently referred to as S.H.B.E.U.).	(Wharf and stevedore workers).
Malay Seamen's Unions. (Subsequently referred to as M.S.U.).	(All workers afloat, mainly Malays).

HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM AMONG HARBOUR BOARD WORKERS.

Before the war there were two important Trade Unions whose functions did not overlap and which embraced between them between eight and nine thousand men. The older was the S.C.E.A.U. whose members were the skilled workers in the dockyards. This Union had been in existence for many years and had long experience in organising the workers and in securing better conditions for them by all the established Trade Union methods. It was able to collect subscriptions, and used its funds not only for financing strikes when occasion arose, but also for benevolent activities among its members. In addition, the Union interested itself in maintaining standards of skill.

During the Occupation it went "underground", but when the War ended it very quickly re-established itself.

The other of the pre-war Unions was the S.H.B.E.U. This was a younger union than that of the dockyard workers and came into being in the nineteen thirties. It embraced the wharf and stevedore workers who were then supplied to the Board by labour contractors. Again its history was one of normal Trade Union development, though it never reached the status of the older union of dockyard workers. Like the latter it resumed its activities at the close of the period of the Japanese occupation.

POST-WAR CONDITIONS.

Soon after the defeat of Japan the two established Unions for Harbour Board workers found rival organisations coming into the field. The first was the union now known as the S.H.L.U. It came into being in a curious manner. In May, 1946, the S.H.B.E.U. successfully negotiated with the Board for an increase of 20 per cent. in wages. This excited the attention of the newly-founded General Labour Union, which was the communist organisation that later became the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions. The Vice-President of the S.H.B.E.U. was beaten up on more than one occasion during the summer, and the President left Singapore in September, 1946, because, as he said the General Labour Union had made life impossible for him on account of his association with the old Trade Union. The following month four unknown persons presented a series of demands to a junior officer in one of the Board's subsidiary offices. The principal demands were for the tripling of wages and for a free supply of considerable quantities of rice. The note paper on which they were typed stated that the demands were put forward by a

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body calling itself the Livelihood Improving Committee of the Singapore Harbour Board Workers. No one had previously heard of this organisation but its address has since become familiar as the headquarters of the S.H.L.U. On 25th October, 1946, five days after the presentation of these demands, a considerable number of Chinese youths appeared at the gates of the Harbour Board and turned all men away as they were coming into work. There was no overt violence but the plan was entirely successful and the premises of the S.H.B.E.U. were destroyed by hooligans a few days later.

Negotiations continued. During the course of them the "Livelihood Improving Committee" changed its name to that of the S.H.L.U. and declared its membership to consist of all workers in the Harbour Board other than the staff afloat, the dockyard workers and the clerks. The delegates were constantly changed and included only one or two men actually working for the Harbour Board. The principals were the Secretary and Vice-President of the General Labour Union now holding office in the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. All delegates wore hammer and sickle badges and occasionally gave the clenched fist salute. It is interesting to notice that these men no longer wear their communist badges though they still exhibit portraits of Russian leaders in their premises.

The newly formed Union claimed to have absorbed the old S.H.B.E.U., and was, in practice, the only Union in the field until the second half of 1947. In August, 1947, a worker was shot by an Indian police constable within the Harbour Board area. The Court later found that the constable had acted in justifiable self-defence. The S.H.L.U. called an immediate strike and demanded that the policeman should be taken into custody, that an enquiry should be held jointly by the Union, the Harbour Board and the Labour Department, and that the Harbour Board should join the Union in demanding that Government should guarantee no recurrence of such an incident. Various expenses were also demanded from the Harbour Board. The strike lasted four days, but soon after the old S.H.B.E.U. and the S.W. & S.L.U. became openly active. The latter Union consisted mainly of Chinese of Cantonese extraction whose old guild association had been given Trade Union form after the end of the Japanese Occupation. Perhaps it should be mentioned that the S.H.L.U. has never been able to produce a register of members or to collect regular subscriptions. The members of the two Unions resisting the S.H.L.U. fear the organisers of the S.H.L.U. This was demonstrated when the latter called for a stoppage of work on the 9th January this year. The other two Unions had stated that their men would definitely work. In fact they worked for one night and then remained absent, declaring that they were intimidated into joining the strike.

This strike, which lasted for 48 hours, was really designed to prevent the Harbour Board from abolishing the contract system of employing labour.

Communist propaganda has, of course, been directed against the contract system of employing labour for a long time and it is, perhaps, necessary to explain why communist-inspired organisations like the S.H.L.U. should be found opposing the abolition of the system. The familiar communist policy of throwing sand into the works on all possible occasions is, of course, one reason, but there is another. The S.H.L.U. has partly relied on the contract system for the building up of its funds. The Union has never been successful in collecting regular subscriptions, and to the best of my belief has never made a serious attempt to organise the collection of regular subscriptions. It could hardly do so while continuing to make no attempt to bring into being a register of members. The labour contractors, from time to time, paid contributions to the Union on various pretexts.

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Under the contract system, gang foremen had ways and means of making money irregularly and from this money they also made periodic donations. The S.H.L.U., and other new Unions of the same parentage, make a regular practice of including demands for the payment of bonuses to the men in one form or another when trade disputes arise. From lump sum payments of this order they take as high a percentage as they can extract. A Union of this kind, which has been superimposed on the men from outside instead of coming into being from among the men themselves, cannot do other than find it hard to build up funds by straightforward Trade Union means.

The new system of direct employment, which commenced on the 10th February, is getting into its stride and it is now possible to say that the danger of some administrative failure or blunder causing a dislocation or even a stoppage of work is past. The S.H.L.U., however, is extremely dissatisfied and has been engaged, unsuccessfully, in trying to stir up discontent. For instance, it called a general meeting of the men on the 8th February, which was attended by some 300, in an effort to rouse indignation against the use of the new labour offices and gates which have replaced the offices of the old contractors. This appeal to the innate conservatism of Asian workers was only partially successful and the men are now willingly using the new offices and gates.

At present the Union is having recourse to different tactics. On the 11th January it presented fifteen new demands. At the first meeting held to negotiate these demands, they were replaced by a new list extended to twenty-three demands. The second list has since been replaced once more by a list of thirty-one demands. The significant features of all three lists have, however, been the same. They are demands for the annual payment of bonuses to the labour and for the virtual surrender by the Harbour Board to the Union of the power to determine who should be appointed, who should be promoted, who should be dismissed and the number of men to be employed in each gang. The latest list of demands calls for 25 men in every gang of stevedores and 31 men in every gang ashore!

It is not easy for a British worker to understand how so large a body of men can be intimidated, but the explanation must be sought in the recent history of the Colony. During the period of the Japanese Occupation the communist guerillas were feared. After the British returned to Singapore many of them took to violent crime. The police force had sunk to the lowest standards under the Japanese and the task of restoring its efficacy and prestige has been immense. Excellent progress has been made, but it still remains a fact that armed robberies exceeded three a day in Singapore during January, 1948, and all communist elements are still feared.

So far this memorandum has discussed the present situation of three out of eight Unions now serving the needs of the Harbour Board workers. The S.H.B.S.A. is well organised on democratic lines in spite of a large and truculent minority of younger men. It has, however, been strong enough to survive this attempt and is doing good work. The M.S.U. has a coherence and stability which one would expect from the common race and religion of its members. The youngest of the Unions is the S.H.B.E.W.U. which consists mainly of skilled and unskilled electrical tradesmen. This Union also has so far survived the communist influence within its ranks. The remaining two Unions compete for the support of the skilled and unskilled workers in the shipyards. They are the very old S.C.E.A.U. and the S.E.W.U. The latter was brought into being by the so-called General Labour Union, now the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions, in 1946 to combat in the communist interest the power of the S.C.E.A.U. in the communist interest the power of the S.C.E.A.U.

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Appendix No. 8.

DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY GOVERNMENTS OF MALAYAN UNION AND SINGAPORE TO TRADE UNION ADVISER.

1. The FUNCTION and DUTIES of the Trade Union Adviser are:

To assist and encourage the early development of the trade union movement in the Malayan Union and Singapore on sound and well-proven lines by—

(*a*) advice and guidance to organisers of trade unions with regard to—

(i) the formulation of objects, rules, range of membership both as to area to be covered and type of workman to be eligible, having in view the desirability of forming an organisation in which every member may take an active part, be aware of its activities and in which the members will have a sufficient unity of interests to form an effective combination in order to achieve the declared objects of the union;

(ii) the methods of organisation;

(iii) the methods of collection of membership fees and financial control;

(iv) a suitable form of office organisation;

(v) procedure at meetings, both general and committee, and the keeping of records;

(vi) the principles and methods of the ballot or taking of votes;

(vii) the preparation of applications for registration under the Trade Union Ordinance.

(*b*) encouraging the formation of trade unions in areas and among workers in any trade or occupation where such unions do not exist and where the workers would benefit by such an organisation in achieving unity and providing a means for the joint settlement of differences or grievances arising from their conditions of employment;

(*c*) encouraging members of a trade union to take an active part in the affairs of the union by regular attendance at meetings and participation in proceedings and so evolve a healthy representative organisation in which all members have an equal right to participate in the control of the union;

(*d*) assisting the emergence of sound leadership in unions;

(*e*) inculcating the spirit of discipline among the members of a union, teaching the principles of democratic government within the union, the necessity of complying with the decisions of the majority, the granting of responsibility to elected members, readiness to accept agreements made by their elected representatives with employers or other unions where they have been empowered to make them, and the identification of members with their executive officers so that unions may be regarded by employers as genuinely representative of their employees;

(*f*) educating workers in the principles, practice and procedure of collective bargaining and negotiation, the method of presentation of demands for the redress of grievances, emphasising the disadvantages of strike action before the presentation of demands, and the need in the interests of the workers to regard the strike as a weapon to be resorted to only when all means of settlement have been tried and failed;

(g) the encouragement of associations of workmen to undertake the responsibility of representing their members in trade disputes and so become trade unions as defined in the Trade Union Ordinance;

(h) fostering the growth and continuance of trade unions when once formed by suggesting the advantages of organised educational facilities, trade training for members and the establishment on sound principles of thrift schemes such as sickness, old age, unemployment and death benefits.

2. To encourage the amalgamation of unions where it would seem desirable in the interests of the workers concerned to amalgamate with a view to improving the machinery of negotiation and the interests of the workers.

3. Where workers' organisations have not arrived at the stage of development necessary to enable them to negotiate on a footing of equality with employers or employers' organisations' to assist the workers in the course of negotiations by giving them advice, it being always understood that where possible workers should act through their own representatives, and should learn to represent themselves.

4. To advise employers on negotiation procedure if requested to do so and to bring to their notice, when the opportunity occurs, the advantages of mutual co-operation in negotiations with workers.

5. To assist trade unions, both of employers and workers, to formulate arrangements for the settlement by conciliation or arbitration of disputes in any agricultural undertaking, trade or industry or in any branch thereof.

6. To advise the Governments of the Malayan Union and Singapore on all matters concerning Trade Unions within their respective territories, and to issue instructions to the Assistant Trade Union Advisers within these territories. Copies of such instructions will be sent to the Colonial Secretary, Singapore, or Chief Secretary, Malayan Union, for their information.

7. To bring to the notice of both Governments any events or activities which he may observe whether on the part of individuals, organisations, workers or employers prejudicial to the development of a sound trade union movement.

8. To suggest to Government the names of workers' representatives whom experience shows to be suitable with a view to their appointment to a panel of persons suitable to act as members of the Industrial Court, a Board of Arbitration or a Court of Inquiry under the Industrial Courts Enactment, No. 12 of 1940, or of any trade board which may hereafter be appointed to fix minimum wages in any industry.

9. To co-operate, when requested, with the Registrar of Trade Unions so as to assist trade unions to comply with the Trade Union Ordinance both at registration and later.

10. To bring to the attention of the officers of the Labour Department any grievances of workers or any matter affecting their conditions of employment which might impair labour relations when such are brought to his notice in order that the officers of the Labour Department may take suitable action under the Labour Code or the Industrial Courts Ordinance by which the Commissioner for Labour is required to take steps to promote a settlement of any trade dispute, whether existing or apprehended.

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Appendix No. 9.

SINGAPORE PRICES, MARCH, 1948.

		Approx.
Butter	$ 1.35-$1.40 lb.	= 3/3*d*. lb.
Flour	.18 lb.	= 5*d*. ,,
Sugar	.24 ,,	= 7*d*. ,,
Bacon	1.25 (back) lb.	= 2/11*d*. ,,
Potatoes	.25 lb.	= 7*d*. ,,
Dried Milk	1.80 ,,	= 4/2*d*. ,,
Tea	2.20 ,,	= 5/2*d*. ,,
Coffee	1.40 ,,	= 3/4*d*. ,,
Soap	.85 ,,	= 1/11*d*. ,,
Lux	.75 large packet	= 1/9*d*. ,,
Marg.	1.25 lb.	= 2/11*d*. ,,
Eggs	.15 each	= 4/2*d*. ,,
Milk	.27 ½ pt.	= 1/2¾ pt.
Bread	.25 small loaf	= 7*d*.
Apples	.25 each	= 7*d*. each
Oranges	.25 ,,	= 7*d*. ,,
Tomatoes	.60 lb.	= 1/4*d*. lb.
Carrots	.60 ,,	= 1/4*d*. ,,
Cabbage	.60 ,,	= 1/4*d*. ,,
Sausages	.75 ,,	= 1/9*d*. ,,
Rusks	2.80	= 6/6*d*. tin
Fish	1.00/2.20	= 2/4*d*. to 5/2*d*. lb.
French Beans	.60/70c. lb.	= 1/4*d*. to 1/6*d*. ,,
Onions	.25/50c. ,,	= 7*d*. to 1/2*d*. ,,
Bananas	.30 for six	= 1*d*. each
Quaker Oats	.70 lb.	= 1/8*d*. lb.
Cheese	1.00/2.20 lb.	= 2/4*d*. to 5/2*d*. lb.
Spinach	.30/40c. ,,	= 8*d*. to 1/- lb.
Pumpkin	.10/20c. ,,	= 2½*d*. to 6*d*. lb.
Meat	.68/1.60 ,,	= 1/7*d*. to 3/8*d*. lb.
Mutton and Lamb ...	.30/85c. ,,	= 8*d*. to 2/-
Poultry	1.20/1.70 ,,	= 2/10*d*. to 4/-
Cigs.	1.50 for 50	= 3/6*d*. for 50
Floor Polish	5.50 5 lbs. Ronuk	= 12/10*d*. for 5 lbs.
Turps.	1.00	= 2/4*d*. bottle 1½ pts.
Starch	.40 lb.	= 10*d*. to 1/- lb.
Drycleaning:		
Dresses	3.00/4.50	= 7/- to 10/6*d*. per dress
Shoe Repairs, Men's ...	8.50/11.50	= 20/- to 26/10*d*.
Cinema Seats	2.00/3.00	= 4/8*d*. to 7/-
Petrol	1.40 gln.	= 3/3*d*. gln.
Dressmaking	10.00/90.00	= £1.3.4. to £9.9.0. per dress, exclusive of material.

Registry
No. PR 1247/265/G. 7 despatches

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~ JHW.

Draft. Despatch.

~~Mission at Addis Ababa~~
Monrovia

and H.M.'s Consulates

at

DAKAR, ~~DUALA~~, 42
~~FERNANDO PO.~~
24 LOANDA, ~~LOBITO~~,
13 BEIRA, LOURENCO 27
MARQUES, ~~MONROVIA~~
~~ADDIS ABABA, HARAR~~,
~~GOMA, MEGA, MAJUNGA~~,
LEOPOLDVILLE, 71.
ELISABETHVILLE, 2
ANTANANARIVO, 32.
~~TAMATAVE~~,
~~MAJUNGA~~.
~~Tibati~~ (Cloud)

Dakar 42
Loanda 24
Beira 13
Lourenco M. 27
Leopoldville 71
Elisabethville 2
Antananarivo 32.

African Dept first.

I should like to read a copy of this to the Civil Secretary at Khartoum and also to have a copy myself. Ought not all posts in Africa to have copies for their own information?

9 11/12

17a

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
S.W.1.

17th December, 1948.

+ 6c (composite copies be)
Confidential

OUTFILE.

Sir,

I ~~have the honour~~ to enclose a copy of the report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organization in Malaya and Singapore" written by Mr. S.S. Awbery, Labour M.P. for Bristol, and Mr. F.W. Dalley, former Assistant General Secretary of the Railway Clerk's Association. Further copies will be sent to you later when they arrive from Malaya.

2. As you will see, this report contains a good deal of valuable material dealing with the growth of Communism. It contains studies of Communist penetration of the labour movement, intimidation of the mass or working men, and the organization of violence. The report also considers the difficulties which lie in the way of organizing real Trades Unions while eliminating bogus ones, the real grievances to be remedied, and the means for ensuring the continual development of a healthy Trades Union movement. The report discusses such questions as the fact that where employers oppose their workers joining genuine Trades Unions, membership is not large enough for collective bargaining to be successful, with the result that the Unions become Communist dominated and strikes and violence more frequent. It also examines the international ramifications of Communism in Malaya, both open and disguised; and the insistence on rigid discipline in all organizations under Communist control. While Section VIII of the report (paragraphs 80 - 130) is perhaps the most striking, the whole report merits careful study; and indeed it is, so far as I know, perhaps the only thorough working analysis in English of the dangers which beset labour in a colonial country and the precautions and remedies required./

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(84615) Wt.34832/152 50,000 12/47 A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(85708) Wt.18402/169 150,000 5/48

required.

3. It is obvious that much of the analysis and of the recommendations apply to other colonial territories besides Malaya. I should be glad therefore, if you see no objection, if you would take an early opportunity of communicating a copy of this report either to the local Colonial Governments or to prominent officials in the Colonial Governments. Copies have already been communicated to the French and Belgian Governments.

14/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(PR 1247/265/G)
Confidential

17th December, 1948.

Sir,

I enclose a copy of the report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organization in Malaya and Singapore" written by Mr. S.S. Awbery, Labour M.P. for Bristol, and Mr. F.W. Dalley, former Assistant General Secretary of the Railway Clerk's Association. Further copies will be sent to you later when they arrive from Malaya.

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I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

Syd. R. Murray.

British Consulates at:
Loanda No. 24,
Beira No. 13,
Elizabethville No. 2,

British Consulates-General at:
Dakar No. 42,
Lourenco Marques No. 27,
Leopoldville No. 71,
Antananarivo No. 32.

1st Member. D. Wood 13/3

OUTFILE

Registry
No. PR 1247/265/G

20 December, 1948.

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

SECRET.

Jean Robertson,

On the off chance that you have not yet seen it, I am sending you ~~herewith~~ a ~~couple of~~ copies of the report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organisation in Malaya and Singapore".

Although, of course, it deals with somewhat different conditions then those facing you in the Sudan, it should be of interest to you in connexion with the Trade Unions the Sudan Government are now creating. Quite apart from ~~the~~ its Trade Union aspect, the report (esp. section VIII) has a considerable interest as a study of the growth of Communism and the way Communism can penetrate labour movements.

14/12

Yours ever

Sgd. George Clutton.

Sir James Robertson,
Khartoum K.B.E.

from

Mr. Clutton

G.L.C. 11/12/48

G L Clutton 11/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(83054) Wt.14696/147 250,000 6/47 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

(84015) Wt.34382/162 50,000 12/47 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(85708) Wt.13462/169 150,000 6/48 " "

If the Office might like to see para. 5

Mitchell 9/12

To Tg/pa 22/12/48.

Despatched 29/12/48

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

20th December, 1948.

(PR 1247/265/G) OUTFILE
Secret

Dear Robertson,

On the off chance that you have not yet seen it, I am sending you a copy of the report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organisation in Malaya and Singapore".

Although, of course, it deals with somewhat different conditions than those facing you in the Sudan, it should be of interest to you in connexion with the Trade Unions the Sudan Government are now creating. Quite apart from its Trade Union aspect, the report (especially Section VIII) has a considerable interest as a study of the growth of Communism and the way Communism can penetrate labour movements.

Yours ever

Geo. George Clutton.

(G.L. Clutton)

Sir James Robertson, K.B.E.,
Khartoum.

NOTE AND WRITTEN ON THIS MARGIN

N. American Dept.
S.E. Asia Dept. Ref.
Mr. C.F.A. Warner.

The Office might like to see para. 5
Nicholls 9/12

To Tg/ss 22/12/48.
Despatched 29/12/48

(84615) Wt.34382/152 50,000 12/47 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(85708) Wt.13462/159 160,000 5/48

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December. D. Wong 9/12/3

PR outfile 22pp

Registry
No. PR 1247/265/G.

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~

JHW.

toc

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
S.W.1.

22nd December, 1948.

SECRET.

Draft. Despatch.

H.M's Ambassador,
at
WASHINGTON.

No. 1827.

5 copies in all.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of the report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organization in Malaya and Singapore" written by Mr. S.S. Awbery, Labour M.P. for Bristol, and Mr. F.W. Dalley, former Assistant General Secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association.

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N. American Dept.
S.E. Asia Dept. Ref.
Mr. C.F.A. Warner.

If the Min. might like to see para. 5
Mitchell 9/12

To T.&P.C. 22/12/48.
Despatched 29/12/48

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(84015) Wt.34938/152 50,000 12/47 A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(35708) Wt.13462/169 150,000 5/48

December. J.W. 29/12/3

precautions and remedies required.

3. I shall be glad if you will communicate copies of this report to the State Department (who will perhaps have also received copies direct from their representatives in Singapore). You may find it possible to bring the report to the attention of those dealing with Soviet policy, and responsible for the long-term planning of counter measures. You may also consider it ~~possible~~ judicious to give a copy unofficially to ~~some prominent official~~ an appropriate recipient in the American Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. ~~This may help to make more~~ pertinent and relevant the advice which American labour is engaged in putting out to Trades Union organizations in many parts of the world. It is obvious that much of the analysis and of the recommendations apply to other colonial territories besides Malaya.

for the Labour Attaché

With of which will undoubtedly find much of interest in the report.

CPAS
17/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Outfile

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(PR 1247/265/G)
Secret

22nd December, 1948.

No. 1827

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of the report recently published in Singapore on "Labour and Trade Union Organization in Malaya and Singapore" written by Mr. S.S. Awbery, Labour Member of Parliament for Bristol, and Mr. F.W. Dalley, former Assistant General Secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association.

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3. I shall be glad if Your Excellency will communicate copies of this report to the State Department (who will perhaps have also received copies direct from their representatives in Singapore). You may find it possible to bring the report to the attention of those dealing with Soviet policy, and responsible for the long-term planning of counter measures. You may also consider it judicious for the Labour Attaché to give a copy unofficially to an appropriate recipient in the American Federation of Labour and in the Congress of Industrial Organizations, both of which will undoubtedly find much interest in the report.

I am, with great truth and respect,
Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

Syd. R. Murray.

His Excellency
Sir Oliver Franks, K.C.B., C.B.E.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Washington.

IR

P/W.

SUDAN GOVERNMENT.

THE SECRETARIAT
KHARTOUM

Telegraphic Address :
"HAKIMAM"

SECRET

PR1247

SCO/37.A.10

28th December, 1948.

Dear Clutton,

Thank you for your letter PR/1247/265/G dated 20th December, 1948 enclosing a copy of the report on "Labour and Trade Union Organisation in Malaya and Singapore", which I had not seen.

Yours ever

J.W. Robertson

G.L. Clutton Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London.

Mr Clutton Sm 18/1.

7/1

D.W.C.

37

19[illegible]

PR

(INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPT.)

PR 1256

Registry Number } PR1256/265/913
FROM Chancery WASHINGTON
No. 659RD
Dated 150/115/48
Received in Registry } 10th Dec 1948 / 17th Dec 1948

Supply of "The New Review" and "Socialist Courier" 659RD: subscription rates and enquiry for version required.

Reference: Fo letter Nov 4th. (PR970/265/913)

Last Paper
PR1247

References
L755/29/407

(Print)

(How disposed of)
D/H E.J. Caddy, BIS New York from 659RD (Mr Smith) HALTHAN
8) Chancery w/Hon HALTHAN
D/H E.J. Caddy, BIS New York, from Mr Smith KILMAR.
D/H E. Caddy, BIS New York, from Mr Smith 26th APRIL

(Action completed) 23.6.49
(Index) See P 9/49

Next Paper
PR1258

ADDED PAPERS

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

MINUTES

Mr Parrott
cc 29/XII
I.P. Cloake 20/12

Be that as it may, we are not getting copies of the Socialist Courier or the New Review. Perhaps Mr. Smith would write a confirm we want them regularly & Copies enclosed have been extracted & handed to Mr. Dummett.
Mr. Smith

Mrs Wells. DW 7/1
b.u. 15/2
11/1

BU 7/3

Mr Nutting
Instructions. Please deal.
34925
We have received [illegible] 11/3 issues of these since December. D. Wells 12/3
Mr. Smith

Registry No. ~~RC/186~~

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open~~

Draft.

E.F. Caddy Esq
British Information Services
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20
N.Y.

Dear Caddy —

Thanks for your letter OS 84/IRD of the 23rd of March about the "Socialist Courier" and the "New Review".

The "Socialist Courier" is now reaching this Department.

The "New Review" is not! We are a separate department from the Research Dept and Library. anything for us must be addressed to "Information Research Department, 17 Carlton House Terrace.

~~I know~~
Will you kindly arrange for an additional copy of the "New Review" to be sent to us

Yours sincerely

A.M.S.
1/4

A.M. SMITH

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(33854) Wt.14606/147. 250,000. 6/47
A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
13 APR 1949
SENT TO TYPE
DESPATCH

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

Minutes.

A) E. Baldy, B/S Newyork, to Mr Smith (0584/IRD) 23rd March

The letter of Feb. 25th in papers L755/29/407 indicates that "The New Review" is being sent to us by B.I.S.

Are you able to trace that we are receiving it?

A.M. Smith
22. 4. 49

1. Miss Houghton
2. Mr. Lunghi

Only one copy of the "New Review" has ever reached this department, ie. No 19 of 1948.

E.P. Houghton
23-4-49

Mr. Smith

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Yours ever, I.R.D.

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

Enter

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

1256

150/115/48

December 10th, 1948.

Dear Department,

Your letter PR 970/265/913 of November 4th, regarding The New Review and the Socialist Courier.

When we came to take out a subscription we discovered that these reviews are published in the Russian language. As your letter did not make it clear that you knew this, we asked British Information Services at New York, where both magazines are published, to obtain a specimen copy of each. This they have done and inform us that the subscription rate for the first is $6.50 a year for three issues and for the second publication $2.00 a year. They point out, however, that they are already sending two copies of the Socialist Courier to the Foreign Office. One goes to you and the other to the Documents Officer.

We enclose the specimen copies and would suggest that if you still wish for a subscription to be taken out for these reviews, it could be done more conveniently by Caddy at Information Services, New York, to whom we are sending a copy of your letter and this reply.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

The Information Research Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

(8305) British Embassy Washington. Sent to The Chancery, Washington. Yours ever, I.R.D. 314

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

IRD
Foreign Office
JAN 1949

Registry
No. PR1256/265/913.

OUTFILE + lc

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

E. J. Caddy Esq.,
British Information Services,
30, Rockefeller Plaza,
New York 20.
N. Y.

From. IRD

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
-5 JAN 1949
SENT TO TYPE 5/1
DESPATCHED 5/1

Please send a copy to The Chancery, British ~~Embassy~~, Washington.

Dear Mr. Caddy,

With reference to the letter 150/115/48 of 10/12/48 from the Chancery, Washington (a copy of which was to be sent to you) regarding our request for a copy of each publication of "The New Review" (Karpovitch) and "The Socialist Courier" (Nikolaevsky), we are aware that they are printed in the Russian language and we should be grateful if you would subscribe to both on our behalf.

The specimen copies have proved ~~more~~ most useful, but we have not received any of the other "Socialist Couriers" mentioned in the Chancery letter, and we presume that they were sent to other departments of the F.O. and that this department was mentioned by mistake.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Chancery, Washington.

Yours ever, ~~I.R.D.~~

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(33654) Wt.14606/147. 250,000. 6/47. A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

6th January, 1949.

(FR1256/265/913)
CONFIDENTIAL:

OUTFILE

Dear Mr. Caddy,

With reference to the letter 150/115/48 of the 10th December, 1948, from the Chancery, Washington (a copy of which was to be sent to you) regarding our request for a copy of each publication of "The New Review" (Karpovitch) and "The Socialist Courier" (Nikolaevsky), we are aware that they are printed in the Russian language and we should be grateful if you would subscribe to both on our behalf.

The specimen copies have proved most useful, but we have not received any of the other "Socialist Couriers" mentioned in the Chancery letter, and we presume that they were sent to other departments of the Foreign Office and that this department was mentioned by mistake.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Chancery, Washington.

Yours ever,

I. R. D.

~~(A.M. Smith).~~

E.F. Caddy, Esq.,
British Information Services,
30, Rockefeller Plaza,
New York 20,
New York.

A.M. SMITH.

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

PR 1256/265/913
Registry No.

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(33054) Wt.14696/147 250,000 6/47 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

F.O.
16 MAR 1949.

Dear Caddy,

Please refer to the letter from Information Research Department of the 6th January 1949 requesting a copy of each publication of "The New Review" (Karpovich) and "The Socialist Courier" (Nikolaevsky).

Up to date we have not received any copies of either publication. Can you please let me know the present position.

Yours sincerely,

A.M. SMITH.

E.F. Caddy Esq.
British Information Services
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20
N.Y.

From A.M. Smith

RECEIVED IN DISTRICT
15 MAR 1949

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
S.W.1.

(PR 1256/265/913) OUTFILE. 16th March, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Caddy,

Please refer to the letter from Information Research Department of the 6th January, 1949, requesting a copy of each publication of "THE NEW REVIEW" (Karpovitch) and "THE SOCIALIST COURIER" (Nikolaevsky).

Up to date we have not received any copies of either publication. Can you please let me know the present position?

Yours sincerely,

(A.M. Smith)

E.F. Caddy, Esq.,
British Information Services,
30 Rockefeller Plaza,
NEW YORK 20.
N.Y.

INDEXED
PR 1256/265/913

Telephone
CIRCLE 6-5100

"A"

Cable:
DIGESTION, NEW YORK

ATION SERVICES
LER PLAZA
20, N. Y.

March 23rd. 1949

56/265/913) of March 16th. We have
st Courier addressed to the "Information
e, London" since a subscription was
loss to understand what has become
dates and bag numbers in which the
ou may be able to find out where they
ourier number 615 was despatched in
eived in the Foreign Office on January
two months issued in one) was despatched
eived in the Foreign Office on March

view" is issued three or four times
number 20, and this we understood was
was despatched to the "Documents Officer, Research Department and Library" on March 7th. in response to a letter from "The Library" dated February 18th (L755/29/407) asking us to take out a subscription.

Copies of "The Socialist Courier" mentioned in my first paragraph have also been sent to the Documents Officer, and if with this information you are unable to trace the copies please let me know, and I will endeavour to obtain additional copies if you will let me know which are required.

Yours ever,

Edgar F. Caddy

Edgar F. Caddy.

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

INDEXED
PR 1256/265/913

Reference for reply

OS84/IRD

CONFIDENTIAL

"A"

Telephone
CIRCLE 6-5100

Cable:
DIGESTION, NEW YORK

BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

March 23rd. 1949

Dear Smith,

In reply to your letter (PR1256/265/913) of March 16th. We have been sending copies of the Socialist Courier addressed to the "Information Research Department, Foreign Office, London" since a subscription was taken out last May, and I am at a loss to understand what has become of them. Perhaps if I give you the dates and bag numbers in which the last three issues have been sent you may be able to find out where they have been routed. The Socialist Courier number 615 was despatched in our sea bag number 3 which was received in the Foreign Office on January 20th. The Courier number 616-617 (two months issued in one) was despatched in sea bag number 35 which was received in the Foreign Office on March 9th.

The "Zovy Zhournal" or "New Review" is issued three or four times a year. The last number issued was number 20, and this we understood was sent to you by the Embassy (I obtained it for them). A copy of this issue was despatched to the "Documents Officer, Research Department and Library" on March 7th. in response to a letter from "The Library" dated February 18th (L755/29/407) asking us to take out a subscription.

Copies of "The Socialist Courier" mentioned in my first paragraph have also been sent to the Documents Officer, and if with this information you are unable to trace the copies please let me know, and I will endeavour to obtain additional copies if you will let me know which are required.

Yours ever,

Edgar F. Caddy

Edgar F. Caddy.

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
17, Carlton House Terrace
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

OUTFILE.

Registry
No. PR 1256/265/913

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

Foreign Office,
26 April 1949.

E.F. Caddy Esq.
British Information Services
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York.

Dear Caddy.

Please refer to your letter 0584/IRD of March 23rd last about the "Socialist Courier" and the "New Review".

~~I have ascertained that we are receiving the "Socialist Courier" in Information Research Department. The~~

The "Socialist Courier" is being received in Information Research Dept satisfactorily.

Only one copy of the "New Review" (No. 19 of 1948) has ever reached the Department. Would you be kind enough to ascertain if the No. 20 mentioned in your letter was actually despatched

Yours Sincerely

A.M. Smith
25/4

A.M. SMITH

from
A.M. Smith

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(33054) Wt.14696/147 250,000 6/47 A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

[illegible] C. Dept. IN
DI
26 APR 1949
SENT TO TYPE 26/4
DESPATCHED 27/4.

The difference between F.O.R.D. and I.R.D.

A.M.S.
29/6.

OUTFILE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.

26th April, 1949.

(PR 1256/265/913)

SECRET:

Dear Caddy,

Please refer to your letter OS84/IRD of the 23rd March last about the "Socialist Courier" and the "New Review".

The "Socialist Courier" is being received in Information Research Department satisfactorily.

Only one copy of the "New Review" (No. 19 of 1948) has ever reached the Department. Would you be kind enough to ascertain if the No.20 mentioned in your letter was actually despatched.

Yours sincerely

(A.M. Smith)

E.F. Caddy, Esq.,
British Information Services,
30, Rockefeller Plaza,
New York,
U.S.A.

INDEXED

PR 1256/265/913

"B"

Telephone
CIRCLE 6-5100

Cable:
DIGESTION, NEW YORK

N SERVICES

LAZA

Y.

May 12th. 1949

6th. (PR 1256/265/913)

the "New Review" No. 20.

Foreign Office on March

the copy mentioned in

to "The Library" copies

view" requested by them

May 5th. (L2267/29/407).

Yours ever,

Edgar F. Caddy

Edgar F. Caddy,

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

"New Review" No 20 has been received.
No need to answer this letter. Mr Caddy is now on leave in this country. I will explain to him the difference between F.O.R.D. and I.R.D.

A.M.S.
2/6.

INDEXED
PR 1256/265/913
"B"

Reference for reply

OS84/IRD

BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Telephone
CIRCLE 6-5100

Cable:
DIGESTION, NEW YORK

May 12th. 1949

Dear Smith,

In reply to your letter of April 26th. (PR 1256/265/913) I am sending addressed to you a copy of the "New Review" No. 20. A copy of this issue was received in the Foreign Office on March 18th. according to our receipts. This was the copy mentioned in my letter to you of March 23rd. 1949.

I am also sending by sea bag addressed to "The Library" copies of the 18th. and 19th. issues of the "New Review" requested by them for the Research Department in a letter dated May 5th. (L2267/29/407).

Yours ever,

Edgar F. Caddy

Edgar F. Caddy,

A.M. Smith, Esq.,
Information Research Dept.,
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

"New Review" No 20 has been received.
No need to answer this letter. Mr Caddy is now on leave in this country. I will explain to him the difference between F.O.R.D. and I.R.D.
A.M.S.
2/6.

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

OS84/Library May 13th. 1949

THIS PAGE.

With the compliments of

Edgar F. Caddy.

British Information Services

New York 20, N. Y.

"The New Review" Numbers 18 and 19. Sent in reply to your request of May 5th. 1949 (L2267/29/407)

The Library,
Foreign Office,
London. S.W. 1

EFC/rd

PR
(INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPT.)

1948

PR 1258

Registry Number: PR 1258/265/913
FROM: A. Morgan, Information Dept., WARSAW, (via FRD)
No. 134/82/48
Dated: 14th Dec 1948
Received in Registry: 17th Dec 1948

Application of State Publishing Institute to COI for Polish Copyrights in Prof. Blackett's book "The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy."

Reference: To letter of 4th Dec. (PE 2349/29/938)

Last Paper: PR 1256

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 17/12/48

(Index) Dec. 12/9/49

Next Paper: PR 1289

20/12

ADDED PAPERS

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

MINUTES

E.E.I.D. (Miss Moschoyle) We spoke. Ceteris paribus IRD would certainly prefer that Prof. Blackett's book should not be published in Poland, but we feel that we should not withhold the copyright in this particular case if it is going to cause any repercussions – either in Poland or here.

J. F. Cloake
20/12

It was agreed in conversation with I.R.D. that we should consider from a policy point of view, what (if anything) could be done, and then concert action with Cultural Relations Department.

A. Morgan

34925

Mr Morgan, however, called in late unexpectedly this afternoon and told me that the Polish firm of KSIAZKA have in the meanwhile acquired the Polish copyright. The question of any action on our part therefore falls away.

H. Hutchison

Cultural Relations Dept ~~said~~ wish to see 21/xii

Thank you. I think that U N Political (Mr Hebblethwaite) and Research Dept may like to see

B.J. Hill Tickell 31.12

UN (Pol) Dept This was found to happen I think. 20-1.
FORD ✓
G.P. 28/1/49

G.P. 3/2

Emk 3/2

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
BRITISH EMBASSY
W A R S A W

Our ref. 134/82/48

Your ref. PE 2349/29/938

14th December, 1948.

Enter PR

1258

Dear Department,

With reference to your letter of 4th December concerning Prof. Blackett's book, attached is the translation of an article, taken from the Anglo-American Press Summary of November 26th, which deals with Sir John Anderson's review of "The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy".

"PANSTWOWY INSTYTUT WYDAWNICZY" /State Publishing Institute/ applied on November 11th, through the BBE, for the Polish Copyrights in Prof. Blackett's book. This application - and later a copy of the above mentioned Press Summary - was sent to the Copyright Section of the COI. As no reply has yet been received you will no doubt wish to discuss this matter with the COI before any further action is taken.

The State Publishing Institute are already getting impatient and have sent a second letter asking whether there is any news of the copyright, and I should therefore appreciate an early directive on this subject.

Yours ever,

ANTHONY MORGAN
/A-Books Officer/

Information Research Department,
Foreign Office,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
L o n d o n S.W.1.

#530 Nov.25,48 (193 lines)

GUILT AND CRIME Article

One of the French delegation members to the Wroclaw Congress of Intellectuals was Rev.Boulier, a prominent scholar and professor in the Catholic Institute in Paris. Rev.Boulier delivered a beautiful speech in Wroclaw defending the principles of world peace and international cooperation. His speech was simple, honest and wise. Rev.Boulier signed the Congress resolution together

the problem of increasing the percentage of active material effectively utilised has been one of the main preoccupations of workers in this field. Professor Blackett's rather superficial discussion of these topics must tend to confirm an over-optimistic view of the possible industrial applications of atomic energy.

SECTION B

THE ATOMIC PLOT AND THE BBC. Excerpts Editorial

Professor Patrick Blackett is universally known as one of the most eminent British scientists, a specialist in the field of atomic nuclear physics and cosmic rays. John Anderson is also well known in Great Britain but his fame is of quite a different sort. He is one of leaders of the diehards in the Birmingham clique. He was Home Secretary (Minister of the Interior) in Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1939-1940 and combatted Nazi agents not as much as he combatted anti-fascists. In Churchill's Cabinet Sir John was in charge of the Exchequer (Ministry of Finance) and after the fall of Churchill's Cabinet, the Labor Government appointed Anderson chairman of the Government Committee for atomic energy matters. Professor Blackett was a member of this Committee and recently published a book entitled: "Military and political consequences of atomic energy". The very first pages of this book caused a great deal of worry to Anderson. That worry changed into fury when Anerson read the following chapters of this book in which the author convincingly describes Anglo-American atomic policy as a plot against the world, primarily against the Soviet Union.

As soon as he read the book the indignant Anderson took his pen and wrote a passionate denial which was broadcast by BBC on November 9. Anderson literally writhes like a snake trying to assure radio listeners that Blackett is wrongly accusing Anglo-American politicians who are as innocent as lambs and never thought of blackmailing anyone with the atomic bomb.

The statement of the die-hard Anderson in defence of atomic warefare does not surprise anyone, but the fact that the official BBC transmitted this statement in full shows a solidarity with Anderson which is quite characteristic. And the fact that this statement was trasmitted by the BBC just at the time when the UN General Assembly discussed the Soviet proposal to ban atomic weapons is a good illustration of the attitude of the British Labor Government delegates to the UN Assembly. These delegates are also against Blackett, they are with Anderson and other Churchill pupils in the action of aggression, with those who also now are concocting the atomic plot of American monopolies against peace and security of nations. Wolnosc #230 Nov.25,48 (193 lines)

GUILT AND CRIME Article

One of the French delegation members to the Wroclaw Congress of Intellectuals was Rev.Boulier, a prominent scholar and professor in the Catholic Institute in Paris. Rev.Boulier delivered a beautiful speech in Wroclaw defending the principles of world peace and international cooperation. His speech was simple, honest and wise. Rev.Boulier signed the Congress resolution together

[illegible] worked depo its is very small. It is well known also that the problem of increasing the percentage of active material effectively utilised has been one of the main preoccupations of workers in this field. Professor Blackett's rather superficial discussion of these topics must tend to confirm an over-optimistic view of the possible industrial applications of atomic energy.

The contract guarantees the planter a payment on account amounting to 20,000 zl per hectare of osier plantation. The rest will be paid three days after delivery of osier is effected.
Dziennik Ludowy, # 310, Nov. 26, 1948, verbatim

HORSES FOR FARMERS IN RECOVERED TERRITORIES. Communique

In September and October 1948 - 1,107 horses were distributed to settlers and to land colonisation cooperatives in Wroclaw province. The horses were imported from Denmark and Iceland. 350 horses purchased in central Polish privinces were also distributed.

250 more horses will be distributed by the Lower Silesian Peasant Self-Help Association.

Olsztyn province farmers have received 3,379 Danish horses on very convenient conditions. A shipment of horses purchased in central Polish provinces will also be directed there.
Gazeta Ludowa, # 309, Nov. 26, 1948, verbatim

FINNISH VESSEL "MOTTA" RESCUED BY "HERKULES". Communique

The Finnish vessel "Motta" carrying a cargo of coal for Finland struck a submerged wreck after leaving Swinoujscie. The accident was caused by the vessel leaving the channel in the region of the fourteenth marker.

The tug boat "Herkules" hurried to the rescue and towed the "Motta" to Swinoujscie. Gdynia-America Line rescued squad pumped water out of the hull and repaired the damage. The "Motta" left Swinoujscie on November 24 for her home port.
Glos Ludu,# 326, Nov. 26, 1948, verbatim

SUGAR INDUSTRY POSSIBILITIES. Domestic despatch

As a result of the steady growth of our sugar production there is also a marked increase in the amount of by-products obtained in the process, such as beet pulp. These by-products provide excellent feed for cattle while molasses and other residues make a very good fertilizer.

Molasses are a by-product particularly valuable for chemical uses. Large amounts of sugar can be extracted from molasses but this process is not practised in this country. Products obtainable from molasses include absolute alcohol, all kinds of yeast and yeast extracts, ammonium and phosphorus salts, glycerine, acetone, citric acid, etc. Our sugar industry produced 125,000 tons of molasses lastyear as against 90,000 in the last prewar year. The growing quantities of molasses provide a wide raw material base for our excellently progressing chemical industry.
Robotnik, # 326, Nov. 26, 1948, verbatim

COPY FOR REFERENCE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
S.W.1.

4th December, 1948.

(PE 2349/29/938)

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Information Officer,

We are not anxious to give Professor Blackett's book "The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy" more publicity than it has already received. Nevertheless some of the accusations against the Americans and indirectly against His Majesty's Government which are contained in the book may be raised with you in one context or another. We therefore enclose the text of a review by Sir John Anderson, who was a Cabinet Minister at the time and Chairman of the British Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy from its formation in 1945 until its dissolution this year. The talk was broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation on the 9th November. You will find in this talk most of the answers which you require.

Yours ever,

INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT.

Information Officer,

...excessive pessimism prevalent in certain quarters.

Having paid this tribute I would offer two criticisms (still dealing with the first part of the book).

I think the writer should have given more weight than he does to the psychological aspect of atomic bombing. An arithmetical calculation of the respective destructive effects of a given weight of atomic bombs and a much greater weight of ordinary high explosive cannot be the whole story. The effect on morale of the phenomena associated with the detonation of an atomic bomb must be a material factor though the evidence at present available may not suffice to support any quantitative conclusion. I think also that the treatment in the book of the important questions of the available world supplies of raw material and of the economic aspects of known methods of treating such material is hardly adequate. The recorded occurences of uranium are very numerous but the number of known rich and easily worked depo its is very small. It is well known also that the problem of increasing the percentage of active material effectively utilised has been one of the main preoccupations of workers in this field. Professor Blackett's rather superficial discussion of these topics must tend to confirm an over-optimistic view of the possible industrial applications of atomic energy.

U.S.S.R. SECTION
GREY NETWORK
1st Broadcast
1645 Trans.
9.11.48

(GNT 21.10.48) WEEKLY BOOK SUMMARY No. 183
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE OF ATOMIC ENERGY. by Professor P. M. S. Blackett, F.R.S.

This is indeed a notable book, written by a man of acknowledged eminence in physical science. It was Professor Blackett who first identified the fugitive positively charged particle now known as the positron. He has worked extensively on cosmic rays and only the other day put forward a theory of magnetism which might be described, without sinister implication in this context, as revolutionary.

Not only, however, is the author a thoroughly competent and versatile man of science. He has also had, by reason of his association with the naval staff during the recent war, exceptional opportunities of studying defence problems, both strategic and tactical. Few laymen can have a better understanding of military matters.

It was, therefore, only to be expected that a book of wide scope from the pen of such a man, setting out as this volume does the results of a most painstaking and thorough analysis of all the material available for an assessment of the military implications of atomic energy, would be of outstanding interest and value. And so it is.

A large part of the book, however, is given up to a discussion of purely political considerations and there a very different story has to be told.

It will be convenient in the circumstances to treat the book as falling into two parts and to deal with them separately.

What I call the first part puts the atomic bomb into perspective with conventional weapons and with other known but far less publicised weapons of mass destruction such as toxins, bacterial cultures and radioactive dust. In the result the author comes to the conclusion, for which he gives cogent reasons, that the efficacy of atomic bombing has been grossly exaggerated. The whole of this part of the book merits the closest study. The passages dealing with civil defence are especially valuable at the present juncture as a corrective of the excessive pessimism prevalent in certain quarters.

Having paid this tribute I would offer two criticisms (still dealing with the first part of the book).

I think the writer should have given more weight than he does to the psychological aspect of atomic bombing. An arithmetical calculation of the respective destructive effects of a given weight of atomic bombs and a much greater weight of ordinary high explosive cannot be the whole story. The effect on morale of the phenomena associated with the detonation of an atomic bomb must be a material factor though the evidence at present available may not suffice to support any quantitative conclusion. I think also that the treatment in the book of the important questions of the available world supplies of raw material and of the economic aspects of known methods of treating such material is hardly adequate. The recorded occurences of uranium are very numerous but the number of known rich and easily worked depo its is very small. It is well known also that the problem of increasing the percentage of active material effectively utilised has been one of the main preoccupations of workers in this field. Professor Blackett's rather superficial discussion of these topics must tend to confirm an over-optimistic view of the possible industrial applications of atomic energy.

When all is said and done, however, the author while still operating on his own familiar territory has earned the gratitude of the wide circle of readers at home and abroad which the book will certainly claim. Now we pass to the sphere of politics, where it is clear that the author's main motive in what he has undertaken is to be sought, consisting in the establishment of a most astonishing thesis. Here it is - summarised in a few words.

Professor Blackett claims to have shown:- first, that the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japanese territory in August 1945 was in fact - (and was quickly recognised by Russia to have been) - the first move in an Anglo-American cold war designed to forestall a Russian offensive in the Far East; secondly, that the Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy, based with devilish ingenuity on the altruistic conclusions of a body of scientists, was another move in the same game; ard thirdly, that the discussions on the scheme of control disclosed a deliberate attempt by the Western allies to deprive the Soviets of the opportunity of raising the economic standard of their people by developing the industrial uses of atomic energy.

There are thus three counts in the indictment and I hope to show that each of them is not only baseless but fantastically absurd. They are unconnected and must be examined separately.

Professor Blackett begins by looking for positive arguments for dropping the atomic bonbs and, finding none to his mind sufficiently cogent - and incidentally making the astonishing remark that there can have been no urgency, as if the unnecessary prolongation of the war by a single week or even day was not a matter of the greatest moment - makes the wholly gratuitous assumption quite unsupported by evidence, that the, to him, obvious motive of going in ahead of the Russians was the true explanation.

A few pointed comments should suffice to dispose of this absurdity.

In the first place it does not seem to have dawned on Professor Blackett that when a nation at war has put forth a tremendous effort - measured in this instance by expenditure of the order of £500,000,000 - to develop a new weapon the natural course as soon as it had been perfected was to use it. It was not, therefore, a question of finding positive arguments for, but of examining possible arguments against, its use. That in fact was done.

The earliest date (July 1945) at which the practicability of an atomic bomb could be put to a conclusive test had been known to a few of us for very many months. It had been thought all along that the final result would come too late to influence the war against Germany but it was pure coincidence that the margin proved to be only a few weeks.

In the sencond place the intention of Russia to declare war upon Japan as soon as Germany had been disposed of was made known to the Western Allies long before the event, and was not only most cordially welconed but assisted in every possible way.

In the third place, the spectacular end of the Japanese war was by no means a foregone conclusion, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb. That Japan was defeated militarily was abundantly clear but there seemed to be a distinct possibility of a coup d'état by a Militarist section fully conscious of that fact but determined to continue hostilities, whether in the hope of better terms through

weariness or dissension among the allies or merely from national pride. There could, in any case, have been no possibility of preventing Russia from advancing through Manchuria as she did, and I do not believe that this question entered for one moment into the calculations of anyone connected with the decision.

Finally, how, I wonder, would Professor Blackett reconcile what I have described as his gratuitous assumption with the known fact that the Western Allies deliberately held back - as they may now bitterly regret - in order to avoid getting into either Berlin or Prague before the Russians?

I come now to the Baruch plan. Britain had nothing to do with the formulation of that plan so it could not have been part of any Anglo-American plot. The author's knowledge of Mr. Baruch is probably slight. I have in that respect the advantage of him and I record my conviction that Mr. Baruch applied himself to the task entrusted to him with as great Messianic fervour (as ever inspired a conscience-smitten atomic scientist to enter quixotically into the unfamiliar field of politics). There were many of us on the British side who were not fully in agreement with some of the features of the Baruch plan. I personally thought that the proposal that all potentially dangerous material and all potentially dangerous installations wherever situated, should be exclusively owned by an international body was "too stiff" for inclusion as an indispensable part of the initial plan but I considered that, having regard to the part played by the Americans and their willingness to hand over everything themselves to such a body, they were entitled to our support if they pressed their point of view. The much canvassed veto question, to which Professor Blackett reverts again and again, could I thought have been settled on the basis of not applying the veto to action by the international body within the sphere allotted to it.

As regards industrial applications, Professor Blackett has certainly found a mare's nest. No doubt such applications, if and when found practicable, would, as he contends, be of greater importance to a partially developed country like Russia than to one fully developed like U.S.A. No doubt also, on the other hand, industrial atomic plants might be an element of danger. But despite foolishly optimistic forecasts by some atomic scientists, the whole thing was altogether too remote to be a significant factor in current policy. The author's criticism of the suggestion that allocation of material for atomic plants should be based primarily on strategic rather than economic grounds, may be well founded, but world opinion would certainly condemn any proposal of the kind if it worked out unfairly in practice.

I therefore challenge the author's main contentions, which I must conclude it was the primary purpose of his book to establish, the earlier and most valuable descriptive part being merely introductory. I think, what I may call an emotional bias towards Communism, has warped his judgment and led him to rely on arguments characterised by a number of conspicuous omissions and by many positive statements of an extremely partisan character.

The book will be widely read and widely quoted. I cannot believe that it will not retard rather than advance the cause of better international relations. Yet that cause must be pursued. It is inconceivable that the failure of the Atomic Energy Commission should be accepted as final. The fundamental trouble is obvious - fear and suspicion on both sides - and the main contributory factors equally obvious - a monopoly of certain vital information by one side, and on the other side closed frontiers. These are the bastions that need to be attacked. That was made clear in the Attlee-Truman-King declaration of November 1945, which remains valid as the starting point for all discussion. As there indicated, the widest exchange of information and experience by progressive stages should be the primary objective, and is the obviously indispensable preliminary to any plan of general disarmament such as Professor Blackett advocates.

I have thought it my duty to express myself as emphatically as does the author and I hope that in doing so I have not been unfair to one, who was a valued colleague on the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, over which I presided for two years, and for whose scientific attainments, sense of honour and intellectual integrity I have the greatest respect.

6 1948

INFORMATION
RESEARCH

PR1289 /G

PR 1289/265/913G

Mr. Cuckley (Colonial Office) to Mr. Cloake
12254/R/48
16. 12. 48
21. 12. 48

Transmission of 12 copies of the Awkiey-Talley Report on "Labour & Trade Union Organisation in the Federation of Malaya & Singapore."

Last Paper.

PR 1947

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft) Mr. Cuckley (C.O.) from Mr. Cloake Dec. 18

Dft) Mr. Blackburne (C.O.) from Mr. Murray 24 Jan.

8) C.R.O. (Mr. Joyce) 26 Jan.

(Action completed.) 14/2

(Index.) P40

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

See within

One copy of this report has been sent to each major African post south of the Sahara and to Khartoum. Copies were also sent to the Brussels capitals for transmission to the governments, and to Washington for the State Department. This action is on other PR pp.

We should let the Colonial Office know what we have done and see if we can stimulate any action by the CRO.

Draft to Mr Blackburne.

sent

J. F. Cloake 19/1

27/1

See also:-

① Miss E. Baker (C.O.) to Mr. Murray No. 96001/T/49 of 11th February.

E M 17/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Mayhew.

Greene

Minutes.

PW
Bolton PR

Awbery - Dalley Report

We have now been able to extract from the Colonial Office a few copies of the report on "Labour and Trades Union Organizations in Malaya and Singapore" written by Mr. Awbery (M.P. for Bristol) and Mr. Dalley, former Assistant General Secretary of the Railway Clerks Association. I attach a copy of this report (which should later be be passed to Mr. Gee).

The report contains a good deal of valuable material. It deals with the growth of Communism and its penetration of the labour movement, and intimidation of the mass of working men, the difficulties in the way of organizing real Trades Unions while eliminating bogus ones, the real reasons to be remedied, and the means for ensuring the continued development of a healthy Trades Union movement. It discusses such questions as the fact that where employers oppose their workers joining genuine Trades Unions, membership is not large enough for collective bargaining to be successful, with the result that the Unions become Communist-dominated and strikes and violence more frequent. This is about the only thorough working analysis of the dangers which beset labour in colonial countries and the precautions and remedies required.

It is clear that we should try to ensure that the implications of this report are understood outside Malaya. It is proposed that we should send copies of this report to our Embassy in Washington: one can be passed to the State Department and one each also to the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. This may help the Americans, both officially and through their Trades Unions, to give the right advice in many parts of the world. It has also been provisionally agreed at the official level that the Colonial Office should, through their own channels, pass copies to the French, Belgian and Dutch Governments. We feel that it might also be advisable for our Embassies to pass copies to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, calling attention to useful points of analysis. This is just the sort of thing which these Ministries of Foreign Affairs appear willing to take from us, and if they study the document with any care the effects may also be quite beneficial. (We would, of course, ask, pro forma, whether the governments in question have carried out similar studies of their own; but it is clear what the answer will be). We also propose to send a copy of the report to each of our principal Consular posts in Colonial Africa. Occasion may arise for our Consuls to bring at any rate certain parts of this report to the attention of the local authorities.

Our representatives who recently met in Singapore will, of course, have copies of this report, and it does not seem to be necessary to take special steps to ensure its distribution in South East Asia. The most that would be necessary would be to ask our representatives in Batavia etc. whether they have been able to make use of the report with the local authorities. On the other hand I do not know what, if anything, has been done in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Perhaps the Commonwealth Relations Office would agree to arrange for copies to be sent from Singapore to our High Commissioners and instruct

them/

them to bring the relevant parts of it firmly to the attention of as many prominent people in the country as may be practicable.

(J. H. Watson).
29th November, 1948.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Tel.: WHitehall 2366

Extension.....

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
and the following Number quoted:

Your Reference.....

COLONIAL OFFICE
SANCTUARY BUILDINGS
GREAT SMITH STREET
S.W.1

toria Street,
on, S.W.1.
ecember, 1948.

PR 1289
1/265/G
1274

27. Nov.

Dear Mr Watson-

By dint of enquiries throughout the Office I have managed to secure 20 unbound copies of the Arbuthnot Dalley Report which were sent by Air Mail from Singapore.

I hope this will serve your purpose.

n Department tells
copies, if
port on Labour
he Federation of
ion is that we
ccording to our
ies which are on
or publication
not yet arrived.
e can only spare
and I hope that
your purpose at
herewith.

ley

LEY.

J. C. CLOAKE, ESQ.

122

Copy to:-

Mr. Joyce,
C.R.O.

attention of prominent people in ~~these Dominions~~ the three New Dominions and Australia + New Zealand.

We have also sent copies to W'ton for communication both to the State Dept and, if the Embassy think fit, to leading Trades Unionists.

Yours ever
Sgd. Ralph Murray.

AW 18/1

RECEIVED IN DIVISION. 21 JAN 1949 SENT TO TYPE 21. 1. DESPATCHED 25/1

(84615) Wt.84382/152 50,000 12/47 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.683
(85708) Wt.13402/150 150,000 5/48

Minutes.

them to bring the relevant parts of it firm
the attention of as many prominent people i
country as may be practicable.

(J. H. Watson)
29th November, 1

The further distribution
suggested by you will
be made when the
other copies arrive
by sea mail in
about a week's time.

Yours sincerely

Grattan Bakes

P.S. I am enclosing
6 copies of a press
Summary which may
be of interest.

NOTHING TO

A. & E. W. Ltd. Gp.685
12/47
548

PR

15, Victoria Street,

London, S.W.1.

16th December, 1948.

My Reference 12254/R/48.

Your Reference

Dear Cloake,

Miss Baker of our Information Department tells me that you have asked for further copies, if possible, of the Awbery-Dalley Report on Labour and Trade Union Organisation in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. The position is that we have about 20 unbound copies and according to our latest information the further copies which are on their way by sea to this country for publication as a non-Parliamentary paper have not yet arrived. In the circumstances I fear that we can only spare 12 of the copies we have in hand, and I hope that this number will be sufficient for your purpose at present. The copies are enclosed herewith.

Yours sincerely,

I. H. Cruchley

I.H. CRUCHLEY.

J. C. CLOAKE, ESQ.

Now 11. one copy sent to Sir J. Robertson Khartoum with Mr. Clutton's letter of 20/12/48 PR. 1247/265/G.

Copy to:-

Mr. Joyce,
C.R.O.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION. 21 JAN 1949 SENT TO REGISTRY 21. 1. 25/1

attention of prominent people in these ~~Countries~~ the three New Dominions and Australia + New Zealand.

We have also sent copies to W'ton for communication both to the State Dept and, if the Embassy think fit, to leading Trades Unionists.

Yours ever
Sgd. Ralph Murray. 18/1

Printed PR 1247/265/G. PR 1289 1244

21p

122

(84615) WL34382/152 50,000 12/47 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.683
(86708) WL19462/150 150,000 5/48 "

PR. 1289/265/G.

OUTFILE.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
S.W.1.

18th December, 1948.

Many thanks for your letter 12242/R/48 of the 16th December enclosing 12 copies of the Awbery-Dalley Report. These should tide us over for the time being. Please let us know as soon as the copies which are on their way by sea arrive.

(J. C. CLOAKE).

I. H. Cruchley Esq.,
Colonial Office,
15, Victoria Street,
London, S.W.1.

122

Copy to:-

Mr. Joyce,
C.R.O.

attention of prominent people in ~~these Dominions~~ the Three New Dominions and Australia + New Zealand.

We have also sent copies to W'ton for communication both to the State Dept and, if the Embassy think fit, to leading Trades Unionists.

Yours ever
Sgd. Ralph Murray. AW 18/1

RECEIVED IN DIVISION. 21 JAN 1949 SENT TO REGISTRY 21.1. DISPATCHED 25/1

(34615) Wt.24382/152 50,000 12/47 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.683
(35708) Wt.13402/150 150,000 5/48

Registry
No. PR 1289/265/G/48.

~~Top Secret~~
Secret.
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~

JCC.

Draft.

Mr. Blackburne,
Colonial Office.

(From:
Mr. Murray).

OUTFILE.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
S.W.1.

+ 1 cpy sc

24th January, 1949.

Dear Blackburne,

I should put on record for you
I think ~~you will be interested to know~~ the use which we have made of the copies so far provided by your department of the ~~report by Messrs.~~ Awbery ~~and~~ Dalley report on "Labour and Trade Union Organizations in Malaya and Singapore".

2. First, We sent copies to all our principal consular posts in Colonial Africa south of the Sahara and also to Khartoum. ~~Copies have been sent to the Brussels capitals~~ for transmission to the French, Belgian ~~and Netherlands~~ Dutch & Luxembourg Foreign offices (who would not necessarily see copies sent to their Colonial ~~Governments and to Washington to be shown to the State~~ Ministries), calling their attention esp. to section 8. ~~Departments~~. We presume that our representatives in South East Asia would have received copies from Singapore, but No/ on the other hand we do not know what ~~we are not sure whether anything~~ has been done in India, Pakistan and Ceylon, where we feel that this document would be very useful. ~~I should therefore like to suggest that~~ Perhaps the C.R.O., to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, ~~should, if agreeable, arrange with you for copies to~~ be could let us know what they have felt able to do, ~~sent from Singapore to our High Commissioners so that~~ ~~they may bring~~ especially about bringing the relevant parts of the report to the attention of prominent people in ~~these Dominions~~ the three New Dominions and Australia & New Zealand.

Then, under a special arrangement for exchanging inf. about Communism with the other signatories of the Treaty of Brussels, we arranged for copies to be passed to

We have also sent copies to W'ton for communication both to the State Dept and, if the Embassy think fit, to leading Trades Unionists.

Copy to:-

Mr. Joyce,
C.R.O.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION.
21 JAN 1949
SENT TO TYPE 21/1
DESPATCHED 25/1

Yours ever

Sgd. Ralph Murray. AW 18/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(84615) Wt.34382/152 50,000 12/47 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.683
(85708) Wt.18462/150 150,000 5/48

OUTFILE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(PR 1289/265/G)
Secret

24th January, 1949.

Dear Blackburne,

I think I should put on record for you the use which we have made of the copies so far provided by your department of the Awbery-Dalley report on "Labour and Trade Union Organizations in Malaya and Singapore".

2. First, we sent copies to all our principal consular posts in Colonial Africa south of the Sahara and also to Khartoum. ~~Copies have been sent to the Brussels capitals~~. Then, under a special arrangement for exchanging information about Communism with the other signatories of the Treaty of Brussels, we arranged for copies to be passed to the French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxemburg Foreign Offices (who would not necessarily see copies sent to their Colonial Ministries), calling their attention especially to section 8. We have also sent copies to Washington for communication both to the State Department and, if the Embassy think fit, to leading Trades Unionists. We presumed that our representatives in South East Asia would have received copies from Singapore.

3. On the other hand we do not know what has been done in India, Pakistan and Ceylon, where we feel that this document would be very useful. Perhaps the Commonwealth Relations Office, to whom

I/

K.W. Blackburne, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Colonial Office.

I am sending a copy of this letter, could let us know what they have felt able to do, especially about bringing the relevant parts of the report to the attention of prominent people in the three New Dominions and Australia and New Zealand.

Yours ever

Sgd. Ralph Murray.

(F.R.H. Murray)

PR. 1289/265/G

Colonial Office,
2, Sanctuary Buildings,
Great Smith Street,
London, S.W.1.

My Reference 96001/T/49.

11 February, 1949.

Your Reference PR/1289/265/G. Secret.

Dear Mr. Murray,

Mr. Blackburne has asked me to thank you for your letter of 24th January, reference PR/1289/265/G informing us about the use you have made of the Awbery Dalley report on "Labour and Trade Union Organisation in Malaya and Singapore".

Owing to an unfortunate mistake the further copies of the report which were being sent from Singapore have not yet arrived, so we have not been able to supply the Commonwealth Relations Office as suggested by you.

We shall, however bear your suggestions in mind when further copies of the report arrive.

Yours sincerely,

E. Baker

(MISS E.K. BAKER)
Information Department.

F.R.H. MURRAY, ESQ.

Minutes.

Mr Gee

PR 1289/265/1G PW

"A"

Here are the 25 copies of the Awbery-Dalley report which you wanted to send out to Labour Attaché's. May we have a spare copy of the covering letter for our records, please?

J. F. Cloake
5/5

(2 ~~boxes~~)

(I.R.D.)

Thank you. These have now gone and I enclose a copy of Mr. Gee's covering letter.

P M Cox.
11/5.

11/5.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Outfile

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

PR 1289/265/G (1948)

9th May, 1949.

Dear Labour Attaché,

I am sending you herewith a copy of the Awbery-Dalley Report on Labour and Trade Union Organisation in Malaya and Singapore. This report attracted a good deal of attention in the press when it was first issued in Malaya last year, and you may perhaps then have seen references to it. For reasons into which I need not go, copies of the report in any large numbers have only recently become available in London, and it is for this reason that you have not previously received a copy. I am sure, however, you will agree that it is an extremely interesting document, not only for its description of conditions in Malaya and Singapore, but also for its forthright description of Communist tactics and methods in exploiting trade union organisations in conditions not dissimilar from those in many other countries where the trade union movement is in its infancy. It is from this particular angle that we hope you will be able to use the material compiled by Awbery and Dalley whenever there is a suitable opportunity.

Yours sincerely,

H. G. GEE

57

PR
(INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPT.)

PR
1292

1940

Registry Number: PR1292/265/913
FROM: FO minute Mr Murray.
No.
Dated: 9th Dec 1948
Received in Registry: 22nd Dec 1948

Suggestion that BBC should broadcast detailed review of Ruth Fischer's book "Stalin and the German Communist Party"

Covers draft letter to Mr Daggyhean, BBC.

Last Paper
PR1289

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)
D/F Daggye-Hean Esq., BBC from Mr R. Murray 9th Dec.

(Action completed)
RRD 22.3.49

(Index)
Regd. 13/9/49

Next Paper
PR304

ADDED PAPERS
A
B
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D
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F
G
H
I
J

MINUTES

A) Mr Daggyhean, BBC, to Mr Murray 17th Dec.

It will be a pity if this cannot be put out. We might b.u. in a month and see how it stands.
J. F. Cloake 23/12

The one criticism I would make about Frau Fischer's book is that it is a bit too heavy going for the layman — too detailed and technical. I wish she could be persuaded to produce a popular

34925

edition, ½ the length and ⅓ of the detail, but with all the flavour and having the same impression. Perhaps we can get Mr Denis Allen to discuss this with the State Dept, & see if someone can sell the idea to her. Then - a 1/6d Penguin? And a German edition?

23/1/L

b.y. 20/1/49. RM - 23/xii

We now hear that a cheap edition is being arranged by the U.S. authorities in Germany.

RM. 13/3

Ref: Section.
EPH 21/3.

EHH
16/3

FOREIGN OFFICE,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
London, S. W. 1.

PR1292/265/913 OUTFILE. 9th December, 1948.

Dear Tangye,

1292

I wonder if you have seen a book which has recently appeared in the United States called "Stalin and the German Communist Party" by Ruth Fischer.

Ruth Fischer, who, as you probably know, was over here the other day, was formerly chairman of the German Communist Party and an important person in the Comintern. She was detained by Stalin in Moscow and finally escaped to Germany, where, after a period of further Communist activity, she eventually gave up the Party and went to the United States.

Her book is something of an event in that it not only relates the history of 1917 to about 1934 in Germany and Russia in great detail as seen from her inside experience, but it contains a great deal of carefully sorted documentary material which I think has probably not been collected elsewhere.

The result is a compilation of extraordinary interest and extremely revealing of the changes of policy and the methods of the Russian Communist Party. It tots up, of course, to a minute and detailed indictment of Stalin himself.

It occurred to me - and I mentioned it to James Miller when we were talking together yesterday - that a review of this book in some detail on the B.B.C. would be of great interest to your listeners and I write therefore to suggest that you should consider this idea.

/There

Tangye Lean, Esq.,
B.B.C.,
Bush House,
W. C. 2.

RECEI
DI
22 DEC 1948

There may, of course, be copyright difficulties if the book has not yet appeared in the U.K. I only know of two copies here myself and both of those are in use, but doubtless your New York office could send you a copy if required.

THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Head Office : Broadcasting House, London, W.1

Bush House, Aldwych, London, W.C.2

TELEPHONE : TEMPLE BAR 4383 CABLES : BROADCASTS, LONDON INLAND TELEGRAMS : BROADCASTS, TELEX, LONDON

17th December, 1948.

INDEXED

PR 1292/265/913

'A'

Ralph Murray, Esq.,
Information Research Department,
Foreign Office,
17, Carlton House Terrace,
London, S.W.1.

Mr dear Murray,

Thank you very much for your letter of December 9th. Concerning "Stalin and the German Communist Party", there appears to be not only copyright but also dollar difficulties. Nevertheless we must certainly do something about it, and I have asked our New York office to send a copy.

You will find it hard to believe, but ever since our last lunch I have been trying to arrange another with Waterfield. It looks as though I might have some success within a month!

Yours ever,

Tangye

(Tangye Lean)

DK